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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the psychological trauma of the survivors of the Chernobyl nuclear 
disaster, which occurred on April 26, 1986. I argue for the emergence from the disaster of 
three Chernobyl traumas, each of which will be analysed individually – one per chapter. In 
reading these three traumas of Chernobyl, the thesis draws upon and situates itself at the 
interface between two primary theoretical perspectives: Freudian psychoanalysis and the 
deconstructive approach of Jacques Derrida. The first Chernobyl trauma is engendered by the 
panicked local response to the consequences of the explosion at Chernobyl Reactor Four by 
the power plant’s staff, the fire fighters whose job it was to extinguish the initial blaze caused 
by the blast, the inhabitants of nearby towns and villages, and the soldiers involved in the 
region’s evacuation and radiation decontamination. Most of these people died from radiation 
poisoning in the days, weeks, months or years after the disaster’s occurrence. The first 
chapter explores the usefulness and limits of Freudian psychoanalytic readings of local 
survivors’ testimonies of the disaster, examining in relation to the Chernobyl event Freud’s 
practice of locating the authentic primal scene or originary traumatic witnessing experience in 
his subjects’ pasts, as exemplified by his Wolf Man analysis, detailed in his psychoanalytic 
study ‘On the History of an Infantile Neurosis’ (1918). The testimonies read through this 
Freudian psychoanalytic lens are constituted by Igor Kostin’s personal account of the 
disaster’s aftermath, detailed in his book Chernobyl: Confessions of a Reporter (2006), and 
by Svetlana Alexievich’s interviews with Chernobyl disaster survivors in her book Voices 
from Chernobyl: The Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster (2006).     
 The second chapter argues that Freudian psychoanalysis only provides a provisional, 
ultimately fictional origin of Chernobyl trauma. Situating itself in relation to trauma studies, 
this thesis, progressing from its first to its second chapter, charts the geographical and 
 
 
temporal shift between these first and second traumas, from trauma-as-sudden-event to 
trauma-as-gradual-process. In the weeks following the initial Chernobyl explosion, which 
released into the atmosphere a radioactive cloud that blew in a north-westerly direction across 
Northern Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Sweden, symptoms of radiation 
poisoning slowly emerged in the populations of the abovementioned countries. To analyse 
the psychological impact of confronting this gradual, international unfolding of trauma – the 
second trauma of Chernobyl – the second chapter of this thesis explores the critique of the 
global attempt to archivise, elegise and ultimately understand the Chernobyl disaster in Mario 
Petrucci’s elegies, compiled in his poetry collection Heavy Water: A Poem for Chernobyl 
(2006), the horror film Chernobyl Diaries (2012, dir. Bradley Parker), and Adam Roberts’ 
Science Fiction novel, Yellow Blue Tibia (2009). Analysing the deconstructive approach of 
Jacques Derrida in these texts – his notions of archive fever, impossible mourning and ethical 
mourning – this chapter argues that the attempt to interiorise, memorialise and mourn the 
survivors of the Chernobyl disaster is narcissistic, hubristic and violent in the extreme. It then 
proposes that Derrida’s notion of ethical mourning, outlined most clearly in his lecture 
‘Mnemosyne’ (1984), enables us to situate our emotional sympathy for survivors – who, 
following Derrida’s lecture, are maintained as permanently exterior and inaccessible to us – 
in our very inability or failure to comprehend or locate the origin of their Chernobyl traumas. 
The third and final chapter analyses the third trauma of Chernobyl: the psychological and 
physiological effects of the disaster on second-generation inhabitants living near the 
Exclusion Zone erected around the evacuated, cordoned-off and still-radioactive Chernobyl 
region. These second-generation experiences of living near a sealed-away source of intense 
radiation are reconstructed in literature and videogaming: in Darragh McKeon’s novel All 
That Is Solid Melts Into Air (2014), Hamid Ismailov’s novel The Dead Lake (2014) and the 
videogame S.T.A.L.K.E.R: Shadow of Chernobyl (2007), developed by the company GSC 
 
 
Game World. The analysis of these texts is informed by Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’s 
psychoanalytic theory of the intergenerational phantom: the muteness of a generation’s 
history which returns to haunt the succeeding generations. This chapter will explore the 
psychological effects upon second-generation Chernobyl survivors, which result from these 
survivors’ incorporation or unconscious interiorisation of their parents’ psychologically 
repressed traumatic Chernobyl experiences, by analysing reconstructions of this process in 
the abovementioned texts. These parental experiences, echoing the Exclusion Zone as a 
denied physical space, have been interred in inaccessible psychic crypts.    
 By way of conclusion, the thesis then offers an alternative theory of reading 
survivors’ Chernobyl trauma. Survivors’ restaging of their Chernobyl witnessing experiences 
as jokes enables them to cathartically, temporarily abreact their trauma through the laughter 
that these jokes engender. 
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Introduction: The Three Traumas of Chernobyl 
 
At 01:23am on April 26, 1986, Reactor Number Four of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 
in Ukraine exploded, causing the worst nuclear accident in history. The short-term casualties 
in the weeks subsequent to this disaster that released a massive cloud of radioactive fallout 
into the air included many of the plant’s staff, the fire fighters whose job it was to extinguish 
the blaze in the wake of the explosion, and the army of “liquidators”: mostly soldiers and 
other volunteer reservists from across the USSR who were sent by the Soviet government to 
Chernobyl and the surrounding towns and villages to evacuate their populations and, via 
decontamination measures, prevent the radioactivity from spreading further. Most of the 
people in these emergency response teams died from radiation poisoning in the days, weeks 
and months following the Reactor Four explosion.       
 The event was only recognised as an international disaster two days after the 
occurrence of the explosion, when operators of the Forsmark nuclear power station in 
Sweden detected unusually high levels of radioactivity in the local atmosphere. Initially 
believing the source of the radiation to be at Forsmark, the Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority traced the radiation cloud’s origin back to Ukraine; it was only when they decided 
to file an official alert to the International Atomic Energy Agency that the USSR admitted 
there had been an accident at Chernobyl. The explosion’s effects were not restricted to the 
local Chernobyl region, then. In the weeks following the blast, the radioactive cloud, blown 
in a north-westerly direction through Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Sweden, 
was primarily responsible for the long-term afflictions of thyroid cancer, leukaemia, 
cataracts, cardiovascular disease and psychological distress that were later suffered in those 
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countries.
1
 In the years in which these afflictions developed, international public opinion 
concerning the Chernobyl disaster and nuclear power in general was characterised by a 
widespread sense of confusion and paranoia.       
 If the sudden, shocking occurrence of local Chernobyl catastrophe and liquidator 
deaths can be considered the first trauma of Chernobyl, then the gradual, global awareness of 
the vast radioactive emission, the inability to fully comprehend its lethality following these 
later international infections, which led to a significant number of protracted deaths in the 
aforementioned countries, and these tragic losses themselves, constitute the second trauma of 
Chernobyl. Situating itself in relation to trauma studies, this thesis, progressing from its first 
to its second chapter, will chart the geographical and temporal shift between these first and 
second traumas: from trauma-as-sudden-event to trauma-as-gradual-process. There is also a 
third trauma of Chernobyl, to be explored in the third chapter: the emergent psychological 
disturbances present in the second generation of Chernobyl survivors living in and around 
what has become known as the Exclusion Zone, the evacuated and cordoned-off area of land 
surrounding the deactivated power plant.       
 In reading these three traumas of Chernobyl, this thesis draws upon and situates itself 
at the interface between two primary theoretical perspectives: Freudian psychoanalysis and 
the deconstructive approach of Jacques Derrida.      
 In order to lay out the theoretical work useful to this thesis we must turn to Sigmund 
Freud’s Wolf Man case study, arguably the most famous analysis of his career. Sergei 
Pankejeff, a wealthy Russian aristocrat from Odessa, in Russia, came to Vienna in 1910 to 
seek treatment from Freud for depression. The pseudonym “Wolf Man,” used by Freud in his 
psychoanalytic study ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’ (1918) to refer to and 
                                                          
1
 For more information on the long-term health effects of the Chernobyl disaster, see ‘Health Effects of the 
Chernobyl Accident: An Overview’, April 2006, 
http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/backgrounder/en/ (accessed 14 July 2014). 
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protect the true identity of Pankejeff, is derived from a dream that the latter had as a young 
child. He recalled this dream in a psychoanalytic session with Freud:  
 
I dreamt that it was night and that I was lying in bed. (My bed stood with its foot 
towards the window; in front of the window there was a row of old walnut trees. I 
know it was winter when I had the dream, and night-time.) Suddenly the window 
opened of its own accord, and I was terrified to see that some white wolves were 
sitting on the big walnut tree in front of the window. There were six or seven of them. 
The wolves were quite white, and looked more like foxes or sheep-dogs, for they had 
big tails like foxes and they had their ears pricked like dogs when they pay attention 
to something. In great terror, evidently of being eaten up by the wolves, I screamed 
and woke up. My nurse hurried to my bed, to see what had happened to me. It took 
quite a long while before I was convinced that it had only been a dream; I had had 
such a clear and life-like picture of the window opening and the wolves sitting on the 
tree. At last I grew quieter, felt as though I had escaped from some danger, and went 
to sleep again.
2
 
 
This dream, Freud claims, was the symptom of an earlier, psychologically traumatising scene, 
which Freud refers to as the primal scene. The Wolf Man case study theorised that an infant 
Pankejeff witnessed his parents’ copulation a tergo. For Freud, the formation of this primal 
scene crucially hinges upon the ocular aspect of witnessing. On the subject of the infant 
Pankejeff’s witnessing of his copulating parents, Freud writes that his patient ‘was able to see 
his mother’s genitals as well as his father’s organ’.3 What this recollection supposedly 
signifies is a scene in which Pankejeff’s mother was anally penetrated by his father, which 
the infant Pankejeff unconsciously interpreted as a personal experience of anal penetration. 
Freud posits this early sight as the cause of the afflictions his patient suffered from 
throughout adult life, namely depression, psychosomatic abdominal cramps, and sporadic 
losses of appetite. Pankejeff’s witnessed primal scene – ‘the child’s real or imagined 
                                                          
2
 Sigmund Freud, ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’, in An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVII, translated and edited by 
James Strachey, with Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1964), p.29 
3
 Freud, ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’, p.37 
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perception of the parents’ sexual relationship’4 – functions for Freud as the origination of the 
trauma, from which his patient’s numerous symptoms and neuroses are derived. Pankejeff’s 
primal scene supposedly engender his wolf dream and fear of wolves (especially of an 
illustration of a wolf crouching on its hind legs in a children’s picture book that his elder 
sister forced him to look at when they were younger); these wolf images visually echo the 
image of his parents’ coitus a tergo, of his father hunched over his mother during the act of 
anal sex in the primal scene. Another of Pankejeff’s neuroses, the alternating fear of and 
sadistic cruelty towards horses and insects, also reflects this witnessed scene of his parents’ 
copulation, specifically the interpretation of simultaneously experienced pain and pleasure of 
being anally penetrated. In sum, this primal scene, Freud argues in ‘From the History of an 
Infantile Neurosis’, is the inaugurating moment of Pankejeff’s trauma, resulting from the 
patient’s witnessing, during infanthood, of a sexual scene that is unconsciously perceived as 
one of violence. This interpretation, which was psychologically repressed and buried in the 
Wolf Man’s unconscious, awaited discovery, Freud claims, in the latter’s psychoanalytic 
study.            
 In the footnotes of ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’, Freud questions the 
veracity of the infant Pankejeff’s primal scene; did it really occur, or was it a fantasy 
concocted by the four-year-old Wolf Man’s dream or imagination of the scene, influenced 
perhaps by extraneous events, such as that of animals copulating? This notion of deferred 
action or “afterwards-ness,” which Freud refers to as Nachträglichkeit, is the process of 
assigning memories that may be inaccurate or entirely false to an earlier period of the 
subject’s history, thereby positing the stage referred to as inauthentic. In the Wolf Man case 
study, Freud writes in the footnotes of ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’ that 
Pankejeff 
                                                          
4
 Jean Laplanche, The Language of Psychoanalysis, (New York: Norton, 1973), p.335 
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understood it [the primal scene] at the time of the dream when he was four years old, 
not at the time of the observation. He received the impressions when he was one and a 
half; his understanding of them was deferred, but became possible at the time of the 
dream owing to his development, his sexual excitations, and his sexual researches.
5
 
 
Pankejeff’s primal scene, then, was interpretable or imagined only by the time he was four 
years old, since, at the age of one and a half, he had not gained the necessary understanding 
of sex to interpret the parental act that supposedly occurred then. In line with much trauma 
theory, this thesis argues that Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit is useful to the study of 
Chernobyl trauma, since many of the nuclear disaster’s survivors living in the towns and 
villages surrounding the power plant did not understand the true nature of the catastrophe 
until weeks, or in some cases months, after the reactor’s explosion; for these individuals, no 
memory of the event was recorded during its occurrence, so any personal recollection of it 
from that period would not be possible. This was due to the Soviet media blackout 
contemporary to the nuclear disaster’s immediate unfolding: an information and 
communication shutdown that was designed to minimise the spread of panic in the USSR. 
Survivors’ understanding of what actually happened at Chernobyl was granted only when the 
full extent of the disaster was revealed to them belatedly by the international press. 
 Freud’s impression of the Wolf Man’s traumatic witnessing event yields contradictory 
hypotheses: either Pankejeff’s primal scene actually occurred in his infanthood, or he 
imagined it at a later date, via Nachträglichkeit, and retroactively installed it there 
unwittingly. In the first of these two mutually exclusive possibilities, the event is real, 
whereas in the second, it is fictional; in the former, the authentic scene is the origin of 
Pankejeff’s psychological trauma, and in the latter, the false memory is. At the close of ‘From 
                                                          
5
 Freud, ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’, pp.37-38 
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the History of an Infantile Neurosis’, Freud remains unable to verify which outcome 
occurred. Archive fever, a notion developed and explored in Derrida’s book Archive Fever: a 
Freudian Impression (1998), is ‘an irrepressible desire to return to the origin, a 
homesickness, a nostalgia for the return to the most archaic place of absolute 
commencement’.6 Archive fever is produced within the Wolf Man case study as a result of 
Freud’s desire to locate the elusive origin of Pankejeff’s psychological trauma, and has a 
double effect on the archive: Freud’s fruitless attempts to disclose the commencement of his 
patient’s trauma that are compelled by its very unverifiablity leads to the exhaustion, deferral 
and ultimately, the annihilation of the text. This process embodies a Freudian death drive that 
renders the will to archivise at once necessary and impossible. Archive fever is particularly 
relevant to the Wolf Man case study: throughout his psychoanalytic career, Freud never 
satisfactorily convinced himself of Pankejeff’s primal scene as either a real or imagined event 
of founding trauma. It is the disclosure and verification of the originating moment of the 
patient’s trauma, Freud claims, upon which their mental recovery rests. The mystery of the 
origins of the Wolf Man’s trauma remained unsolved after Freud’s former’s death in 1939; in 
the 1970s, Pankejeff, who was interviewed by the Austrian journalist Karin Obholzer, 
disputed Freud’s claim that the psychoanalytic treatment had been successful, and remarked 
‘that it is difficult to play the role of a showpiece of psychoanalysis’.7 Pankejeff recalled: 
‘That was the theory, that Freud had cured me one hundred percent. [...] It’s all false’.8 
Furthermore, as Obholzer writes, Pankejeff saw Freud’s interpretation of the dream as highly 
improbable. Pankejeff said: ‘The whole thing is improbable because in Russia, children slept 
in the nanny’s bedroom, not in their parents’’.9 Archive fever also has particular relevance to 
                                                          
6
 Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: a Freudian Impression, translated by Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), p.91 
7
 Karin Obholzer, Wolfman: Conversations with Freud’s Patient Sixty Years Later, translated by Michael Shaw, 
(New York: Continuum, 1982), p.231 
8
 Obholzer, Wolfman: Conversations with Freud’s Patient Sixty Years Later, p.113 
9
 Obholzer, Wolfman: Conversations with Freud’s Patient Sixty Years Later, p.36 
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the testimonial recording of the Chernobyl disaster. As the first chapter of this thesis will 
indicate, the efforts to record or archive the event’s eyewitness experiences, namely in Igor 
Kostin’s photographs of the initial nuclear disaster site compiled in his book Chernobyl: 
Confessions of a Reporter (2006) and Svetlana Alexievich’s interviews with Chernobyl 
disaster survivors compiled in her book Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral History of a 
Nuclear Disaster (2006), are continually thwarted by their inability to disclose the origins of 
the survivors’ traumas definitively.       
 Another set of psychoanalytic theories must be explored before we can depart from 
this theoretical introduction: that of mourning and melancholia, introjection and 
incorporation, and impossible and ethical mourning. For Freud, the process of mourning is a 
normal stage in the grieving of a lost loved one. It is, Maria Torok argues in her essay ‘The 
Illness of Mourning and the Fantasy of the Exquisite Corpse’ (1968), a ‘gradual, slow, 
laborious, mediated, [yet] effective’10 coping strategy designed to deal with and surmount this 
grief, and involves what she terms the “introjection” of the departed love object. Torok’s 
notion of introjection is a reinforcement of Sándor Ferenczi’s founding conceptualisation of 
the term, defined as a “casting inside” of fixations upon the lost love object, followed by its 
replacement with another love object and a consequent broadening of the ego. Torok and her 
co-writer, Nicholas Abraham, write in their essay ‘Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection 
Versus Incorporation’ (1972) that in the early infant stage:  
 
the early satisfactions of the mouth, as yet filled with the maternal object [the suckled 
breast], are partially and gradually replaced by the novel satisfactions of a mouth now 
empty of that object but filled with words pertaining to the subject. The transition 
from the mouth filled with the breast to the mouth filled with words occurs by virtue 
                                                          
10
 Jacques Derrida, ‘Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok’, in Nicholas Abraham and 
Maria Torok, The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 
xvii 
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of the intervening experiences of the empty mouth. Learning to fill the mouth with 
words is the initial model for introjection.
11
 
 
In a broader sense, Torok’s theory charts the replacement of one love object with another, a 
process brought about by the absence or death of the original object. One can thus see how, 
upon the death of a loved one, the mourner introjects this person, detaches themselves from 
them libidinally, and moves on in order to forge new social relationships. However, when this 
normal and life-enhancing sequence is disturbed, usually by the mourner’s misunderstanding 
or non-witnessing of the love object’s death, melancholia occurs. Melancholia, most notably 
outlined in Freud’s psychological study ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917), is ‘the refusal 
of loss, in which the lost love-object is “incorporated” in the ego in defiance of its death or 
disappearance’.12 In melancholia, it is as if the love object still lives, not in reality, but in the 
mourner themselves, who refuses to let it go. Like mourning, melancholia is painful, but it is 
not in itself a forward-oriented process, a teleological series of steps. Rather, it is a fantasy, as 
Abraham and Torok argue. This internalising process that characterises the symptoms of 
melancholia – the emotional and sometimes physical withdrawal from the external world, a 
lack of empathy towards anyone bar the love object (who is obsessively over-identified with), 
and the repeated interruption of daily life by the love object’s imagined presence, appearing 
in fantasy or daydream – differs somewhat from the specific fantasy of incorporation (though 
the former sometimes involves the latter). Incorporation, unlike melancholia, denotes the 
consumption – often imagined as a literal, oral consumption – of the lost love object that is 
always unconsciously denied as such. (Freud maintains that melancholia results from either 
conscious or unconscious losses, or losses that are a combination of both. In some cases of 
                                                          
11
 Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, ‘Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection Versus Incorporation’, in The 
Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of Psychoanalysis, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp.127-128 
12
 Maud Ellmann, ‘Introduction: Bad Timing’, in Sigmund Freud, On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia, 
translated by Shaun Whiteside, (London: Penguin Classics, 2005), viii 
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melancholia ‘the patient cannot consciously perceive what he has lost’; in others, ‘the patient 
is aware of the loss which has given rise to his melancholia, but only in the sense that he 
knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him’.)13 In incorporation, ‘So in order not 
to have to “swallow” a loss’ at all, Abraham and Torok write,  
 
we fantasise swallowing (or having swallowed) that which has been lost, as if it were 
some sort of Thing. Two interrelated procedures constitute the magic of 
incorporation: demetaphorisation (taking literally what is meant figuratively) and 
objectivation (pretending that the suffering is not an injury to the subject but instead a 
loss sustained by the love object). The magical “cure” by incorporation exempts the 
subject from the painful process of reorganisation. When, in the form of imaginary or 
real nourishment, we ingest the love object we miss, this means that we refuse to 
mourn and that we shun the consequences of mourning even though our psyche is 
fully bereaved. Incorporation is the refusal to reclaim as our own the part of ourselves 
that we placed in what we lost; incorporation is the refusal to acknowledge the full 
import of the loss, a loss that, if recognised as such, would effectively transform us. 
The fantasy of incorporation reveals a gap within the psyche; it points to something 
that is missing just where introjection should have occurred.
14
 
 
In short, this gap, referred to in Abraham and Torok’s work as a crypt or mental grave, 
indicates an unacknowledged loss that, in its status as entirely unconscious knowledge, is 
denied as ever taking place.         
 The later work of Jacques Derrida, in which he outlines an ethical approach to the act 
of mourning through the turns of so-called “impossible mourning,” takes as its departure the 
Freudian distinctions between mourning and melancholia outlined previously, if only to 
problematise them. Derrida views Freud’s concept of mourning – the introjection of the lost 
love object in the manner described earlier – as a profoundly narcissistic and violent act. It is 
necessary at this point to clearly foreground the role of memory in this Freudian mourning 
process in order to reveal precisely what it is about mourning that Derrida sees as 
                                                          
13
 Sigmund Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ in On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia, p.203 
14
 Abraham and Torok, ‘Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection Versus Incorporation’, pp.126-127 
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problematic. In Abraham and Torok’s theory of introjection, the infant introjects the breast, 
the maternal food substance, with words (‘cries and sobs, delayed fullness, then as calling, 
ways of requesting presence, as language’);15 ‘The passage from food to language in the 
mouth presupposes the successful replacement of the object’s presence with the self’s 
cognizance of its absence’.16 In other words, the infant is aware of the absence of the breast in 
a primal memory of sorts, which is articulated after their transition into language. Memory of 
the lost object is equally central in adult mourning, as Tammy Clewell claims, outlining 
Freud’s ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ in her article ‘Mourning Beyond Melancholia: Freud’s 
Psychoanalysis of Loss’ (2004). ‘The work of mourning’, she writes, 
 
entails a kind of hyperremembering, a process of obsessive recollection during which 
the survivor resuscitates the existence of the lost other in the space of the psyche, 
replacing an actual absence with an imaginary presence. This magical restoration of 
the lost object enables the mourner to assess the value of the relationship and 
comprehend what he or she has lost in losing the other. But prolonging the existence 
of the lost object at the centre of grief work (Trauerarbeit) does not persist 
indefinitely, for Freud claimed that the mourner, by comparing the memories of the 
other with actual reality, comes to an objective determination that the lost object no 
longer exists. With a very specific task to perform, the Freudian grief work seeks, 
then, to convert loving remembrances into a futureless memory. Mourning comes to a 
decisive and “spontaneous end,” according to Freud, when the survivor has detached 
his or her emotional tie to the lost object and reattached the free libido to a new 
object, thus accepting consolation in the form of a substitute for what has been lost.
17
 
 
In most cases, then, both mourning and melancholia engender memories of the lost object in 
the mourner, but for different reasons: in melancholia the creation of imagined images forms 
the refusal of loss and the inability to move on, and in normal mourning, the determination, 
acceptance, and surmounting of loss is predicated on this very same obsessive production of 
                                                          
15
 Abraham and Torok, ‘Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection Versus Incorporation’, p.127 
16
 Abraham and Torok, ‘Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection Versus Incorporation’, p.128 
17
 Tammy Clewell, ‘Mourning Beyond Melancholia: Freud’s Psychoanalysis of Loss’, in Journal of the American 
Psychoanalytic Association, (Vol. 54, Issue 1, Winter 2004), p.44 
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memory. When the memories of the lost love object are compared to the love object’s non-
existence in reality, the mourner is able to comprehend, step back from and thus put to rest 
their personal relationship with the love object that was also lost, enabling mourning to come 
to an end. For Derrida, however, this comparison between the mourner and the lost love 
object can never be legitimate; the departed always exceed the memory or imagination of the 
mourner, and amount to more than just the sum total of the recalled personal relationships 
that mourners held with them. In mourning, Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas write in 
their editors’ introduction to Derrida’s The Work of Mourning (2001): ‘the very notion of 
interiorisation is limited in its assumption of a topology with limits between inside and out, 
what is ours and what is the other’.18 Mourning is thus impossible without violence, since the 
required interiorisation of the lost other across the perceived division between our mental 
inside and outside always fractures, wounds, injures and traumatises them. This violence 
occurs because the lost other is reduced to narcissistic memories of the mourner’s 
relationship with them by the recollection deployed in the mourning process, which 
necessarily estranges the other from their own actual, once-living identity.   
 Derrida’s solution to this problem is an ethics of mourning implicit in his sense of 
impossible mourning. Ethical or impossible mourning presupposes the fundamental violence 
of normal mourning occurring in the manner that has just been outlined. In order to sidestep 
this narcissistic violence, we must resist the act of interiorisation, and hold a respectful, 
distanced relationship with the other: one which encompasses the disappeared, ex-lovers, the 
deceased, and victims of trauma. Here, mourning must fail; the gift of Mnemosyne – ‘the 
mother of all muses, as Socrates recalls in the Theaetetus’ – which ‘is like the wax in which 
all that we wish to guard in our memory is engraved in relief so that it may leave a mark, like 
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that of rings, bands or seals’,19 must not be received. Mnemosyne’s gift, Derrida says in his 
lecture ‘Mnemosyne’, given on March 26, 1984 to commemorate the death of his Belgian-
born philosopher friend, Paul de Man, which occurred approximately a month before, is the 
power of memory: the ability to tell a story, recall our memorised or interiorised knowledge 
of the dead, ‘speak of them, and do them justice, as long as their image (eidolon) remains 
legible’.20 In order to resist interiorising the dead and keep them outside of us, Derrida says,  
 
We can only live this experience [of mourning] in the form of an aporia: the aporia of 
mourning and prosopopaia, where the possible remains impossible. Where success 
fails. And where faithful interiorisation bears the other and constitutes him in me (in 
us), at once living and dead. It makes the other a part of us, between us – and then the 
other no longer quite seems to be the other, because we grieve for him and bear him in 
us, like an unborn child, like a future. And inversely, the failure succeeds: an aborted 
interiorisation is at the same time a respect for the other as other, a sort of tender 
rejection, a movement of renunciation which leaves the other alone, outside, over 
there, in his death, outside of us.
21
 
 
This thesis focuses on the following others: the dead and traumatised survivors of the 
Chernobyl disaster. In The Work of Mourning, Derrida writes:  
 
the place of a survivor is unlocatable. If such a place were ever located, it would 
remain untenable, unbearable, I would almost say deadly. And if it appeared tenable, 
the speech to be held or the word to be kept there would remain impossible. Such 
speech or such a word is thus also untenable-impossible.
22
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Here, Derrida reverses the violence between commemorator and survivor to maintain, in a 
respectful manner, the latter’s inaccessible, uninteriorisable position. Following Derrida’s 
formulation in ‘Mnemosyne’, it is not the survivor who cannot bear our speech on or 
recollection of them, but the reverse: we cannot tolerate a sustained confrontation with the 
survivor situated in trauma, and their interiorisation in us through our words and memories is 
untenable. Such approximations are impossible or untenable because they cannot ever 
faithfully represent the survivor’s painful, traumatic experience of disaster. Here, the very 
non-fixity of the survivor’s identity, shaped by their traumatic experience, enacts violence 
upon the interiorising mourner. To avoid incurring this violence, Derrida urges us to view the 
other (the disappeared, deceased or traumatised) as an Absolute Other, which is a term coined 
by the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas to designate the other’s absolute alterity: one 
who is ungraspable and perhaps even unapproachable, who cannot be fixed in understanding 
with language or the gaze. To acknowledge the absolute alterity of the other respectfully and 
through a necessary attitude of responsibility, Derrida claims that we should not speak of 
them as if we understood them, but rather listen to them, even in their absence, without ever 
demanding or expecting an answer that would grant us an understanding of them.   
 Taken as a whole, the argument of this thesis charts the shift away from 
psychoanalysis’s attempts to disclose the origins of Chernobyl disaster survivors’ traumas 
and melancholia – an inherently violent act that engenders archive fever and primal scenes 
that cannot be verified as absolute, historical facts. This departure from psychoanalysis is also 
a movement towards a deconstructive approach to reading the nuclear catastrophe: the text’s 
acknowledgement and restaging of its own inability to disclose the origins of Chernobyl 
disaster survivors’ traumas or to come to terms with their insurmountable personal losses. 
 The next section of this introduction will outline the effects of reading Chernobyl – 
both the disaster and the site in its aftermath – through the investigative, desiring method of 
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psychoanalysis. Following this, the introduction will proceed to raise further, textual 
problems caused by the drive to read the nuclear disaster. Finally, it will provide an overview 
of the three Chernobyl traumas consecutively, explaining the ways in which each of them 
will be analysed: one per chapter. 
 
Chernobyl: A World Without Us 
What does it mean to come after something – after, say, Jacques Derrida or the Chernobyl 
disaster? Nicholas Royle, in his book After Derrida (1995), writes that deconstructive 
readings of texts after Derrida’s  
 
are ‘in the manner of’, ‘in agreement with’, ‘in honour of’ and even ‘in imitation of 
Derrida’s work. But at the same time there are differences. These differences could be 
phrased in terms of an essential paradox in the notion of exposition. Reading is 
inaugural and every exposition, however accurate or faithful, necessarily differs from 
that which it expounds.
23
 
 
More generally, reading a text or event produces, in the exposition that follows, a copy or 
supplement to the original. This reading introduces discrepancies between itself and the 
original, which may never be reconciled by further supplementation. To read the Chernobyl 
disaster is to create a double of the event, to propagate a subsequent, textual version of it. To 
read it is also to come after it in a different sense: in ‘the sense of “going in search of.”’24 
Readers have come after or gone in search of the ultimate meaning of Derrida’s work, namely 
what he really meant to convey through his writing; a similar pursuit of the truth of the 
Chernobyl disaster – what really happened there or what is really there now – has created 
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supplementary readings of the event, which come before its eternally delayed final meaning. 
 The supplement is always belated, and by virtue of this, always fictional. The trauma-
inaugurating event – a true, naturally-unfolding history as far as psychoanalysis is concerned 
by and large – can only be posited in its entirety after it has concluded in real-time. The 
exposited traumatic history such as the Chernobyl disaster, then, is an inauthentic event 
assembled via Nachträglichkeit: a fictional past insofar as it was not recorded “live” – when 
the trauma originated and first developed observable symptoms or effects – but 
retrospectively. This holds true not only for the Chernobyl disaster, but for all catastrophic 
events.           
 Upon entering Ruin Lust (2014), Tate Britain’s exhibition on artists’ fascination with 
ruins, visitors were greeted with The Destruction of Pompeii and Herculaneum (1832), a 
painting by John Martin. For Pliny the Younger, who observed the eruption of Mount 
Vesuvius in 79 AD from across the Gulf of Naples at Misenum, the event is a traumatic 
memory. Recalling the event to the historian Tacitus in what is perhaps the first eyewitness 
account of disaster and record of survivor trauma, he writes, quoting Virgil’s Aeneid: ‘“The 
mind shudders to remember...but here is the tale”’.25 He proceeds to recollect his experience 
after the eruption at length: 
 
Now came the dust, though still thinly. I look back: a dense cloud looms behind us, 
following us like a flood poured across the land. “Let us turn aside while we can still 
see, lest we be knocked over in the street and crushed by the crowd of our 
companions.” We had scarcely sat down when a darkness came that was not like a 
moonless or cloudy night, but more like the black of closed and unlighted rooms. You 
could hear women lamenting, children crying, men shouting. Some were calling for 
parents, others for children or spouses; they could only recognise them by their 
voices. Some bemoaned their own lot, other that of their near and dear. There were 
some so afraid of death that they prayed for death. Many raised their hands to the 
gods, and even more believed that there were no gods any longer and that this was 
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one last unending night for the world. Nor were we without people who magnified 
real dangers with fictitious horrors. Some announced that one or another part of 
Misenum had collapsed or burned; lies, but they found believers. It grew lighter, 
though that seemed not a return of day, but a sign that the fire was approaching. The 
fire itself actually stopped some distance away, but darkness and ashes came again, a 
great weight of them. We stood up and shook the ash off again and again, otherwise 
we would have been covered with it and crushed by the weight. I might boast that no 
groan escaped me in such perils, no cowardly word, but that I believed that I was 
perishing with the world, and the world with me, which was a great consolation for 
death.
26
 
 
The dust and volcanic ash in the traumatic scene is the primary source of the victims’ fear. It 
prevents these eyewitnesses from recognising their relatives by sight, and causes them to 
misconstrue certain destructive effects of the eruption. However, as Pliny’s mind shudders to 
recollect the event, his testimony also assumes the status of a fiction. In an instance of 
Nachträglichkeit, the memory of the event, not merely the event itself, is traumatic, and this 
traumatic act of remembering surely affects the veracity of the recollected tale. This notion of 
testimony as fiction will be further explored in the introduction to the third chapter of this 
thesis through Derrida’s Demeure: Fiction and Testimony (1996).   
 There is a tendency for visitors to the Exclusion Zone to reconstruct textually the site 
and the event of Chernobyl as fantasies, demonstrating not only the ways in which, through 
archive fever, analysis repeatedly overlooks the ultimate truth of the disaster, but also how 
this ideal meaning is intentionally ignored by investigation. This Derridean opening of the 
future itself, in which a traumatic event’s meaning coincides not with itself, but with the 
fantasies of its readers, will now be explored. In his book Living in the End Times (2010), 
Slavoj Žižek examines Alan Wiesman’s book The World Without Us (2007), which ‘offers a 
vision of what would happen if humanity (and only humanity) were suddenly to disappear 
from the earth – natural diversity would bloom again, with nature gradually colonising human 
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artefacts’.27 The fantasy of the world without us, Žižek claims, is of the reduction of humans 
‘reduced to a pure disembodied gaze observing our own absence’.28 One of the most 
significant worlds without us is that of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. For Žižek,  
 
The irony is that the most obvious example [of a world without us] is the catastrophe 
at Chernobyl: flourishing nature has taken over the disintegrating debris of the nearby 
city of Pripyat.
29
 
 
An additional irony to Žižek’s – that the most famous case of a world without humans is a 
world that humans created – is that we are obsessed with witnessing a world from which we 
are absent. More than twenty years after the disaster, the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone 
continues to be one of the world’s most-visited tourist destinations. It grips our imagination 
and compels us to envision, on the one hand, in the absence of a disclosable history of the 
disaster, what might have taken place there, and on the other – and this is perhaps what sets 
Chernobyl apart from other disused sites haunted by past traumas, such as the Nazi 
concentration camps – what could be. The framing of Chernobyl by the global media as a 
mysterious site abandoned and untouched by humans thereafter makes it easy for us to 
fantasise the events taking place within it.
30
 In his analysis of Gérard Wajcman’s essay ‘The 
Animals that Treat Us Badly’ (2009), in which the animals in a safari park ignore the tourist-
filled jeep driving through it, Žižek writes:   
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The fact that the animals ignore the intruding tourists is crucial – it points towards a 
double movement of de-realisation that characterises utopian fantasies: the scene is 
presented as a fantasy (even if it “really happened,” as is the case here – what makes it 
into fantasy is the libidinal investment that determines its meaning).
31
 
 
Could not the same be said of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone? In the tourist’s observation of 
an environment that has been abandoned by humans long ago and, in nature’s unimpeded 
reclamation of it, no longer registers our past impactful activity upon or within it, we are 
reduced to the status of phantoms, pleasurably cut off from the progress of the world. 
Following this theory of utopianism, what “really happened” at Chernobyl is determined by 
fantasy: the event is whatever we desire to read, think, and write about it.    
 The spectral observation of the Exclusion Zone as a site of fantasy is a common 
notion among visiting tourists, who often take photographs of its many ruined buildings and 
other structures. It is ‘a nondescript dump in Ukraine, the very real and irreversible remains 
of an extinct civilisation’32, according to Magali Arriola in her article ‘A Victim and a 
Viewer: Some Thoughts on Anticipated Ruins’ (2005). What is it about the actual Exclusion 
Zone that drives global tourism and textual reproductions of tourists’ experiences of it, in the 
service of a global, and, as I will outline in the next section of this introduction, particularly 
Western cultural imagination? Arriola writes: 
 
Travellers and the guards who watch over it say that people’s reasons for visiting 
Pripyat range from a fascination aroused by deserted places and decaying industrial 
cities to the curiosity that the site of the catastrophe itself inspires, since, for many, it 
stands as a perfect preservation of the shell of daily life under the Soviet regime.
33
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Contradictorily, the Chernobyl disaster produced at once an unremarkable wasteland that 
evokes nothing more than the literal signified entity of a ruined Soviet time warp, and an 
inspiring landscape that functions as a take-off point for subsequent flights of fancy in the 
form of imagined places and themes beyond the obvious allegory of the USSR’s collapse. 
Chernobyl, as this thesis will go on to suggest, is increasingly determined in a Western 
cultural mindset by its imaginative extensions, which take the form of photographs, literature, 
videogames, and other texts.   
 
The Chernobyl Archive: A Canon from Translation 
Another archive governs the study of Chernobyl on another, more fundamental level. Firstly, 
what groups the following texts together, which form the primary material for the study of 
Chernobyl for this thesis, is their materialisation in English. This archive of the Chernobyl 
disaster and its legacy, therefore, has been made available to my research through translation, 
primarily from Russian and Ukrainian. A second point, consequential to this fact, must now 
be raised: the Chernobyl archive of translated texts has also been situated in relation to the 
global community that English unites and to which it serves particular cultural imperatives, 
by textualising its social values and pleasures, thereby revealing the upkeep of a Western 
outlook and imagination of the rest of the world. Beyond what translation can achieve in 
providing non-Russian and Ukrainian readers with an understanding of local Chernobyl 
disaster survivor testimony and the traumatic experiences therein, the observation by the 
English-speaking world of Chernobyl therefore also operates as a selection. The translation of 
this testimony into English and into literary genres familiar and palatable to Western tastes, 
such as poetry, the short story, the novel and the universal, digital language of videogames, 
casts a shadowy, absent opposite. This reverse consists of the untranslated or unspeakable 
20 
 
testimonies to trauma that may not fit the desired or appropriate criteria for translation into 
literary genres and gaming desired by Western appetites. As a result, the Chernobyl survivor 
testimonies that remain in either their initial language or in non-verbalised traumatic 
repression are in danger of being left behind by this global canonisation configured for 
Western audiences, and, existing only at a local level, would likely remain beyond the reach 
of international trauma studies.        
 It is important to briefly state, in relation to Chernobyl, what these Western appetites 
consist of. The West, I claim throughout this thesis, desires a representation of the Chernobyl 
disaster that is much in line with pre-existing narratives common to other mass traumatic 
events, exemplified most strongly perhaps by the Jewish Holocaust, but, as I suggested 
earlier, which include the added potential for further, new, imagined catastrophes situated 
there. The selected texts covered throughout the course of this research portray Chernobyl as 
a politically and psychologically repressed “dead zone,” and as a relic or legacy of the 
bygone, failed politics of the Soviet Union hitherto undiscovered by the outside world. This 
textual reconstruction calls for a fictitious, exploitative, often commercialised and self-critical 
investigative violation of the disaster site.       
 The conclusion to this thesis attempts to push beyond the bipartite issue of the 
selective canonisation of Chernobyl texts and the violent, marketed adaptation of the 
traumatic event for Western audiences. By highlighting the ways in which Chernobyl disaster 
survivors’ culturally specific customs and languages – primarily Russian and Ukrainian – 
creep into the testimonies of the event that have been translated into English, my research 
proposes a way in which this local content can be incorporated into the archive. This is aimed 
not necessarily at a global understanding of survivors’ traumatic experiences, but at fostering 
new, culturally specific methods of trauma abreaction among local populations of Chernobyl 
disaster survivors.           
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 In conclusion to this section, the thesis proceeds with the knowledge that there is (and 
will likely always be) translation work to be done. My research functions not only as an 
analysis of the rather limited number of texts on the Chernobyl disaster available to English 
readers, but also as a call for the continual translation of local experiences of the disaster and, 
increasingly, as survivors die and the event retreats from lived memory into our collective, 
inherited memory of history, its intergenerational, psychological aftermath. This call is also 
for a deeper, global understanding of the otherwise increasingly elided, culturally specific 
instances of the working through of Chernobyl trauma across post-communist Eastern 
Europe.   
 
The First Trauma of Chernobyl: Witnessing the Chernobyl Disaster 
 
Trauma arises from the time lag between experience and understanding; the psyche is 
permanently scarred when the event arises too soon, the sense too late.
34
 
 
The first chapter of this thesis will explore the ways in which the Chernobyl disaster 
engenders political and psychic “loose ends.” The Chernobyl power station, like the Soviet 
brand of communism it symbolised, suddenly malfunctioned, and had to be hastily 
abandoned. The abrupt evacuation of the Chernobyl region and the cultural retreat from 
Soviet communism were marked by psychological trauma on a national and personal basis. 
At the individual level, in accordance with Maud Ellmann’s above-quoted claim, the trauma 
of evacuees – who were among the first to be confronted with the excessive conditions of the 
Chernobyl disaster – resulted from their limited experience of the event; any resulting 
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understanding was cut short by the rapidity of the region’s evacuation and the political 
repression surrounding it. The lives of the residents of the Chernobyl region were irrevocably 
disrupted: almost all of them were forced to leave their personal belongings behind, due to 
the items’ radioactive contamination. Without realising it, most people would never return to 
their former homes; some thought that they would only be spending a week or two away on a 
holiday of sorts. On a national level, it was with great, widespread shock and shame that the 
nuclear disaster was received by the Soviet people. Prior to its occurrence, they assimilated 
the politicians’ and State-owned newspapers’ assurances that ‘our [the USSR’s] nuclear 
plants do not represent any risk. We could have built them at the Red Square. They are safer 
than our samovars
35’.36 Pripyat was officially named the “atomic city of the future”. It is 
unsurprising, then, that the citizens of the USSR were unprepared for and humiliated by the 
fact that a future they were promised would never materialise, due to discrepancies between 
political rhetoric and the actual safety of Soviet nuclear power plants. A comprehensive study 
entitled The Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident, which was carried out between 
July and August 2001 on behalf of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), reported that the disaster’s survivors 
 
had been subjected to a series of shocks: the accident itself; the discovery of its true 
extent and nature with Perestroika; resettlement; the effects of the break up of the 
Soviet Union, and the subsequent collapse of living standards and of much of the 
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welfare state. They had developed an overwhelming sense of helplessness and 
victimisation.
37
 
 
The archive of eyewitness accounts analysed in this chapter (incorporating Igor 
Kostin’s photographs compiled in Chernobyl: Confessions of a Reporter and other local 
survivors’ testimonies compiled by Svetlana Alexievich in Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral 
History of a Nuclear Disaster) constitutes the first of three Chernobyl traumas. The archive is 
unable to retrace the series of traumatic events that were withdrawn from prematurely, 
disallowing the reintroduction of the disaster’s full historicisation and comprehension to take 
place. This chapter will analyse the hasty psychic vacation of the Chernobyl space that 
accompanied its rapid physical evacuation; as Alexievich’s collected survivor testimonies 
make clear, many witnesses of the disaster and its aftermath simply do not remember these 
events – a classic symptom of psychological trauma. Other symptoms of this trauma caused 
by the disaster, Alexievich’s interviews reveal, include flashbacks to the aspects of the event 
that were remembered, involuntary re-enactments of these memorised scenes, and nightmares 
derived from them. Such symptoms (identified by the American Psychological Association 
[APA] as post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD]), manifest at once as an absence and disorder 
of memory. As Ruth Leys writes in her book Trauma: A Genealogy:  
 
the idea [behind PTSD] is that, owing to the emotions of terror and surprise caused by 
certain events, the mind is split or dissociated: it is unable to register the wound to the 
psyche because the ordinary mechanisms of awareness and cognition are destroyed. 
As a result, the victim is unable to recollect or integrate the hurtful experience in 
normal consciousness; instead, she is haunted or possessed by intrusive traumatic 
memories. The experience of the trauma, fixed or frozen in time, refuses to be 
represented as past, but is perpetually re-experienced in a painful, dissociated, 
traumatic present.
38
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The aim of Freudian psychoanalysis is twofold: to help the sufferer fill in the mnemic blanks 
of the experienced traumatic event, and to help them retrospectively construct the true 
chronological order of its constituent parts. In her book, Leys writes that many 
psychoanalysts have praised pioneering French psychologist Pierre Janet  
 
for distinguishing between two kinds of memory – “traumatic memory,” which 
merely and unconsciously repeats the past, and narrative memory,” which narrates 
the past as past – and for validating the idea that the goal of therapy is to convert 
“traumatic memory” into “narrative memory” by getting the patient to recount his or 
her history.
39
 
 
This was, of course, the aim of Freud’s psychoanalytic sessions with Sergei Pankejeff. 
Freud constructed the Wolf Man case study by recording his patient’s autobiographical 
recollection of experienced, interrelated, childhood traumas, with the aim of ridding him of 
his depression and psychosomatic digestive disorders that were contemporary with the 
analysis. The recollection begins with Pankejeff’s childhood neuroses concerning his phobia 
and sadomasochistic torturing of animals, and his sudden, discontented, irritable, violent 
disposition. It then covers a period of deep piety in which he felt compelled to kiss all the 
holy pictures hanging in his room each night before bed, in which he also remembers uttering 
blasphemes such as “God-swine” or “God-shit,” before reversing backwards in time and 
arriving at the infamous, infant witnessing of his parents’ coitus a tergo. Freud’s sessions 
were designed to document these symptoms and the order in which they occurred, in order to 
encourage the patient to recognise the relocation of their traumatic past from its 
psychologically disruptive position in the lived present to its historically correct site, enabling 
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them to gain mastery over its symptoms. Freud also proposed that the healing of the patient 
could be achieved by identifying the origin of their neuroses’ origin. In his interview with 
Karen Obholzer, Pankejeff states Freud’s outlook in relation to psychoanalytic treatment: 
‘“he believes that some childhood experience, a trauma, is the cause of an illness. And if one 
remembers this event, one gets one’s health back. In five minutes.”’40    
 In Freud’s treatment of Pankejeff, as with many other psychoanalytic readings of a 
subject, a resistance against the asserted veracity, chronological order, and origin of the 
traumatic history emerges. As the theoretical introduction of this thesis explored, Freud’s 
analysis of Pankejeff’s primal scene oscillated between determining it as an actually-
occurring event and a fantasy concocted in his patient’s later childhood, which was perhaps 
derived from the latter’s witnessing of animals copulating and referred back, via 
Nachträglichkeit, to the infant stage. The possibility of this fake origin of trauma threatens 
Freud’s therapeutic efforts, which, in Pankejeff’s summary, rest on the disclosure or 
recollection of a previously repressed, real experience. Pankejeff’s inability to assert the 
chronological order of his neuroses’ emergence accurately presents further obstacles on the 
path to his healing. Freud articulates these obstacles in his Wolf Man psychoanalytic study by 
asking the following questions: 
 
What was the origin of the sudden change in the boy’s character? What was the 
significance of his phobia and of his perversities [regarding animals]? How did he 
arrive at his obsessive piety? And how are all these phenomena interrelated? I will 
once more recall the fact that our therapeutic work was concerned with a subsequent 
and recent neurotic illness [Pankejeff’s adult depression and digestive disorders], and 
that light could only be thrown upon these earlier problems when the course of 
analysis led away for a time from the present, and forced us to make a détour through 
the prehistoric period of childhood [the infant primal scene].
41
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Pankejeff’s psychoanalysis acts as a sort of trial of Freud’s entire practice, adamant as 
it is that the patient can be relieved of their psychological suffering by chronologically-
ordering their neuroses, and identifying the trauma’s origin in an authentic primal scene. 
With this configuration in mind, the first chapter of this thesis will explore, in relation to the 
psychoanalysis of recollected Chernobyl disaster survivor accounts, the usefulness and limits 
of Freudian psychoanalytic practice. In attempting to heal the Chernobyl disaster survivor by 
reasserting an authentic order to their recollected, witnessed events of the nuclear disaster, 
and tracing these backwards psychoanalytically to locate the exact origin of their traumatised 
behaviour, two problematising psychic mechanisms arise: the screen memory and 
Nachträglichkeit.           
 The screen memory prevents the unimpeded retrospective movement of 
psychoanalytic investigation by repressing or psychically blockading a memory or memories 
of an authentic traumatic event. The screen memory, as its name suggests, screens off this 
repression with other, obliquely relevant memories, a resistance which, Freud writes in a 
private letter to Wilhelm Fleiss (1899), later published as ‘Screen Memories’ (1950), ‘tries to 
prevent any such preference [for the repressed mnemic scene] from being shown. [...] in this 
respect the resistance gets its way; what is recorded is another psychical element closely 
associated with the objectionable one’.42 Some of the survivor testimonies compiled in Voices 
from Chernobyl refer to the nuclear disaster as a war: a screen memory resulting from the 
lack of their true understanding of the event through either its deliberate obfuscation by the 
Soviet authorities, or its psychic repression or forgetting – a common mental reaction to 
experienced trauma. In both cases, the reconfiguration of invisible, bodiless radiation as a 
traditional enemy against which a war can conceivably be waged displaces the original, 
traumatic, true event of radioactive contamination and poisoning, preventing it from being 
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known to consciousness.         
 Where the screen memory constitutes a psychic resistance that cordons off traumatic 
moments of the past from memory, rendering them inaccessible to recollection, the second 
psychic resistance to the disclosure of a trauma, Nachträglichkeit, concerns the patient’s 
memories formed after the trauma’s origination or manifestation in symptoms. Through the 
Nachträglichkeit or “deferred action” of a patient’s belated recollection of a childhood 
trauma, Leys explains,  
 
Trauma was constituted by a relationship between two events or experiences – a first 
event that was not necessarily traumatic because it came too early in the child’s 
development to be understood and assimilated, and a second event that was not 
inherently traumatic but that triggered a memory of the first event that only then was 
given traumatic meaning and hence repressed.
43
 
 
In relation to the Chernobyl disaster, Nachträglichkeit occurred when the initial explosion at 
the power plant and the subsequent, vast radioactive emission were psychologically repressed 
by eyewitnesses, integrated into their understanding only at a later date. These belated 
memories of the disaster were introduced (often long) after-the-fact of its occurrence; as 
mentioned earlier, its belated understanding was acquired not through the return of a memory 
formed contemporarily to the event, but through a delayed disclosure by an external body: the 
international media. The evacuated civilians were only notified of the disaster’s true causes 
and effects by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the fall of Soviet 
communism in 1989.
44
 For some survivors, this disclosure served as a trigger for the 
recollection of their own experiences of the disaster. Following Leys’ description of 
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Nachträglichkeit, the identification of a traumatic event by belated disclosure, in the shape of 
either global, democratic news or personal eyewitness recollection in psychoanalytic sessions 
or interviews,
45
 “calls into question the binary oppositions – inside versus outside, private 
versus public, fantasy versus reality, etc. – which largely govern contemporary 
understandings of trauma’.46 One of the key binary oppositions undermined by 
Nachträglichkeit, I would add, is that between past and present. By retroactively rendering 
the Chernobyl disaster as traumatic through the assignation of belatedly-formed traumatic 
memories – which, for some survivors in Alexievich’s interviews, constitute its first 
recollection – the present is dragged into a past that only then gains its traumatic significance. 
Like the screen memory, Nachträglichkeit threatens the notion of a chronological sequence of 
events, and an authentic and dateable origin of trauma. In a similar situation to Freud in the 
Wolf Man case study, Nachträglichkeit causes numerous questions to flood the Chernobyl 
analyst: was the occurrence of the nuclear disaster inherently traumatic for and repressed by 
its contemporary witnesses, or did the event only become traumatic posthumously, as a 
memory retrieved or formed in later psychoanalytic recollection? Can we ever truly be 
confident that this recollection process retrieves accurate memories of the disaster, or are they 
informed by other, loosely related or extraneous events? Even if these memories are of 
authentic occurrences, can psychoanalysis assert the correct chronological order of the 
disaster’s memorised, component stages so as to trace back to and identify the one, for the 
survivor under analysis, from which the trauma originally emerged and that, when disclosed, 
supposedly “heals the subject in five minutes?”      
 In referring to and disordering one’s traumatic history in a way that tantalisingly hints 
at and frustratingly obscures trauma’s historical origins, memory invokes the screen memory 
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and Nachträglichkeit psychic measures. This chapter will explore the emergence of these two 
resistant processes in Chernobyl disaster eyewitness recollection: in the archives of Kostin’s 
Chernobyl photographs and the survivor testimony recorded in Alexievich’s interviews. It 
will propose that the psychoanalytic observation of the event these two texts draw upon 
enacts a form of archive fever when faced with the two defensive psychic processes that 
protect the subject from the painful realisation of trauma through the fictionalising and 
rearranging power of memory. (Psychoanalysis is invoked in Alexievich’s interviews, which 
work in the same way as Freud’s talking cure: the analysand is invited to talk about their 
neuroses, thus providing the analyst material with which to implicate their underlying causes. 
It also emerges in the development of Kostin’s photographs of Chernobyl, which were taken 
shortly after the reactor’s explosion; these graphic reproductions of the disaster site echo the 
difficulties with which psychologically traumatic events are recollected.) The archive fever 
incurred in these two texts constitutes a fruitless attempt, driven by the Freudian drive 
towards the investigation’s ultimate death or destruction through their analytical techniques 
of recollection aimed at fixing the origin and chronological order of survivors’ traumas 
incurred by their experiences of the Chernobyl disaster. The failure of the psychoanalytic 
methods deployed in the texts not only undermines the authenticity of their archival 
recollection of the event, but also the capacity of Freudian psychoanalysis as a reliable tool 
for the healing of mental trauma.        
 By way of introducing this notion of indefinite slippage, the chapter will assert the 
essential unrepresentability of Chernobyl’s radiation. This radiation constitutes the Lacanian 
Real, the ‘hard resistant kernel’47 of reality that defies symbolisation and disrupts our 
coherent, consistent experience of reality. To be precise, the radiation is a Symbolic Real, a 
series of invisible chains of nuclear decay that restructure our reality, which, following Glyn 
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Daly’s definition of the Symbolic Real in Žižek: A Primer (2004), ‘refers to the anonymous 
symbols and codes (scientific formulae, digitalisation, empty signifiers...) that function in an 
indifferent manner as the abstract “texture” onto which, or out of which, reality is 
constituted’.48 The gradual radioactive disintegration of atoms – the building blocks out of 
which we and our reality are constructed – functions as an excessive, intolerable whole 
(neither a lack nor an absence in itself) ‘that constitutes the very universal order of Being’.49 
It is radiation’s exposure and attack upon this otherwise imperceptible, absolute ontology that 
engenders physical and psychological trauma among Chernobyl disaster survivors, and 
provides psychoanalytic readings of the event with the Lacanian objet petit a or unattainable 
object of desire to be attained as understanding through disclosure, thereby calling for 
psychoanalytic archiving and triggering this archive’s self-destructive quest for the trauma’s 
authentic origin and order that was obfuscated by the survivor’s screen memory and 
Nachträglichkeit psychic mechanisms.  
 
The Second Trauma of Chernobyl: Reading the Chernobyl Disaster Witness 
If psychoanalysis cannot chronologically order nor disclose the origin of Chernobyl disaster 
survivors’ trauma despite repeated efforts, how should the analyst approach the catastrophic 
event? If the therapeutic goal of psychoanalysis is unattainable, how should readers respond 
to the Chernobyl disaster’s survivor testimony, if at all? Opposing the total abandonment of 
reading recollections of shocking events as related by their victims, whose memories 
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sometimes screen off the implicated, traumatic history with other, belatedly-formed 
memories,
50
 Jenny Edkins argues in her essay ‘Time, Personhood, Politics’ (2014) 
 
for the attempt to construct monuments and memories of another sort, ones that do not 
incorporate the unforgettable, or [...] the traumatic, into the narratives of history and 
its linear temporalities, but which attempt to encircle the trauma, the unspeakable, the 
unforgettable, and mark its presence as such. We can acknowledge the void, the lack 
or excess at the heart of our symbolic universe [...] without attempting to name or 
gentrify it. Such an acknowledgement, a marking, is a way of remaining faithful.
51
 
 
Instead of incorporating the trauma into a single, linear narrative of the event, which can be 
undermined by the multiple interpretations put forward by the victim’s traumatised psyche, 
interiorisation should be resisted, as Edkins suggests. The event’s obfuscation by topically 
related yet divergent screen memories, and its continual revision via a series of alternative, 
Nachträglich interpretations that sit parallel to one another should be preserved, instead of the 
simplified reading offered by Freudian psychoanalysis. To embrace these varying 
recollections that approximate or orbit an absent true account of the event is to tacitly 
acknowledge or bear witness to its untranslatability into testimony.    
 The second chapter of this thesis claims that, with respect to reading the Chernobyl 
disaster, psychoanalysis is redundant, and ought to cede to another, more fruitful, respectful 
form of reading: the deconstructive approach of Jacques Derrida. This shift is evident in the 
departure, which this chapter will chart in a series of primary texts, from the memorialising, 
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mourning, and ultimately, the interiorisation of Chernobyl disaster survivors’ trauma and 
suffering. Such an interiorisation into the analyst’s study is impossible, following Derrida’s 
theory of impossible mourning, which was outlined in the theoretical introduction of this 
thesis, without violently fracturing survivors’ identities and psychologically painful 
experiences. The analysed shift turns towards Derridean ethical mourning – also explained in 
the theoretical introduction – which calls for survivors and their experiences of the disaster to 
be placed eternally outside or beyond the scope of the reader’s memorialisation or 
understanding. Each experience constitutes an inaccessible core of grief or, adapting Julia 
Kristeva’s analysis of her patients’ depression and trauma, a black hole of melancholia, 
which can only be revolved around and never directly confronted; ‘Their sadness would be 
rather the most archaic expression of an unsymbolisable, unnameable narcissistic wound, so 
precocious that no outside agent (subject or agent) can be used as referent’.52 One must 
acknowledge that ‘interiorisation [of the survivor and their traumatic experience] is never 
completed and [...] remains in the end impossible’.53 The primary texts explored in this 
chapter – Mario Petrucci’s elegies compiled in his poetry collection Heavy Water: A Poem 
for Chernobyl (2007), the horror film Chernobyl Diaries (2012, dir. Bradley Parker), and 
Adam Roberts’ Science Fiction novel, Yellow Blue Tibia (2009) – bear witness to the shift 
from impossible mourning to ethical mourning by reconstructing it. This shift marks a sea 
change that contributes, in a significant manner, to the evolution of trauma studies: from 
perceiving trauma-as-event to trauma-as-process. In other words, it is a conceptual departure 
from treating trauma as originating from a singular, initial occurrence that, when disclosed, 
can be contained or isolated, enabling healing to take place in the form of the successful 
mourning of loss on a global level. In this configuration, Chernobyl disaster readers from 
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around the world – exemplified by the speakers of the Heavy Water elegies and the tourists 
visiting the Exclusion Zone in Chernobyl Diaries – respond to the catastrophe, its survivors, 
and its aftermath from a geographical and socioeconomic remove by claiming for the tragic 
event’s psychological impact upon them – an interiorisation of the trauma of the other 
narcissistically identified with and co-opted as their own. The primary texts analysed in this 
chapter reconstruct and thereby criticise this stance of privileged mourning, which, according 
to its staged practitioners – the speakers and protagonists of these texts – is imperative. 
Writing about the Holocaust in his book History and Memory after Auschwitz (1998), 
Dominick LaCapra asks: ‘do some events present moral and representational issues [...] for 
groups not directly involved in them?’54 Traumatic memory, he continues, is  
 
something one indulges in with bitter-sweet melancholy. It is the chocolate-covered 
madeleine of the psyche on which one overdoses. Memory in this phenomenological 
sense presumably gives access to direct experience, often vicarious experience, that 
may be sacralised or seen as auratic. Thus construed, memory involves fixation on the 
past that inhibits action in the present oriented to a more desirable future.
55
 
 
In order to sidestep this problematically sensory, obsessive mourning that never 
satisfactorily completes itself to engender a favourable future, this thesis embraces the 
concept of trauma-in-process. This process is witnessed in the eternal incompletion of 
survivors’ mourning and the disallowing of the reader’s direct experience of survivors’ 
trauma, as the primary texts analysed in this chapter illustrate.    
 The first section of this chapter charts the ethical shift that takes place in Petrucci’s 
Heavy Water: A Poem for Chernobyl through three of the collection’s exemplary elegies: 
‘Every Day I Found a New Man’, ‘Black Box’, and ‘Envoy’. This section will argue that 
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‘Every Day I Met a New Man’ commits an unethical interiorising of the subject, Lyudmilla 
Ignatenko, and her mourning of her fire fighter husband, Vasily, whose severe radiation 
poisoning, hospitalisation, and protracted death was effected by his tackling of the Reactor 
Four blaze. The elegy perpetrates the violent act of interiorisation by reconstructing 
Lyudmilla’s mourning process in first-person narration, decisively concluding it. In reality, 
this step-by-step grieving was cut short by the State intervention aimed at isolating Vasily: by 
preventing visitor access to his bio-chamber to limit the possible spread of his radioactive 
contamination, and, immediately after his death, by removing his corpse from the hospital 
and burying it hastily, without a proper funeral, in a Moscow graveyard with restricted 
access. This government interruption of Lyudmilla’s mourning engendered her melancholia, 
characterised as a pathological inability to let go of a love object that was not gradually, 
effectively separated from. This psychic disturbance is absent from Petrucci’s elegiac 
interpretation of Lyudmilla’s reaction to Vasily’s condition and eventual death.   
 The second elegy, ‘Black Box’, portrays the observation of an unnamed woman who 
witnessed the Chernobyl disaster when she was younger, by her curious boyfriend, who 
attempts to capture her traumatic experience by asking her questions and interpreting her 
responses, then writing them down. The elegy uses this premise to restage the narcissistic, 
violent attempts of interiorising the other, demonstrating the failure of these efforts to capture 
her pain authentically. In this elegy, interiorisation purposely fails, echoing Derrida’s 
‘Mnemosyne’; the refusal of the gift of Mnemosyne – to know how to tell a story of the other 
– is acted out in the elegy, which thereby sustains the other’s alterity and separation from us. 
 The third elegy to be analysed in this section, entitled ‘Envoy’, reveals an impasse 
between impossible mourning and ethical mourning: on the one hand, the allure of 
interiorisation by reimagining the other’s trauma must be resisted, and on the other, the use of 
imagination and the human senses to sympathise with the other must be employed so as not 
35 
 
to entirely abandon them, as Sean Gaston argues in his book The Impossible Mourning of 
Jacques Derrida (2006). Providing an overview of this impasse, Gaston writes: 
 
[Emmanuel] Levinas argues in Totality and Infinity (1961) that the relationship with 
the other that remains other cannot be reduced to a movement of sympathy merging 
us with him. Imaginative sympathy is a mode of synthesis that – despite its good 
intentions, despite its good conscience – colonises and domesticates the infinite 
alterity of the other.
56
 
 
Where Levinas claims for an unbridgeable gap between us and the other that ought to be 
acknowledged as such, Gaston, channelling the spirit of Derrida, who passed away on 
October 9, 2004, shortly before the former began writing The Impossible Mourning of 
Jacques Derrida, takes a different stance. He asks: ‘How does one avoid the monu-
memorialisation of Jacques Derrida? How does one write a narrative, or a story even, of the 
work of Jacques Derrida after 8-9 October 2004?’57 Taking Derrida as his other, Gaston, 
unlike Levinas, does not outright refuse to indulge in the gift of Mnemosyne: the knowledge 
that determines how to tell a story of the other. Rather, Gaston’s portrayal of the gap is one 
that, though it cannot be fully bridged, entices us to move psychically towards the other, 
perhaps against our will. While he does not advocate the possibility of an interiorisation of 
the other, he does examine in his book, through his personal experience of the aftermath of 
Derrida’s death, an uncomfortable closeness to them. He writes on December 1, 2004: 
 
Keith Crome from Manchester Metropolitan University has very kindly sent me a 
copy (a copy of a copy) of the film Derrida (2002) (Dick and Kofman). It arrived 
today. I would like to see it and am reluctant to see it. It is not so much that I am 
afraid of losing or contaminating the fleeting impressions I have of seeing and hearing 
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Jacques Derrida (15 March 1991, October 1992-February 1993), but an anxiety about 
getting too close to Derrida (but, already, it is a question of getting to close to 
Derrida, the film). [...] As if I could avoid getting to close to spectres.
58
 
 
We should not violently resist this close proximity we find ourselves in with the other, 
Gaston argues. ‘Derrida traces what he calls “the economy of pity” in his reading of [Jean 
Jacques] Rousseau. For Rousseau, la pitié is the most natural, most human feeling’.59 The 
speaker in Petrucci’s ‘Envoy’, who functions as an interpretation or restaging of the 
collective voice of all the living and dead Chernobyl disaster eyewitnesses, invokes the 
economy of pity to direct our imaginative sympathy towards the catastrophe’s victims and 
survivors. Gaston’s quotation from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) is 
relevant here: ‘“Our senses...never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, [...] 
and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception” of the senses of 
another’.60 Our imaginative sympathy for the Chernobyl disaster victims and survivors called 
upon in ‘Envoy’ ought to be derived from our senses of hearing and touch. The elegy urges 
its readers to listen to and feel the vibrations of the event’s trauma, thereby acknowledging 
our natural human feelings that form our connection to it. This practice strikes an ethical 
balance between Levinas’s theory that the other, in their infinite alterity, is inaccessible to the 
pastness of writing and can only be encountered in the liveness of being present, face-to-face 
with the other,
61
 and Freud’s practice of normal mourning, in which the pastness of the lost 
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love object is transcended and thus surmounted by imagining and remembering them. The 
imagined listening to and touching of the Chernobyl disaster sufferer’s pain does not 
condemn them to an inaccessible past, present or future as writing does (the ‘Black Box’ 
elegy, as stated earlier, reconstructs this impasse between maintaining the other’s eternal 
absence and violently writing their forced, inauthentic presence; ‘writing [...] is “without 
pity”’,62 according to Rousseau). Instead, ‘Envoy’ at once avoids leaving the other at an 
infinite remove and violently inscribing them into presence via writing. Its sympathetic 
listening to or sensing the imagined presence of the Chernobyl disaster victims and survivors 
‘“opens us to a certain nonpresence within presence...the suffering of others is [only] lived by 
comparison, as our nonpresent past or future suffering.” We remember, we anticipate and we 
feel pity for others only through an image that exceeds “sensible presence.”’63 The non-
presence within our presence of the Chernobyl disaster sufferer, whose trauma is imagined as 
that of our own past or future trauma, is spectral. Located in the Derridean hauntological
64
 
order of being, namely as a ghost ‘between all the “two’s” one likes, such as between life and 
death’,65 ‘between something and someone, anyone or anything’,66 and now and some other 
time or non-time, the sympathetically imagined Chernobyl disaster sufferer in ‘Envoy’ 
provides readers with the only true ethical position in regards to representing and thus 
maintaining in our presence a connection with the other. As all textual depictions of the 
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Chernobyl disaster survivor explored in the thesis from this point onwards attest to, Levinas’ 
realisation of an ultimate remove, a “we can never begin mourning” in which the survivor can 
feel harmfully isolated and ostracised from outsiders, may be no more respectful than the “we 
can always end mourning” implicit in Freud’s theory of normal mourning.   
 In Specters of Marx (1993), Derrida asks ‘How to distinguish between two 
disadjustments, between the disjuncture of the unjust and the one that opens up the infinite 
asymmetry of the relation to the other, that is to say, the place for justice?’67 The horror film 
Chernobyl Diaries, analysed in the second section in this chapter, makes a distinction 
between these two outcomes. On the one hand, the film’s protagonists, which consist of a 
group of American, Australian and European “extreme tourists,” carry out impossible 
mourning during their visit to the Exclusion Zone: they attempt to prove the existence of 
survivors living in Pripyat in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster by exploring and 
photographing the ghost town. On the other hand, the film itself, via the cinematic horror 
technique of withholding the monster antagonist from view through the use of the staged 
environment and the darkness therein, maintains the survivors, who stealthily kill off the 
visitors one by one, as fundamentally inaccessible to the technology of archival reproduction 
that enforces unjust interiorisation. These two opposing outcomes are bound together 
inextricably in the film, however. When the tourists exploring Pripyat realise the danger that 
they are in, they try to escape from the Zone and its aggressive inhabitants. This attempt at 
hastily restoring separation merely intensifies the protagonists’ disorientation within the Zone 
and the attacks that are carried out upon them. My analysis will use this filmic action to 
suggest that we cannot evacuate the Chernobyl region, either physically or psychologically, 
any more ethically than we have narcissistically penetrated it in an attempt to understand it, 
without incurring a confrontation with the Zone’s survivors or re-settlers in their absolute 
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otherness. Chernobyl Diaries stages this otherness as a Žižekian Imaginary Real. ‘With the 
Imaginary Real we have precisely the (unsustainable) dimension of fantasmatic excess-
negation’,68 Glyn Daly writes in Žižek: A Primer. Žižek’s Imaginary Real describes the 
subject’s experience of the confronted, horrific object: ‘an unbearable encounter that cannot 
be resolved/domesticated in their symbolic universe and from which they desperately try to 
escape’.69 In Chernobyl Diaries, the protagonists’ inevitable encounters with the partially 
obscured, unwelcoming Pripyat residents, from whom they desperately try to escape, are 
unbearable. The inhabitants present a violent rupture in the symbolic world: continually 
avoiding integration into our understanding of the reality of Chernobyl, yet presenting us with 
an unavoidable, absolute, traumatic limit in the form of a horrific sign of the disaster’s 
radioactive effects upon the human. The analogy with real-life encounters with actual 
Chernobyl survivors, the film suggests, is as follows: their traumatic experiences remain 
forever beyond our power of interiorising understanding, yet any attempt to circumvent these 
by forgetting or ignoring them is equally impossible.     
 The third and final section of this chapter turns to explore Adam Roberts’ Science 
Fiction novel Yellow Blue Tibia (2010). The novel, this section claims, ironically provides a 
definitive origin of the Chernobyl disaster in the form of a magic, cryptic word – an act it 
encourages us to be critical of. For Abraham and Torok in their reading of Freud’s 
psychoanalytic study of Sergei Pankejeff, the Wolf Man, magic, cryptic words  
 
are manipulated by cryptonomy as dried flowers in a herbarium. Divested of 
metaphorical reach and the power to institute or defuse an extralinguistic event as 
action, cryptonyms create a collection of words, a verbarium, with no apparent aim to 
carry any form of knowledge or conviction.
70
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Pankejeff’s magic words, Abraham and Torok argue in their book The Wolf Man’s Magic 
Word: A Cryptonomy (1986), enabled him to indirectly and unconsciously refer at once to his 
founding, infant, witnessed trauma and the subsequent neuroses that were triggered by key 
events in his later childhood and adult life.
71
 However, just as Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari have argued in their book Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972) that a 
reduction from the complex, rhizomatic relations between the multitude of psychological 
personalities and conditions to a single cause (to the Oedipal “daddy-mommy-me” triangle, 
for example)
72
 cannot take place without grossly distorting them, the disclosure of the cause 
of the Chernobyl disaster as one word or culprit can only be a work of fiction.   
 Both this section and the previous section, which analyses Chernobyl Diaries, will 
take up the Derridean notion of testimony-as-fiction. The archive of testimony (of what 
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happened at Chernobyl) that the two texts’ protagonists provide is in the form of a narrative 
testimony: the digital photographs of the Zone taken by Chernobyl Diaries’ extreme tourists 
and the recollection of the traumatic, first-hand memories of the Chernobyl disaster and its 
psychological repercussions by the fictional protagonist narrator of Yellow Blue Tibia, 
Konstantin Andreiovich Skvorecky. The narrative testimony in these two texts functions 
 
as a testimony that is said to be serious and authentic, or as an archive, or as a 
document, or as a symptom – or as a work of literary fiction, indeed the work of a 
literary fiction that simulates all of the positions that we have just enumerated. For 
literature can say anything, accept anything, receive anything, suffer anything, and 
simulate everything; it can even feign a trap, the way modern armies know how to set 
false traps; these traps pass themselves off as real traps and trick the machines 
designed to detect simulations under even the most sophisticated camouflage.
73
 
 
Derrida remarks in his essay Demeure: Fiction and Testimony that there must be an instant to 
open the possibility for testimony – ‘One must oneself be present, raise one’s hand, speak in 
the first person and in the present, and one must do this in order to testify to a present, to an 
indivisible moment’.74 Nevertheless, the problem with testimony, he claims, is that the 
indivisible instant of its delivery is at once unitary and divisible into after-effects. As soon as 
one begins delivering testimony, the instant is shattered; the telling of testimony extends 
beyond the moment it testifies to. Its  
 
condition of possibility is destroyed by the testimony itself. Ocular, auditory, tactile, 
any sensory perception of the witness must be an experience. As such, a constituting 
synthesis entails time and thus does not limit itself to the instant. The moment one 
attests, bears witness, the instant one gives testimony, there must also be a temporal 
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sequence – sentences, for example – and above all, these sentences must promise their 
own repetition and thus their own quasi-technical reproducibility.
75
 
 
The reproductions of the witnessing of either the Chernobyl disaster or its physical or 
psychological aftermath – through the technology of digital photographs in Chernobyl 
Diaries and Skvorecky’s relation of first-person narrative and dreams in Yellow Blue Tibia – 
designate the protagonists’ original, live witnessing experience of Chernobyl, namely of 
photographing the disaster site in the former text’s case, or confronting the initial disaster and 
one’s recorded traumatic memories of it in the latter’s. Though ‘one need not wait for 
cameras, videos, typewriters, and computers’76 – the utterance of the testimonial sentence 
will do – following Derrida, 
 
it is perhaps here, with the [photographic and mnemic] technological both as ideality 
and prosthetic iterability, that the possibility of fiction and lie, simulacrum and 
literature, that of the right to literature insinuates itself, as the very origin of truthful 
testimony, autobiography in good faith, sincere confession, as their essential 
compossibility.
77
  
 
The digital photographs of the Zone taken by Chernobyl Diaries’ extreme tourists are at once 
ostensibly faithful signifiers of their personal witnessing instant and, as earlier stated in this 
introduction, a stored, re-viewable product of archive fever endlessly chasing the truth but 
never capturing it. In a similar vein, this final section of chapter two will analyse Skvorecky’s 
reproductions of his traumatic memories of the Chernobyl disaster in Yellow Blue Tibia, 
specifically the ways in which these memories, though they determine him as a witness of the 
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exact moment of the Reactor Four explosion in the story’s depiction, unravel a fiction: the 
aforementioned magic, cryptic word that exposes the fictional cause or culprit of the disaster. 
 
Instant and Incidence: The Fast and Slow Disaster of Chernobyl and its Third, 
Intergenerational Trauma 
In the third and final chapter, the thesis turns to explore the different ways that the myriad 
responses to the Chernobyl disaster tap into one big, variegated Chernobyl trauma. The 
Exclusion Zone, I claim, identifies a new, global subject of trauma. In ‘In Place of an 
Epilogue’, in Voices from Chernobyl, Svetlana Alexievich writes: ‘I used to travel among 
other people’s suffering, but here [at Chernobyl] I am as much a witness as the others. My 
life is part of this event. I live here, with all of this’.78 To be witness to or enter into the 
ongoing psychological trauma unfolding at Chernobyl is to claim membership of a species. 
She continues: ‘For three years I rode around [the Exclusion Zone] and asked people: the 
workers at the nuclear plant, the scientists, the former Party bureaucrats, doctors, soldiers, 
helicopter pilots, refugees, re-settlers’, she continues.79 Alexievich reveals over the course of 
her interviews that many Russian refugees who were displaced by the post-communist, 
nationalist uprisings in Armenia, Georgia, Abkhazia, Tajikistan and Chechnya came to the 
Chernobyl Zone, viewing it as a safe haven from the political turmoil that exiled them from 
their homelands. Also, she discloses, re-settlers to the Zone returned there because family 
members living elsewhere refused to lodge them after the evacuation, due to their high levels 
of radioactive contamination.
80
 Species, which cuts across barriers of nationality and politico-
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economic class, ‘may indeed be the name of a placeholder for an emergent, new universal 
history of humans that flashes up in the moment of danger that is climate change’,81 where 
climate change refers to changes in political and, as this chapter will argue, ecological 
temperature.            
 The Chernobyl disaster, ‘while an accident in the sense that no one intentionally set it 
off, was also the deliberate product of a culture of cronyism, laziness, and a deep-seated 
indifference toward the general population’,82 Keith Gessen reminds us. Žižek observes that a 
similar culture  
 
was going on in ex-Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 80s, so that when things exploded 
[politically] in the late 80s, it was already too late: the old ideological consensus had 
become thoroughly putrid and collapsed in on itself.
83
   
 
Politically speaking, from the completion of the first reactor’s construction in 1977 to the 
explosion of the fourth in 1986, the Chernobyl power plant underwent a slow disaster. After 
the Soviet authorities’ near two decades-long administrative malaise, it suddenly, literally 
exploded, due to its long-term neglect; ‘the Soviet system had taken a poorly-designed 
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reactor and then staffed it with a group of incompetents’.84 The universal, traumatised human 
species previously mentioned is only officially realised in the transition of Chernobyl from a 
slow disaster to a fast disaster, when Reactor Four exploded. Until that moment, both 
technological failure and trauma, due to their creeping, insidious progress, went unnoticed as 
such. This rapid, traumatic emergence is followed by a turn towards another slow disaster: 
the gradual, ecological impact within and beyond the Exclusion Zone. As mentioned at the 
outset of this introduction, the long-term risks posed globally to humans by the radioactive 
cloud released by the reactor’s explosion in the years that followed included thyroid cancer, 
leukaemia, cataracts, cardiovascular disease and psychological distress. A further, similar 
shifting in pace of the disaster’s progress could occur, heralding a repetition of these sorts of 
symptoms in the global population. From the initial explosion to the year 2014, the current 
sarcophagus at Chernobyl, which was hastily constructed in 1986 and to this day entombs the 
exploded reactor, has been gradually deteriorating, due to the extremely high levels of 
radiation it holds back. The slow process of the sarcophagus’s radioactive decay has called 
for a New Safe Confinement (NSC) to be constructed and placed over it, to prevent a similar 
yet greater disaster from taking place at Chernobyl; ‘everyone knows that if the [current] 
Cover were to collapse, the consequences would be even more dire than they were in 1986’.85 
Here, Chernobyl could again progress from a slow disaster to a fast disaster, where the 
sustained deterioration of the sarcophagus could lead to a sudden, massive, renewed 
emergency. In either scenario, ‘This threat to the very existence of humanity creates a new 
sense of “we” which truly encompasses all of humanity’86, as Žižek writes of global warming 
generally.           
 In particular, the deceleration of the causes and effects of Chernobyl trauma calls for a 
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review of the traditional trauma-as-event model. My thesis will further critique this model, 
which is frequently aligned with a Eurocentric conception of the occurrence of trauma. It will 
continue to argue for the validity of the emergent trauma-as-process model, which provides a 
more constructive approach to the study of global, systemic manifestations of trauma. Stef 
Craps, in his essay ‘Beyond Eurocentrism: Trauma Theory in the Global Age’ (2014), 
outlines the need to move away from established notions of the arrival of trauma. He writes:  
 
trauma theory continues to adhere to the traditional event-based model of trauma, 
according to which trauma results from a single, extraordinary, catastrophic event. It 
follows that the traumatic impact of racism and other ongoing forms of oppression 
cannot be adequately addressed within the conceptual frameworks which trauma 
theory provides.
87
 
 
The continual traumatic impact of racism, sexism or the political and environmental 
corruption that resulted in the Chernobyl disaster is endemic and long-term. In societies 
studied for their national traumas, these forces elude the event-based model of trauma. The 
study of ongoing race-related conflicts and widespread misogyny present throughout 
developing and developed countries, for example, which is more or less contemporary with 
my claim for the criminally censorious policies of the Former Soviet Union on the 
construction and use of nuclear power plants, sits in stark contrast to the founding 
categorisation of trauma as an instantaneous or sudden shock. This origin of trauma studies is 
exemplified by case histories of railway disasters of the 1850s, and combat experienced in the 
First and Second World Wars.
88
 These traumatic events were theorised from an exclusively 
Eurocentric or American-centric perspective by psychologists including Sigmund Freud and 
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his pupils Karl Abraham and Sándor Ferenczi, who between them developed the concept of 
the war neuroses, in which soldiers returned from the front suffering from what at the time 
was termed shell-shock
89
 exhibited symptoms derived from their personal experience of a 
traumatic event. These symptoms, the concept claimed, were characterised by the soldier’s 
inability to depart psychologically and psychosomatically from their past experiences of 
combat. The war neuroses maintained the event as the central and unassailable cause of the 
returned soldier’s behaviour, which consisted of repeatedly returning to combat experiences 
mentally through their compulsive, trance-like re-enactments, somnambulistic episodes, 
nightmares and flashbacks. These effects of the traumatic event were partially mitigated by 
certain psychic defences, such as amnesia, identity dissociation, or psychological and 
physical numbness. Other European followers of the event-based model, such as Freud’s 
daughter Anna Freud, his biographer Ernest Jones, and the American psychoanalyst Abram 
Kardiner, also explained their respective patients’ symptoms, such as those of children, 
through the event-based model. This model is further problematised when faced with entirely 
globalised traumas, such as those examined by contemporary trauma studies which were 
mentioned earlier, particularly when the trauma in question is suffered by those whose socio-
cultural practices of dealing with it and domiciles fall outside the Eurocentric or American-
centric influence, such as many of the Chernobyl disaster survivors. Michael Rothberg in his 
preface to the edited collection The Future of Trauma Theory: Contemporary Literary and 
Cultural Criticism entitled ‘Beyond Tancred and Clorinda: Trauma Studies for Implicated 
Subjects’ (2014) comments that: 
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the site of the actual production of trauma theory – the Euro-American academy – has 
remained distant from many of the sites of trauma’s impact. Thus [...] we must 
continue to trouble the West/non-West binary that is at the root of Eurocentric 
thinking (and some forms of resistance to it): the distinctions between event-based, 
systematic, and structural trauma do not map onto any simple, geo-cultural map, but 
cut across all borders (even if their distribution is markedly uneven).
90
 
    
To propose ways of reconsidering trauma theory and relating it to the global sites of trauma’s 
impact beyond Europe and Eurocentric thinking, the following will be studied in the third 
chapter of the thesis: the Science Fiction novella by David Thorpe entitled Doc Chaos: The 
Chernobyl Effect (1988), two recent novels – Darragh McKeon’s All That is Solid Melts Into 
Air (2014) and Hamid Ismailov’s The Dead Lake (2014) – and the videogame S.T.A.L.K.E.R: 
Shadow of Chernobyl (prod. GSC Gameworld, 2007). These four texts reject the event-based 
model in favour of depicting radiation as a trauma that extends beyond the theoretical 
boundaries set by the Euro-American academy: beyond the borders of the body, generational 
borders, and the geo-cultural borders between the Former Soviet Union and the West.    
 The analysis of Doc Chaos: The Chernobyl Effect will revolve around notions of the 
corporeality of the body, namely the ways in which nuclear reactions, portrayed in the 
novella as beyond the understanding of humans and essentially unpredictable and 
uncontrollable, engender a new sense of bodily materiality when they inevitably turn 
catastrophic. Judith Butler in her book Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” 
(1993), distinguishes between concrete bodily form and the production of bodily matter, and 
explores the excess that is also generated by yet excluded from this binary. Specifically, she 
examines the regulated, sociological production of a phallogocentric, heteronormative 
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sexuality, and an abjected, queer sexuality, which emerges as a disturbing excess from that 
same system of sexual construction. Adapting this theory to an analysis of Thorpe’s novella, 
this first section of the third chapter will suggest that nuclear power plants, as systems of 
energy production, also generate an inevitable bi-product: nuclear waste. Eventual nuclear 
meltdown, which the novella’s titular character Doc Chaos claims is an unavoidable result of 
improperly abjected nuclear waste, installs trauma at the level of bodily materiality, rendering 
it as abject radioactive detritus. The event of the Chernobyl disaster is depicted by the story 
not as the sole progenitor of physical trauma in the nuclear age, but as the culmination of a 
long series of scientific errors, ranging from previous nuclear accidents such as Three Mile 
Island in Pennsylvania, USA, in 1979 and Windscale in Cumberland, Great Britain, in 1957. 
As the novella details, public concern surrounding nuclear power following these events was 
mollified by political reassurance that it was safe, and necessary to further rapid industrial 
and urban development. This preceding run-up of repressed anxiety extends to the trauma 
following the Chernobyl disaster, which takes place near the novella’s conclusion. In line 
with Rothberg’s theory and Butler’s notion of bodies that matter, the traumatising radioactive 
fallout from the Chernobyl event cuts across and extends beyond bodily boundaries. In the 
novella’s reconstruction of the aftermath, the radioactivity not only spreads across and infects 
the global population, but also requires first a fluid bodily form or sex – a repeated 
technological act invented by Doc Chaos of vacating consciousness from one radioactively 
decayed body and installing it into another (perhaps differently sexed) fresh body – and then 
a matter entirely beyond bodily form: consciousness merged with the subatomic world that 
has resulted from the catastrophic, global, radioactive decay of matter, ‘the occasion for a 
radical rearticulation of the symbolic horizon in which bodies [do not] come to matter at 
all’.91 As the novella suggests, then, trauma in the form of radiation does not map itself onto 
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any simple, bodily, sexed map, but cuts across bodies, the binary divisions between sex, and 
those between form and matter.        
 Like Doc Chaos: The Chernobyl Effect, All That is Solid Melts Into Air and The Dead 
Lake conceive of trauma as assignable ‘not to one historically locatable event but to history 
itself, as one long catastrophe’,92 following Sam Durrant’s formulation of the trauma-as-
process model. However, this model, the second section of this chapter will also argue, does 
not depart entirely from Eurocentric or American-centric conceptions of the instantaneous, 
overwhelming event and the subsequent returns of its traumatic, repressed content. According 
to Anaya Jahanara Kabir in her essay ‘Affect, Body Place: Trauma Theory in the World’ 
(2014): 
 
The future of trauma theory cannot lie in a rejection of structures which make 
available a common currency for reckoning, accountability and reconciliation; 
wherever their roots may lie, they are part of global modernity thanks to the spread of 
European social structures and norms.
93
 
 
This section will read the two aforementioned novels through a Eurocentric structure of 
trauma that does not conform to the event-based model: the notion of a seemingly eventless, 
ongoing experience of disturbed life that is enshrined in the psychoanalytic theory of the 
phantom proposed by Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok in their psychoanalytic studies The 
Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of Psychoanalysis (1994) and The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: 
A Cryptonomy (1986). In these two books they claim, drawing on a decidedly Freudian 
vocabulary of an event’s psychic repudiation and unconscious incorporation, a repressed 
domestic or family trauma occurring in the first generation haunts members of the second 
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generation as an encrypted, unnameable affliction which, silenced by parents, aunts, uncles or 
other elders, lies outside the children’s conscious referential coordinates. It is in this sense, 
then, that this section calls the Chernobyl disaster an “eventless” trauma – one that has been 
removed, by first-generation-repression, from the second generation’s very conception of 
their personal history. Both All That is Solid Melts Into Air and The Dead Lake depict 
parentally repressed, domestic, traumatic events that are their psychically incorporated by 
respective child protagonists. These events are encrypted by being displaced into the form of 
repeatedly recollected nuclear explosions: at Chernobyl in All That is Solid Melts Into Air, 
and the Kazakhstan Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site in The Dead Lake. In these two novels, 
the family secrets-turned-phantoms incorporated by the second generation, which is disguised 
as replayed nuclear detonations and other neuroses, do not haunt the child protagonist as a 
series of events in the form of sudden, traumatic disruptions of daily life, but as extended, 
omnipresent processes of trauma that encompass the ongoing painful re-experience of past 
explosions and fearful anticipation of future explosions.     
 Finally, this chapter will turn to an analysis of the first-person perspective videogame 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R: Shadow of Chernobyl. The game presents the identities of those living in the 
Exclusion Zone as inscrutable, specifically the eponymous S.T.A.L.K.E.R and another 
individual codenamed “The Strelok.” These namesakes, the outward manifestations upon 
visible surfaces of encrypted and therefore inaccessible identities, designate the absent 
Exclusion Zone inhabitants whom the player is tasked with tracking down somewhere in the 
Chernobyl region as absolutely other, thereby proposing an ethical relationship with actual 
Chernobyl disaster survivors. The game, set in the near future, in which a second nuclear 
disaster with unknown repercussions has taken place in the Exclusion Zone after an attempt 
at its repopulation, represents further encryptions: the Zone is littered with “artefacts”94 
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which cause various psychic disturbances when encountered – symptoms experienced by the 
player of an inscrutable event interior to the Zone itself. The player must venture to the heart 
of the new disaster site – again, the (now entombed) Reactor Four turbine hall – to disclose 
the cause of these cryptic effects. My analysis of the game will also look at the 
deconstruction or failure to convey meaning of its internal code. Errors in the unwitnessed 
interiority of coding that create unintended effects at the level of witnessed gameplay echo 
experienced symptoms of inaccessible traumas, represented here as absences or breakages in 
the chains of the production of meaning. Finally, the ethical relationship with Chernobyl 
inhabitants, I will claim the game suggests, revolves around speaking to the absent Absolute 
Other, originally theorised by Emmanuel Levinas and defined earlier in this introduction, 
without experiencing or even expecting a response.  
 
Conclusion 
The first-hand testimonies compiled in Voices from Chernobyl, the conclusion to my thesis 
will suggest, offer an alternative method of reading Chernobyl trauma. Some witnesses of the 
Chernobyl disaster and participants of the following evacuation and liquidation operations 
cathartically restage their traumatic memories of the event as experiences of fictional 
characters. These reconstructions, rendered through the medium of oral storytelling, echo the 
bawdy, authority-subverting aspects of carnival and laughter theorised by the Ukrainian 
cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. The conclusion to the thesis argues for a culturally local 
articulation of experienced trauma that is distinct from but effected by the “talking cure” 
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practice common to Eurocentric and American-centric models of trauma abreaction. 
 To summarise, chapters one, two and three of this thesis correspond to the first, 
second and third traumas of Chernobyl respectively, which were each outlined at the start of 
this introduction. Freudian psychoanalysis – the search within a patient’s memories for an 
authentic primal scene (the originary traumatic witnessing experience) in order to rid the 
patient of their neuroses and depressions which derive from it – is faced with three key 
obstacles when reading the Chernobyl disaster, the first chapter will argue: the traumatic 
disruption of the witnessing experience by the radiation as Symbolic Real, the erasure or 
overwriting of the witnessing experience by the screen memory, and the belated assignation 
(Nachträglichkeit) of latterly recovered memories and increased understanding of the disaster 
to the witnessing experience. The Freudian psychoanalytic archiving of the patient’s 
recollected past to disclose their primal scene and the three difficulties this process faces are 
exemplified by Kostin’s photographs of the Chernobyl disaster’s immediate aftermath 
reproduced in his book Chernobyl: Confessions of a Reporter and Alexievich’s interviews 
with local survivors compiled in her book Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral History of a 
Nuclear Disaster. As stated at the beginning of the introduction of this thesis, the first trauma 
of Chernobyl is constituted by the initial, local experience of the disaster, which is analysed 
by Freudian psychoanalysis. The second chapter analyses the second-hand responses to the 
disaster, showing how Derridean deconstruction is at work in Petrucci’s Heavy Water elegies, 
the Chernobyl Diaries film, and the novel Yellow Blue Tibia. It examines their self-aware or 
self-imposed inability to disclose and mourn the losses of local survivors’ trauma. This 
intentional textual failure, which maintains these survivors at an ethical exteriority as argued 
by Derrida’s notion of ethical mourning, is a staged trauma that aims to bear witness to the 
uninterpretable first-hand experiences of the Chernobyl disaster by reconstructing the 
uncrossable gap in understanding between the local survivors, whom these experiences 
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belong to, and second-hand readers of the event. This instructive, uncrossable gap, as 
reconstructed by these three texts, constitutes the second trauma of Chernobyl: the double 
movement of the archive, namely the impossible yet self-destructively inevitable drive to 
elegise, photograph or otherwise archive the local survivor-as-other. The third chapter turns 
to deal with the third trauma of Chernobyl: the intergenerational trauma experienced by 
second-generation survivors, namely those children who, unlike their parents, did not witness 
the disaster or the evacuation and liquidation of the Chernobyl region first-hand. They inherit 
their parents’ trauma unconsciously when the latter are silent about it. An unspoken secret of 
one generation, through this psychic inheritance, becomes an unspeakable secret in the 
following generation. Abraham and Torok’s theory of incorporation, outlined in the earlier 
theoretical introduction, is particularly useful in tracing the psychological and physiological 
symptoms of intergenerational Chernobyl trauma and its reconstruction in two novels: All 
That is Solid Melts Into Air and The Dead Lake. Finally, it will explore how S.T.A.L.K.E.R: 
Shadow of Chernobyl offers us an example of an ethical relationship with Chernobyl disaster 
survivors, who are rendered in the videogame as Absolute Others. 
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Chapter One: Chernobyl Trauma, Testimony, and Psychoanalysis 
 
The locks of memory, it appears, have always already been severed. In the place of 
the transcendental ground of subjective memory, Primal Scenes substitutes a textual 
memory; in lieu of a human subject, a series of intertextual constructions.
1
 
 
The Chernobyl nuclear disaster is an immemorial event, having always already escaped the 
severed locks of memory. For its local survivors, whose own mnemic retention of the event 
has been shattered by traumatic experience, primal scenes substitute the absent memory with 
textual reconstructions of other (possibly imagined) acts of witnessing. The survivor’s 
memory of an authentic Chernobyl disaster, this chapter will argue, is repressed in part by the 
Soviet authorities’ socio-political response to the event. In an interview with journalist 
Svetlana Alexievich, Yevgeni Brovkin, an instructor at Belarus’s Gomel State University, 
recalls:  
 
In the first days after the accident, all the books in the library about radiation, about 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, even about X-rays, disappeared. Some people said it was an 
order from above, so that people wouldn’t panic.2 
 
Brovkin’s testimony bears witness to the gagging of panic-causing information about 
radiation in the aftermath of the disaster, which served to politically deprive survivors of a 
conscious experience of its traumatic quality. Radioactivity, this trauma to which no 
information contemporary to the disaster’s aftermath refers, is a silent gap or space in the 
survivor’s memory of the event. Katya P., who witnessed the disaster as a child, recalls: ‘I 
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don’t remember the fear, but I remember lots of weird things. [...] We were “evacuated”. My 
father brought that word home from work. It was like in the [Great Patriotic] war books’.3 
Katya P.’s absent memory of fear bears witness to the political repression of the disaster’s 
trauma, and her formation of a series of substitute “weird” memories, such as the imaginative 
comparison between the evacuation of Pripyat and that of towns and villages during the Great 
Patriotic War, is a symptom of this repression. For Sigmund Freud’s patients, specifically 
women suffering from neuroses gained, he theorised, by sexual traumas occurring in 
childhood, ‘we find that impressions from the pre-sexual period which produced no effect on 
the child attain traumatic power at a later date as memories, when the girl or married woman 
has acquired an understanding of sexual life’.4 Just as sexual events emerge as traumas in 
consciousness only after the subject gains a knowledge of sexual life, the impression of the 
Chernobyl disaster attains conscious, traumatic power only after the witness belatedly 
acquires a knowledge of radiation. Unable to comprehend the impact of the nuclear disaster 
as it unfolds, Katya P.’s childhood memory of the event, like a neurotic dream symptomatic 
of a repressed trauma, merely ‘points towards the origin, but its interpretation cannot reveal 
the origin’.5 In other words, her testimony of this period cannot disclose what happened at 
Chernobyl. Deprived of an understanding of radiation with which to disclose the disaster 
fully, then, her memory of Chernobyl is a primal scene, an interpretation of the event through 
predating history and imagination that is passed off as authentic experience. Chernobyl, in 
relation to Lukacher’s theory of the primal scene, ‘comes to signify an ontologically 
undecidable intertextual event that is situated in the differential space between historical 
memory and imaginative construction, between archival verification and interpretive free 
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play’.6 After information about radiation was restored by the authorities, ‘people compared it 
[the Chernobyl disaster] to Hiroshima. But no one believed it. How can you believe in 
something incomprehensible? No matter how hard you try, it still doesn’t make sense’.7 Here, 
Katya P.’s trauma, repressed during her witnessing of the disaster, becomes known to her. It 
emerges from the irreconcilability between her newly-gained knowledge of radiation and the 
memorised childhood scene from which it was absent. In recollection, she retains her 
inauthentic childhood memory of the disaster, unable to retrofit it with latent and ill-fitting 
understanding. ‘Trauma’, Maud Ellmann writes in the introduction to Freud’s ‘Mourning and 
Melancholia’ (1917), ‘arises from the time lag between experience and understanding; the 
psyche is permanently scarred when the event arises too soon, the sense too late’.8 Brovkin 
recalls:  
 
If we’d beaten Chernobyl, people would talk about it and write about it more. Or if 
we’d understood Chernobyl. But we don’t know how to capture any meaning from it. 
We’re not capable of it. We can’t place it in our human experience or our human 
time-frame.          
 So what’s better, to remember or to forget?’9 
 
In dealing with this desynchronicity between the event’s occurrence and its understanding, 
Katya P. discards the latent understanding of radiation and retains her childhood memory of 
the disaster. What is better for her is to remember and forget, selectively. She remembers not 
a radioactive fire but ‘an ordinary fire, being put out by ordinary firemen’10 at the exploded 
Chernobyl reactor. Although there is missing meaning from this memorised scene, there are 
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traces or cinders of it in the fire’s aftermath and recollection. For Ned Lukacher in his 
introduction to Jacques Derrida’s Cinders (1987), ‘Cinders is about the fire that is still 
burning at the origin of language, the not yet literal but more than figurative fire that can be 
felt in the cinders of a language’.11 The once literal fire of Chernobyl, lost to the figurative 
testimonial expressions of predating history and imaginative interpretation, now exists as 
cinders eternally awaiting articulation, promising but not delivering expression of the 
disaster’s authentic witnessing and complete understanding. As Lukacher writes: 
 
Cinders are the quarks of language, neither proper nouns nor metaphors, the traces of 
neither ontotheology nor of the generalization of metaphor, naming neither truth nor 
its impossibility, but all the while keeping a space open into which the truth, or its 
impossibility, might come.
12
 
 
The Chernobyl disaster engenders a radioactive, traumatic site in which authentic witnessing 
and complete understanding, like the fire that once burned there, has been extinguished. 
Testimony, however, bears witness to the cinders of forgotten or unremembered truth. By not 
disclosing truth or this impossibility of its disclosure, testimony keeps the space between 
absent memory and latent knowledge open. Katya P. gestures towards this absence of 
understanding and the ways in which it might be provisionally, personally reconstituted, 
recollecting:  
 
My mother especially has felt confused. She teaches Russian literature, and she 
always taught me to live with books. But there are no books about this. She became 
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confused. She doesn’t know how to do without books. Without Chekov and Tolstoy. I 
want to remember, and also I don’t want to.13  
 
This encountered impasse between remembering and forgetting the disaster, where 
understanding is impossible because authentic memory has failed and latent knowledge 
cannot restore it, constitutes a new method of memory formation. On the one hand, 
intertextual memory in the form of literature, theatre and film contextualises the survivor’s 
limited experience and on the other, interpretation of this limited experience in itself provides 
the provisional, personal understanding of the disaster in the absence of real truth. For Katya 
P., ‘no book has helped me understand [Chernobyl]. And the theatre hasn’t, and the movies 
haven’t. I understand it without them though. By myself. We all live through it by ourselves, 
we don’t know what else to do’.14 A soldier, one of many sent to Chernobyl to ensure the full 
evacuation of outlying towns and villages, recalls: 
 
I’ve forgotten everything. I only remember that I went there, and after that I don’t 
remember anything, I forgot all of it. I can’t count money. My memory’s not right. 
The doctors can’t understand it. I go from hospital to hospital. But this sticks in my 
head: you’re walking up to the house, thinking the house is empty, and you open the 
door and there’s this cat. That, and those kids’ notes.15 
 
A primal scene is a patient’s unverifiable (and oftentimes immemorial) traumatic witnessing 
experience supposedly disclosed by subsequent incidents. These later experiences, Freudian 
psychoanalysis wishes to claim, act as signifiers – however distorted they may be – of the 
primal event: the origin of the patient’s neurotic or otherwise debilitating mental symptoms. 
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In the above soldier’s testimony, one can infer the generalisation of the primal scene and its 
uptake by the psychoanalytic study of Chernobyl disaster eyewitnesses. This soldier’s 
testimony of a traumatic memory and a loss of all other memories refer not to an earlier 
traumatic primal witnessing of parental copulation, as was supposedly the case with Sergei 
Pankejeff, Freud’s Wolf Man. The primal scene can represent the witnessing instance or 
possibility of a wide assortment of real or imagined traumatic experiences, ranging from 
viewing shell shock-inducing scenes of military combat or post-war devastation to rotting 
food substances or piles of domestic waste. The soldier’s remaining memory is, he believes,  
of him approaching an abandoned house during the eerily quiet aftermath of the Chernobyl 
region’s evacuation (after which, as part of the area’s radioactive “deactivation”, former-
inhabitants’ pets had to be hunted down and shot dead, since their fur had absorbed high 
levels of radiation). Whether acted upon or not, the consequences of this order, given by the 
authorities overseeing the liquidation, provide content for the possibility of a primal scene. 
The soldier finds a cat within the house: ‘I think’, he recollects, it ‘must be a clay cat. I come 
over, and it’s a real cat. He ate all the flowers in the house. Geraniums. How’d he get in? Or 
did they leave him there?’16 Although traumatic memories cannot disclose the reality of an 
originally experienced event – whether or not the striking memorisation of a cat determines 
the fact that the soldier had shot cats prior to this remembered scene as instructed is 
unverifiable – such memories are not simply an entirely fictional supplement completely 
unrelated to unremembered experience. Rather, the primal scene enables the analyst to 
witness the reaction of the psyche to trauma. ‘In constructing such events,’ Lukacher writes, 
‘we do not flee from history into formalism. Quite the contrary, such constructions enable us 
to grasp something essential in historical experience’.17 For Lukacher, the primal scene is not 
simply a regression from history into fantasy. It does not verify nor disqualify truth, but 
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liberates instead a sort of subjective truthfulness: how one is affected by the perception of 
either real or imagined trauma, constituting ‘a step towards solving the crisis of interpretation 
that emerges when the question of the origin must be remembered but memory fails utterly, 
when all the evidence points towards an origin that nevertheless remains unverifiable’.18 In 
Violence, Slavoj Žižek writes that ‘a distinction needs to be made [...] between (factual) truth 
and truthfulness: what renders a report of a raped woman (or any other narrative of trauma) 
truthful is its very factual unreliability, its confusion, its inconsistency’.19 Irrespective of its 
status as either fact or fiction, the event’s truthfulness is rendered through the recollection of 
traumatic experience, the very prohibition to factual truth. For Chernobyl disaster survivors, 
recollection of the disaster through the fiction of literature, film and imaginative 
interpretation is where the truthfulness of the primal scene is constituted. ‘The construction of 
such primal scenes’, writes Lukacher, ‘thus affords us a new strategy for recovering, through 
intertextual memory, the motive forces of historical change insofar as they enable us to trace 
the emergence of new discourses’.20 This chapter analyses the emergence of new discourses 
on survivors’ recollection and memorialisation of Chernobyl through the primal scene’s 
formation in the photographs taken by Igor Kostin of the disaster’s initial occurrence and 
presented in his book Chernobyl: Confessions of a Reporter (2006), and the disaster’s witness 
testimonies gathered and compiled by Svetlana Alexievich in Voices from Chernobyl: The 
Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster (2006). 
 
Radioactivity and the Real in Igor Kostin’s Chernobyl: Confessions of a Reporter  
 
The radiation from Chernobyl represented the intrusion of a radical contingency. It 
was as if the “normal” enchainment of cause and effect were for a moment suspended 
                                                          
18
 Lukacher, Primal Scenes: Literature, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, p.24 
19
 Slavoj Žižek, Violence, (London: Profile Books, 2008), p.3 
20
 Lukacher, Primal Scenes: Literature, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, p.14 
62 
 
– nobody knew what its exact consequences would be. The experts themselves 
admitted that any determination of the “threshold of danger” was arbitrary; public 
opinion oscillated between panicked anticipation of future catastrophes and 
acceptance that there was no cause for alarm. It is precisely this indifference to its 
mode of symbolization that locates the radiation in the dimension of the real.
21
 
 
 
Igor Kostin, Untitled. 1986. Private Collection. Chernobyl: Confessions of a Reporter, (New York: Corbis, Umbrage 
Editions, 2006), p.3. Print 
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The above photograph, depicting the remains of the Reactor Four turbine hall, is the only one 
of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant as it appeared on the morning of April 26 1986, a few 
hours after the explosion. The photographer, Igor Kostin, a reporter for the Soviet State-
owned press agency Novosti, took multiple aerial photographs of the disaster’s immediate 
aftermath. Due to the site’s extreme radiation, all but this one came out blank. ‘In Kiev, while 
developing it,’ he says: 
 
the film was covered with an opaque surface. Almost all the photographs are entirely 
black, as if the camera had been opened in full light and the film exposed. I did not 
understand it then, but it was due to the radioactivity.
22
  
 
Kostin’s attempt at recollection through photography – a demonstration if not a depiction of 
radiation’s perplexing threshold beyond which witnessing disappears – heralds a return of the 
Lacanian Real. In Kostin’s photographs of Chernobyl, as in any other return of the Real, ‘the 
real which returns has the status of an(other) semblance: precisely because it is real, that is, 
an account of its traumatic/excessive character, we are unable to integrate it into (what we 
experience as) reality’.23 Kostin circles the disaster site in his helicopter, taking photographs 
in an attempt to record the witnessed scene. Chernobyl’s radioactivity, a traumatic force 
which renders the site in excess of photographic reproduction, denies recognition and 
integration of this scene into experienced reality. Here, the cause of trauma, through the 
unrecollectability of the scene that contains it, is ‘the object cause [that] is always missed; all 
we can do is encircle it’.24 However, Kostin’s photographs describe a form of witnessing 
beyond recognition, of trauma that can’t be witnessed or represented in a record of empirical 
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evidence. The sequence of events Kostin experiences constitutes Kelly Oliver’s double 
meaning of witnessing, where ‘eyewitness testimony based on first-hand knowledge, on the 
one hand, and bearing witness to something beyond recognition that can’t be seen, on the 
other – is the heart of subjectivity’.25 Kostin’s opaque photographs bear witness to the 
disaster’s high level of radiation without recording it – by not recording it – echoing witness 
subjectivity wherein a traumatic event has not been memorised but leaves a telling, 
indecipherable, indelible mark upon consciousness in the form of a primal scene. In the 
attempted photographic reproduction of the Chernobyl disaster’s immediate aftermath, as in 
the attempted psychoanalytic recollection of any other witnessed event of trauma, ‘analysis 
appears on the scene to announce that there is knowledge that does not know itself, 
knowledge that is supported by the signifier as such’.26 The unknown knowledge of radiation 
is announced by its disruption of photographic signification. In terms of psychic signification, 
the aim of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, assuming that the unconscious ‘is not 
simply that which must be read but also, and perhaps primarily, that which reads’,27 is to 
interpret the unconscious disruption of the subject’s consciousness. While the unconscious is 
itself inaccessible and therefore unreadable, Shoshana Felman writes that: 
 
what can be read (and perhaps, what should be read) is not just meaning but the lack 
of meaning; that significance lies not just in consciousness but, specifically, in its 
disruption; that the signifier can be analysed in its effects without its signified being 
known; that the lack of meaning – the discontinuity in conscious understanding – can 
and should be interpreted as such, without necessarily being transformed into 
memory.
28
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Being recollected, the events of disruption need not necessarily be transformed into conscious 
and meaningful memories, for this would (perhaps erroneously) identify them as symptoms 
of the subject’s actual traumatic past. After his original psychoanalytic readings of his Wolf 
Man patient, Sergei Pankejeff, Sigmund Freud ‘began to question the authenticity of the 
subject’s memories, and […] suspect[ed] that the therapeutic effect of these “recollected 
ideas” may have nothing to do with their historical reality’.29 Freud’s re-reading of the Wolf 
Man case study is an instance of Nachträglichkeit that echoes his patient’s belated claim at 
four years old for the identification of the primal event occurring in infanthood, from which 
the dream originated. This return to the archive, which is at the same time a return of 
archivisation in the sense of re-reading the archive, charts the crucial shift of a primal scene 
from its status as one definite, traceable event to its status as a series of intertextual instances 
of fantasy and of possible events, which are all beyond the reality of the subject’s past. As a 
direct representation and verification of the disaster, the photographic archive of Chernobyl 
fails; it should cede to a similar interpretative archivization of events beyond their graspable 
reality, analogous to psychoanalytic reading only insofar as ‘the analyst is called upon to 
interpret the excess in the patient’s discourse – what the patient says beyond what he has been 
incited to say’.30 In other words, what he believes, but cannot prove, actually happened. 
Instead, however, after developing the film, Kostin recalls: ‘I ended up obtaining an 
acceptable photograph that I sent to Moscow, to the Novosti agency main office. It was not 
published. But by then I already knew I was going to return to Chernobyl to take more 
photographs’.31 Despite its technological failure and political repression, this process of 
photographic archivisation is repeated in an attempt to verify the historical event of the 
Chernobyl disaster. Similarly, Freud repeatedly revisits his pleasure principle theory to 
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attempt its verification as an actual, psychological event; ‘the complete game’32 is one of 
Freud’s continual departure from and return to the theory, analogous to his grandson Ernst’s 
Fort-Da game of repeatedly throwing away and seeking a wooden spool, which Freud 
analysed in his psychological study ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920). Alan Aycock 
writes on the subject of Freud’s theory of the pleasure principle: ‘Freud never completely 
proved its existence to his satisfaction, but he never discarded it entirely, reworking it 
continually throughout his life’.33 Freud refuses to relinquish his hard work in ‘Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle’. He takes steps to modify his theory using the same psychoanalytic 
practice with which he asserts ‘the complete observation, and the complete interpretation of 
the game’34 of Ernst’s Fort-Da. Here, Freud sticks to his method, attempting to unite a 
number of observed scenes in writing
35
 to prove the pleasure principle’s reality as a universal 
psychic event common to all mental development. In this totalising process or scene of 
interpretative writing, however, Jacques Derrida ‘suspects an incompletion (in the object or in 
its description) [...] in that this is the scene of an interminably repeated supplementation, as if 
it never finished completing itself [...] there is something like an axiom of incompletion in the 
structure of the scene of writing’.36 The unchanging, unsatisfactory method engaged across 
the succession of Freud’s patients – to relate the development of their respective symptoms 
and histories to one theory – yields unsatisfactory proof of the pleasure principle’s actual 
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existence. In navigating and mapping his subjects’ psychological terrain, Freud ‘‘steps for 
nothing’ in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, [takes] one “step further” only to take it back in 
advance’.37           
 Kostin’s attempt to produce a complete, unified map of the Chernobyl Exclusion 
Zone through interconnected instances of its photographic reproduction is derailed by the 
continually changing radioactive scene. One of his photographs depicts the liquidator
38
 
headquarters, where Igor Akimov, the coordinator, is receiving orders by telephone. On the 
wall behind him is a patchwork of enlarged photos – all taken by Kostin – which are used by 
the staff to prepare the liquidation missions. The photos are fragments of visual analysis 
forced together to create an apparently complete scene that can be used to master and safely 
navigate their subject. However, ‘The radioactivity was not diffused in a homogenous way’, 
recalls Kostin. ‘It was like spots appearing on the surface of the Earth. At certain places, it 
measured 500 roentgens, and right next to it, only a few. A strong wind or a rain shower and 
it changed’.39 Here, the dispersal of radioactive ‘spots’, analogous to the ever-shifting and 
divergent behavioural patterns of Freud’s neurotic patients, continually elude fixity in a 
complete, unified scene. As a result, on the mapped-out roof of the Chernobyl power plant, 
the liquidators: 
 
only had to stay for forty seconds. In that time they were to throw one or two shovels 
full of radioactive waste into the wide open hole of block number Four. [...] The siren 
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beeped. Eight soldiers came out running and headed toward the roof. Forty seconds 
later, the siren beeped again: they returned, still running.
40
 
 
In this Fort-Da of investigation, the liquidator, like the analyst, tracks the scene and takes a 
step forward; then its circumstances change and he must retreat lest he enter a dangerous 
space created by misinterpretation. Kostin, like Freud however, continues to step forwards. 
Always attached to the liquidators – soldiers, scientists and workers whose job it was to stop 
the spread of radioactivity at Chernobyl – he recalls: 
 
We were at war against the radiation. Traditional warfare implies that you know 
where deadly bullets are coming from, and that you can hide behind a rock or in a 
trench. At Chernobyl, there was no trench, no tank to protect you. The enemy was 
everywhere, nothing stopped it. You were hit by thousands of bullets and you did not 
know who was firing on you. You did not know if you were injured, or where you had 
been hit, or at which point. So you continued going forward.
41
 
 
Despite the impossibility of its mastery and the threat of death, the navigation and mapping of 
radiation must move forwards. Kostin’s investigation is compelled by a mixture of patriotism 
and the death drive: ‘The idea of remaining at home or, worse, taking the first plane and 
fleeing the radiation, did not cross my mind [...] The workers there [at Chernobyl] spoke the 
same language as I do. They were my people, my brothers. I was one of them. I stayed’.42 
Paraphrasing Freud’s essay, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, Derrida writes that the death 
drive is the drive ‘to return to the inorganic state. The evolution of life is but a detour of the 
inorganic aiming for itself, a race to the death. It exhausts the couriers, from post to post, as 
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well as the witnesses and the relays’.43 The process of investigation through photographic 
archivisation invokes the death drive; the persistent mapping of Chernobyl and the aiming of 
life’s most direct route from one safe spot to the next within the minefield of radiation 
inevitably entails a deadly detour into radioactive death. ‘In the first months of [...] 1987’, 
Igor Kostin recalls, ‘many liquidators were already dead’.44 Here, the doubleness of Derrida’s 
archive fever is at work. The ceaseless drive or journey towards disclosure of the complete 
scene inadvertently and repeatedly diverts down dead ends of enquiry, which disclose only 
ever-shifting fragments. The continuation of the quest to track down, disclose and render 
complete is derailed by this very endeavour. The archive, always compelled to push forwards, 
to strive for access to the impossible unified origin of meaning, necessarily leads itself 
towards its own frustration and ultimately, annihilation. In short, as the theoretical 
introduction to this thesis outlined, archive fever at once founds and renders impossible the 
will to archivisation. Furthermore, without the death drive, Derrida writes, ‘there would not 
in effect be any desire or any possibility for the archive’.45 At Chernobyl, the subject remains 
determined to map the spread of radiation and avoid radioactive death, driven to ensure that 
it:  
 
...dies of its own death, that it follows its own, proper path toward death [...] This step 
must occur within it, from it to it, between it and itself. Therefore one must send away 
the non-proper, reappropriate oneself, make oneself come back until death. Send 
oneself the message of one’s own death.46 
 
 The repeated excursions into Chernobyl, despite the danger this task presents, attempt to put 
off the non-proper, radioactive death; the liquidators must return to Chernobyl until they die 
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of internal, natural death. This ideal goal, reached by successfully mapping safe routes within 
the Exclusion Zone, is achievable according to the State. They promise this eventuality, 
saying that internal, natural death will come; the protection and survival against radiation and 
its non-proper, external death will be guaranteed, proven: ‘Very few [liquidators] thought of 
deserting’, recalls Kostin. He says:  
 
The military promised to double their wages, to triple them, to even multiply them by 
six if they worked very close to the plant. Their morning conversations were filled 
with talk of the cars and the houses that they would be able to buy. We made projects 
and spoke about the future.
47
  
 
According to the State, the liquidators will prevail, even though their work is hard. ‘Every 
day, we would receive the newspaper’, Arkady Filin, one of the liquidators, recalls. ‘I would 
read the headlines: “Chernobyl, place of accomplishment,” “The reactor is defeated,” “Life 
goes on.” The political assistant of our unit organised meetings and said to us that we must 
win. But vanquish who? The atom? Physics? The universe?’48 This rhetorical commitment to 
survival, despite its real cost, is analogised by the operation of the Freudian pleasure principle 
and its deferral to that of the reality principle, in which, Freud writes: 
 
Under the influence of the ego’s instincts of self-preservation, the pleasure principle is 
replaced by the reality principle. This latter principle does not abandon the intention 
of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless demands and carries into effect 
the postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of possibilities of 
gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on this long 
road to pleasure.
49
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The analogy can be described between the following two operations: the super-egoic State 
and its liquidator ego accepting the postponement of immediate pleasure – victory over the 
reactor – for the temporary deferral of this success to the arduous, dangerous, radioactive path 
which will supposedly and ultimately lead to victory, and Freud’s acceptance of the delay of 
satisfactorily proving once and for all the pleasure principle as a universal psychic event. He 
substitutes the immediate attainment of this goal with the “realistic” analytical and theoretical 
detours which will ultimately reward his patience. The liquidators are ill-equipped to deal 
with the radiation they encounter, and Kostin recalls that ‘the first masks they gave us [...] 
were very poorly made. After wearing one for two hours, our mouths would get covered with 
ulcers because of the heat and the bad air circulation’.50 On a different level, Freud is ill-
prepared for the journey ahead, unsure of what difficulties he will encounter to enforce the 
pleasure principle’s survival as a legitimate theory: ‘What follows’, he writes, embarking on 
his theoretical journey to prove the pleasure principle, ‘is speculation, often far-fetched 
speculation, which the reader will consider or dismiss according to his individual 
predilection’.51 Tracing the pleasure principle back to its earliest moment of evolution, Freud 
adds: 
 
For a long time, perhaps, living substance was thus being constantly created afresh 
and easily dying, till decisive external influences altered in such a way as to oblige the 
still surviving substance to diverge even more widely from its original course of life 
and to make even more complicated detours before reaching its aim of death.
52
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Where the life substance was constantly dying and being reborn anew, early psychoanalytic 
theory and its practice was continually rejected, abandoned and replaced by fresh 
hypotheses
53
 until external circumstances arose in the form of Freud’s desire to rework one 
theory, the pleasure principle, through complicated revision so that it “survives” practice; at 
the outset of ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, he writes, his theory of the pleasure principle 
will face constant reinvention: ‘the least rigid hypothesis, it seems to me, will be the best’.54 
The Chernobyl liquidator is forced by external circumstances in the form of the State to make 
ever more complicated detours through the Exclusion Zone before arriving at their own 
proper death. Sergei Sobolev, deputy head of the Executive Committee of the Shield of 
Chernobyl Association, recalls that: 
 
Colonel Yaroshuk [...] walked through the Zone and marked the points of maximum 
radiation – they exploited him in the fullest sense of the term, like he was a robot. 
And he understood this, but he went, he walked from the reactor itself and then out 
through all the sectors around the radius of radioactivity. On foot. With a dosimeter in 
hand. He’d feel a “spot” and then walk around its borders, so he could put it on his 
map accurately.
55
 
 
Survivor testimony marks a shift from singularity to multiplicity, from one witness to many, 
from the State’s desire for one communal analytic result, recollection and articulation of the 
Chernobyl disaster as history – analogous to Freud’s desire for the pleasure principle to be 
understood as a universal psychic event – towards the realisation of many subjective 
recollections, which expose a range of compliant and antagonistic responses to the 
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authoritative, official methods and results of accounting for the disaster. Here, the event of 
the disaster shifts from history to memory, where memory undermines both history and itself; 
on the one hand it exposes history’s heavy censorship and unsatisfactory “closure” of the 
event, and on the other the problematic results of its own recollection: the ways in which it 
memorialises the disaster yet leaves it incomplete, unfinished, always a work-in-progress. 
‘We currently seem to be witnessing a shift from history to memory’, writes Stefan Gunther, 
‘from representational determinacy to protean construction-in process. It could be argued that 
this shift represents a turn from the emphasis on the importance of remembering accurately to 
a reflection on the very processes that define and constitute the act of remembering itself’.56 
Following Gunther, the second section of this chapter will explore the diverse survivor 
recollections of the Chernobyl disaster compiled by journalist Svetlana Alexievich in Voices 
of Chernobyl: the Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster. It will analyse their contestation of the 
event as State-authored history and their self-referential psychological and sociological 
workings. 
 
Screen Memories and Nachträglichkeit in Svetlana Alexievich’s Voices from Chernobyl: The 
Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster 
Sergei Pankejeff’s depression and neuroses, as outlined in the theoretical introduction to this 
thesis, are originated by a traumatic event that cannot be chronologically placed nor 
ontologically verified. Sealed off in an inaccessible time capsule that is buried somewhere in 
Pankejeff’s actual or imagined past, the origin of his depression and neuroses acts as an 
unlocatable and thus undated event. In the absence of a definite answer regarding the source 
of his patient’s trauma, Freud, returning to the Wolf Man case study, ‘questions whether the 
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primal scene, the observation of parental coitus [and the originating moment, Freud 
previously thought, of Pankejeff’s trauma] ever had any reality as an event. It might rather be 
a phantasy concocted from the observation of animals copulating, then referred back to the 
parents’.57 Unsure of its authenticity, Freud: 
 
then felt obliged to re-trace the story, offering another and much less evidential kind 
of origin, to tell another version of the plot, and then to finally leave one juxtaposed to 
the other, indeed one superimposed on the other as a kind of palimpsest, a layered text 
which offers differing versions of the same story.
58
 
 
In a psychoanalytic session, Pankejeff recalls that as a child, ‘Horses [...] gave him an 
uncanny feeling. If a horse was beaten he began to scream, and he was once obliged to leave 
a circus on that account. On other occasions he himself enjoyed beating horses’.59 Freud asks 
in the case study ‘Whether these sorts of contradictory attitudes towards animals were really 
in operation simultaneously, or whether they did not more probably replace one another, but 
if so in what order and when – to all these questions his memory could offer no decisive 
reply’.60 Freud is unable to determine the fixed reality of Pankejeff’s trauma, since a single 
chronology of its neurotic symptoms cannot be recollected. What the case study discloses 
instead of a final truth, as Brooks writes, is a multitude of possible stories: in the above 
example, of Pankejeff being frightened of and at a later time enjoying horses being beaten, of 
vice versa, and of him being simultaneously frightened of and enjoying horses being beaten. 
 The radiation caused by the Chernobyl disaster, itself a trauma-inaugurating event, 
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remains inaccessible to complete understanding due to a similar impasse: during the 
liquidation operation, no scientifically accurate readings of the radiation levels in the 
Exclusion Zone were made available to the liquidators, since granting them access to these 
results (which showed roentgen readings far in excess of the maximum safe dosage) would 
likely lower the liquidators’ morale or cause them to abandon their duties. Instead, only a 
series of contradictory, inaccurate readings were available in the Zone. In Svetlana 
Alexievich’s interviews with surviving liquidators, the interviewees recollected how much 
radiation they thought they received in the Zone, and the counter-claims to these levels that 
were made by other personnel or the Soviet authorities. ‘I talked to some scientists’, a 
liquidator recalls. ‘One told me, “I could lick your helicopter with my tongue and nothing 
would happen to me.” Another said, “You’re flying without protection? You don’t want to 
live too long? Big mistake! Cover yourselves!”’61 He also remembers: ‘On my medical card 
they wrote that I got 21 roentgen, but I’m not sure that’s right’. In the Exclusion Zone, 
 
there’s a man there with a dosimeter, 10-15 kilometres away from the power station, 
he measures the background radiation. These measurements would then be multiplied 
by the number of hours that we flew each day. But I would go from there to the 
reactor, and some days there’d be 80 roentgen, some days 120.62  
 
Like the mutually exclusive interpretations of Pankejeff’s trauma, readings of radiation levels 
in the Exclusion Zone are embroiled in eternal self-conflicts. Just as Pankejeff’s trauma 
cannot originate from both a real and imagined primal scene, a liquidator cannot have gotten 
twenty-one roentgen and, say, one hundred and twenty roentgen in the same instance. Like 
Pankejeff, the totality of the accounts of the radiation levels continue ‘to be frozen in a 
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double and contradictory hypnosis: compelled to testify for and against the reality of an 
alleged misdeed’.63 Freud wants to ascertain whether Pankejeff’s primal scene was real or not 
so that, if it actually did happen, he could definitively prove and thereby steer parents away 
from the real possibility of a misdeed: the enabling of debilitating neuroses of children that 
might occur if they somehow witnesses their parents’ sexual activity. As we have seen, 
however, Pankejeff’s primal scene, and thus its status as a trauma-originating event, remains 
unverifiable, even if parents would still do well to keep out of sight of their children during 
lovemaking.           
 In comparison, the discrepancies in the radiation levels of the Exclusion Zone emerge 
from the intentional absence or political suppression of a true reading. In this way, the 
possible reality of the Zone as a dangerous, debilitating site, in contrast to the infant sight of 
parental copulation, is intentionally obscured rather than naturally inaccessible. Although we 
cannot verify the reality of Pankejeff’s primal scene, we now possess the scientific facts of 
Chernobyl: ‘I’d worked as an engineer for twenty years, I was well-acquainted with the laws 
of physics. I knew that everything living should leave that place, if only for a while’, Marat 
Kokhanov, the former chief engineer of the Institute for Nuclear Energy of the Belarussian 
Academy of Sciences, says. He recalls: 
 
On my first trip to the Zone I measured a background radiation level in the forest five 
to six times higher than on the roads or fields. But high doses were everywhere. The 
tractors were running, the farmers were digging on their plots. In a few villages we 
measured the thyroid activity for adults and children. It was one hundred, sometimes 
two and three hundred times the allowable dosage. There was a woman in our group, 
a radiologist. She became hysterical when she saw that a group of children were 
sitting in a sandbox and playing. We checked breast milk – it was radioactive. We 
went into the stores – as in a lot of village stores, they had the clothes and the food 
right next to each other: suits and dresses, and nearby salami and margarine. They’re 
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lying there in the open, and they’re not even covered with cellophane. We take the 
salami, we take an egg – we make a roentgen image – this isn’t food, it’s a radioactive 
byproduct.          
 We see a woman on a bench near her house, breastfeeding her child – her milk 
has cesium in it – she’s the Chernobyl Madonna.     
 We asked our supervisors, What do we do? How should we be? They said: 
“Take your measurements. Watch television.” On television Gorbachev was calming 
the people: “We’ve taken immediate measures.” I believed it. [...] We were used to 
believing. I’m from the postwar generation. I grew up with this belief, this faith. 
Where did it come from? We’d won that terrible war [the Great Patriotic War]. The 
whole world was grateful to us then.       
 So here’s the answer to your question. Why did we keep silent knowing what 
we knew? Why didn’t we go out into the square and yell the truth? We compiled our 
reports, we put together explanatory notes. But we kept quiet and carried out our 
orders without a murmur because of Party discipline.
64
  
 
 Here, the misdeed of not informing the affected people of the true levels of radiation which 
greatly exceed the allowable dosage is overlaid by another story: a reassuring narrative 
orchestrated by the Party in which heroes comparable to those who fought in the Great 
Patriotic War are saving the people from nuclear disaster. In a return to Brooks’s image of 
Freud’s multiple interpretations of the Wolf Man case study, this superimposing of one text 
upon another is a palimpsest in the sense that the overlaid text scrapes away the underlying 
one so that, instead of offering multiple readings of the event, one version is made available 
(the word palimpsest derives from the Latin palimpsēstus, meaning “scraped clean and used 
again”). This erasing, heroic narrative is exposed by the following survivor testimony of an 
event that occurred shortly after the liquidation of the Chernobyl region began, but before the 
evacuation order was issued:  
 
People from the Party would come to the villages and the factories to speak with the 
populace, but not one of them could say what deactivation was, what the coefficient 
was for the leakage of radionuclides into the food supply. They didn’t say anything 
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about alpha- or beta- or gamma-rays, about radiobiology, ionizing radiation, not to 
mention about isotopes. For them, these were things from another world. They gave 
talks about the heroism of the Soviet people, told stories about military bravery, about 
the machinations of Western spy agencies.
65
  
 
This account bears witness to the repression of information pertaining to the Zone’s 
radioactivity; the Party officials do not know about (or are not allowed to mention) the 
various types of radioactive decay. Instead, stories about military heroism and “the enemy” 
invoke an illusion of war.          
 The repressed content that refers to radiation bears a striking resemblance to Freud’s 
theory of the repressed in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, which has ‘no other endeavour 
than to break through the pressure weighing down on it and force its way either to 
consciousness or to a discharge through some real action’;66 it is by the repressive power of 
the ego, which keeps unconscious, destructive drives at bay, Freud adds, that the repressed 
event remains unknown. The political repression of information regarding radiation with 
rhetoric forms a screen memory: a protective psychic layer that, when placed within the 
Chernobyl region inhabitant, prevents them from discovering the traumatic, excessive truth of 
the disaster, which was founded by Kokhanov’s earlier dosimetric measurements. A 
psychological version of Freud’s theory of protozoic barriers of single-cell organisms erected 
against excessive external stimuli, the screen memory conventionally prevents a previously 
experienced or witnessed trauma from violently erupting from its repressed, unconscious 
state into conscious awareness. In a private letter to Wilhelm Fleiss (1899), later published as 
‘Screen Memories’ (1950), Freud identifies the screen memory as the result of a psychic 
resistance towards the formation of an authentic memory of an original, traumatic event. Due 
to the repression of authentic memory during the witnessing act, 
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What is recorded in the memory is not the relevant experience itself – in this respect 
the resistance gets its way; what is recorded is another psychical element closely 
associated with the objectionable one [...] And since the elements of the experience 
which aroused objection were precisely the important ones, the substituted memory 
will necessarily lack those important elements and will in consequence most probably 
strike us as trivial.
67
 
 
The screen memory at Chernobyl, of heroism and war, which fills the local, lay population’s 
absence of memories of the region’s radiation, is externally, sociologically imposed upon 
them by the State-as-superego. Instead of a witnessed scene of trauma being replaced, as in 
Freud’s theory, the screen memory here covers an original absence of witnessing; the 
inhabitants of the region not involved with the liquidation, or who were not part of the plant’s 
staff, did not initially know anything was radioactive.    
 This absence of memory, which is concealed through the substitute, screen memory, 
marks a designated return to a previous, fictional state of memory. The notions of heroism 
associated with the Great Patriotic War are culturally resonant for the Chernobyl survivor, 
even for those who were born after the war’s historical occurrence. These notions form a 
memoir-like fiction, ‘a product of wishful distortion,’ equivalent in meaning to Madelon 
Sprengnether’s definition of the screen memory, ‘based on adult needs or desires [to avoid 
pain]’.68 The establishment of the anachronistic past in the Chernobyl present essentially 
fictionalises the experience of the disaster. ‘What happened can never be recalled verbatim’, 
Sprengnether writes. ‘By inventing details of scene and dialogue, creating composite 
characters, and compressing and rearranging events, the memoir writer necessarily 
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“fictionalizes” his or her experience’.69 Amongst the eerily quiet streets of Pripyat after the 
evacuation, one liquidator recalls that ‘there are still posters: “Our goal is the happiness of all 
mankind.” “The world proletariat will triumph.” “The ideas of Lenin are immortal.” You go 
back to the past’.70 To function as a successful protective psychic layer, the screen memory 
must be deprived of traumatic content. The above testimony bears witness to the overwriting 
of reality with images and slogans referring to the wartime past. Here, the Chernobyl present 
is not shaped by the actual, historical event of the Great Patriotic War, but by the fiction that 
refers to the war through the temporally ubiquitous, patriotic slogans printed on propaganda 
posters. These printed words are deprived of any actual, experienced wartime trauma, and are 
instead based on wishful distortions of the war, inspiring courage and promising a 
pleasurable, permanent, ideal timelessness.
71
 Even those who did not participate in the Great 
Patriotic War feel compelled to obey the reality principle these words embody, in which the 
immediate advent of the ideal state, the State of complete, revolutionary victory, is deferred 
by the promise of its long-term arrival. ‘I’d never been to war’, a second liquidator recalls, 
but I got a familiar feeling. I remembered it from somewhere. From where? I connected it to 
death, for some reason’.72 Here, the reality principle of wartime Soviet propaganda forms a 
universal experiential substance, dislocated from history and replanted at Chernobyl by 
memory, which any witness can associate with the nuclear disaster so as to screen off its 
traumatic nature. For those who do remember the war from first-hand experience, military 
blockades designed to keep evacuees out of the radioactive Exclusion Zone assume a former 
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significance. Some residents ‘sneak into their villages through a military blockade’, recalls 
Anatoly Shimanskiy, a journalist reporting from the zone. ‘Through snowy forests, through 
camps, at night. They get chased, caught by helicopters, cars. “It’s like when the Germans 
were here,” the old-timers say’.73 This mnemic return to the Great Patriotic War, which is not 
a return to the exact conditions of the event but to a memory of them, is, like an organism 
following the pleasure principle, a return to ‘an old state of things, an initial state from which 
the living entity has at one time or other departed and to which it is striving to return by the 
circuitous paths along which its development leads’.74 This movement is also a race towards 
the destination of death, Derrida would remind us. The above testimonies bear witness to the 
palimpsestic “scraping away” and overwriting of the radioactive reality of the Chernobyl 
present by recollections of the Great Patriotic War. It is through the circuitous, timeless 
image of revolution enshrined in the recollected propaganda posters where ideas, actions and 
words become eternal, where the end leads to the beginning, where the dead become 
immortal, and thus, as Derrida writes, where ‘the end of the living, its aim and term, is the 
return to the inorganic state’.75       
 ‘Much has changed in the world since these interviews were completed in 1996’76, 
Keith Gessen writes in his Translator’s Preface to Alexievich’s Voices from Chernobyl. Since 
the fall of Soviet communism in 1989, reports on the true levels of radioactivity in the 
Exclusion Zone such as Marat Kokhanov’s, which were repressed by “Party discipline”, had 
less to stand in the way of their routes to publication. In Belarus,  
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Aleksandr Lukashenka is now Europe’s most brazen dictator, confidently heading for 
a fourth presidential term after repeatedly “disappearing” opposing politicians. 
Though usually deaf to European protests, Lukashenka did in August 2005 grant 
amnesty to Yuri Bandazhevsky, imprisoned in 1999 after publicising research that 
indicated that the effects of the Chernobyl accident were more serious than previously 
understood, especially in children.
77
 
 
For Freud, the belated return of repressed trauma by the deferred act of memory is a return 
not of the traumatic event itself, but of traumatic memory, a Nachträglichkeit or “afterwards-
ness” of trauma. As Freidrich-Wilhelm Eickhoff writes, ‘Nachträglichkeit provides the 
memory, not the event, with traumatic significance’.78 What is undecidable, for Freud, is the 
moment when an event, in memory, takes on its traumatic significance. In a lengthy footnote 
to the Wolf Man case study in ‘The History of an Infantile Neurosis’, he writes: 
 
We must not forget the actual situation which lies behind the abbreviated description 
given in the text: the patient under analysis, at an age of over twenty-five years, was 
putting the impressions and impulses of his fourth year into words which he would 
never have found at that time. If we fail to notice this, it may easily seem comic and 
incredible that a child of four should be capable of such technical judgements and 
learned notions. This is simply another instance of deferred action. At the age of one 
and a half the child receives an impression to which he is unable to react accordingly; 
he is only able to understand it and to be moved by it when the impression is revived 
in him at age four; and only twenty years later, during the analysis, is he able to grasp 
with his conscious mental processes what was going on in him. The patient justifiably 
disregards the three periods of time, and puts his present ego into the situation which 
is long past.
79
 
 
This compression of time between the event’s occurrence and its various revisionist 
recollections puzzles Freud; at what point in Pankejeff’s past, he questions, did the analysed 
trauma emerge? If not in the immemorial infant period – where he believes the traumatic 
                                                          
77
 Keith Gessen, ‘Translator’s Preface’, xii 
78
 Friedrich-Wilhelm Eickhoff, ‘On Nachträglichkeit: The Modernity of an Old Concept’, in The International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, (Vol. 87, No. 6, December 2006), p.1453 
79
 Freud, ‘On The History of an Infantile Neurosis’, p.45 
83 
 
event took place but was repressed due to Pankejeff’s insufficient mental development – then 
in which subsequent recollection? Like Freud himself, Pankejeff at age twenty-four becomes 
an analyst or narrator, ‘engaged in a complex process of investigating, constructing, and 
revising the trajectories’80 of his history. Like the screen memory, a cover story in which the 
repressed, traumatic past is artfully concealed through latent invention, each successive act of 
Nachträglich recollection, in which the author possesses a more advanced level of 
interpretation and articulation, writes memory as fiction.     
 Where the screen memory fictionalises the experience of the Chernobyl disaster by 
overwriting it with memories deprived of traumatic content, Nachträglich memories 
fictionalise it by reconstituting the absence within memory with latent memory – recordings 
of the event that are not contemporary to it. Anna Badaeva, an evacuee from the Chernobyl 
Exclusion Zone who re-settled there after the collapse of Soviet communism, recollects that 
the world into which information about radiation has been reintroduced is ‘a new world. 
Everything’s different. Is that the radiation’s fault, or what?’81 Although information about 
radiation can be reintroduced to Badaeva’s past and present experiences of reality, it cannot 
disclose the past as traumatic because it fails to locate the emergence of this trauma as an 
event in the historical past. Following Eickhoff, trauma emerges in the present reintroduction 
of memory, not the past event the memory refers to, which has the effect of updating the non-
traumatic experience of a so-called safe Chernobyl landscape as unsafe, which had, since the 
disaster, always been contaminated by the radiation that was politically repressed during 
Soviet times. Referring to the belatedly published, reliable reports, which are no longer 
subject to this political repression, Badaeva recalls: ‘They scare us! The apples are hanging in 
the garden, the leaves are on the trees, the potatoes are in the fields. I don’t think there was 
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any Chernobyl, they made it up. They tricked people’.82 ‘There were berries in the forest, and 
mushrooms. But now that’s all gone. They don’t let you eat the mushrooms or the berries. I 
always thought that what was boiling in your pot would never change, but it’s not like that’.83 
The memory revision that new information engenders does not disclose a stable, actual past 
from which trauma emerges historically but a continually shifting fiction which provokes 
trauma only in this past’s constant recollection. ‘That in remembering,’ Eickhoff writes, ‘the 
past is depicted from the understanding of the present instead of being kept and simply 
discovered in the memory. Therefore, it will subsequently only become what it will always 
have been in the future’.84 For Anna Badaeva, however, Chernobyl may never become in 
memory what it always was in history; there is, as in all Nachträglich recollections, a 
compression of time between the emergence of radiation at Chernobyl and her awareness of 
it, but she cannot project her ego into the past as Pankejeff did during his psychoanalytic 
sessions with Freud, a movement that was discussed earlier in this section. Instead, she 
refuses to believe the Nachträglich supplement of the belatedly published reports; the 
presence of radiation thus remains unintegrated with her memory of the past – a fiction in the 
sense that the radioactive contamination of gardens, fields and forests did not occur.  
 It is arguable, then, that the sudden emergence of radiation at Chernobyl may not be 
the origin of Chernobyl trauma since we cannot save it from being but a memory, subject as it 
is to the constant development or degradation of the mind, the advent of new information, 
and revised recollection.
85
 Symptoms of Chernobyl trauma could be engendered by an 
imagined or alternative event that takes place prior to the disaster or elsewhere, beyond the 
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Exclusion Zone. The origin of trauma, like a primal scene, exists in ontological flux between 
singular reality and manifold fiction, the historical event and the multiple moments of its 
interpretation or imagination. ‘What the primal scene establishes’, Ned Lukacher writes, ‘is 
that at the origin one discovers not a single event that transpires in one temporal sequence but 
a constellation of events that transpire in several discrete temporal sequences’.86 In the Wolf 
Man case study, to further explore its contradictions examined earlier in this section, ‘the 
issue seems to be whether the Wolf Man’s main nightmare [of the wolves in the tree] and his 
subsequent neurosis produced their own fictitious origin, or whether the nightmare and the 
neurosis indeed resulted from a prior and real event’.87 The reversible temporal sequence of 
actual event to trauma or trauma to retrospectively imagined event discloses mutually 
exclusive explanations for how the neuroses originated and later manifested their symptoms: 
Pankejeff’s dream of wolves either posits fictional origins of trauma misremembered as real, 
or refers to one or many possible events that the dreamt wolves symptomatically symbolise. 
If the origin is imagined, the dream discredits as symptoms of a single traumatic event 
(among other things) his forced, repeated witnessing and being scared in childhood of an 
image of a wolf that ‘was standing upright, striding out with one foot’, represented in a 
particular picture-book. ‘His elder sister, who was very much his superior, used to tease him 
by holding up this particular picture in front of him on some excuse or other, so that he was 
terrified and began to scream’.88 Traumatic significance may be assigned to this childhood 
image retrospectively by the adult Pankejeff after recalling the occasion of his dream. 
Conversely, if the trauma did result from a real event, his neuroses may be symptoms of 
interrelated, traumatic, yet still unverifiable events that also occurred in his past: his supposed 
witnessing of the crouched floor-polishing housekeeper, Grusha, his earlier attempted sexual 
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seduction by his sister, or his infant witnessing of his parents’ coitus a tergo. ‘Would she 
[Pankejeff’s sister] have touched him in a way that the child could have called “polish” as 
one also says “polish” a wooden floor?’89 Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok ask in The 
Wolf Man’s Secret Word: A Cryptonomy. Is this action in some way related to the scene of 
parental copulation, which was described in the theoretical introduction to this thesis? All the 
readings of the Wolf Man case study, after their careful consideration of the evidence, 
oscillate between determining the unverifiable events of traumatic origination and the 
manifestation of symptoms as reality on the one hand, and as fantasy on the other. Whether it 
is real or imagined, the event of Pankejeff’s infant witnessing of his parents’ coitus a tergo 
only gains its traumatic significance by deferral upon ‘the transformation of the memory into 
a trauma at age 4, a striking example of Nachträglichkeit’.90 In other words, there is nothing 
inherently traumatic about Pankejeff’s experience of the primal event; it is the memory of it 
which is traumatic, experienced as a trauma at age four, but only disclosed as such during 
Freud’s analysis twenty years later. The disclosure of trauma and its possible cause only 
occurs during continual analysis of the case study in an always incomplete and interminable 
scene of writing. The past, instead of being always already complete, in need only of 
disclosure, is constituted and reconstituted by analysis, forming, for Derrida, ‘repositories of 
a meaning which was never present, whose signified presence is always reconstituted by 
deferral, Nachträglichkeit, belatedly, supplementarily: for the Nachträglichkeit also means 
supplementary’.91 Pankejeff’s past is never complete: it is belatedly and continually 
reconstituted in the footnotes of Freud’s adaptive reading and postscripts by subsequent 
theorists. ‘Derrida says pointedly,’ as Eickoff reminds us, that ‘the postscript generates the 
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past-present’92 (and therefore, the fiction-truth) of the scene of writing. Freud refuses to 
relinquish his theory that the origin of Pankejeff’s trauma is the real or imagined scene of his 
parents’ coitus a tergo, maintaining its validity as source through addendums to his analysis. 
As stated in the theoretical introduction to this thesis, after positing the primal scene through 
his patient’s dream analysis, it occurs to Freud that the decisive event of parental copulation 
may be fictional: retrospectively constructed as the origin of trauma by the forces of 
imaginary production. This theoretical revision occurs after Freud’s belated discovery of 
Pankejeff’s memory of witnessing copulating animals as a child; through Nachträglichkeit 
the latter retrospectively misremembers the act taking place between his parents, the scene 
supposedly witnessed in infanthood.         
 In a similar form of postscripting of the Chernobyl disaster, Anatoly Shimanskiy 
keeps ‘a separate notebook [about events that happen in the Exclusion Zone]. I write down 
conversations, rumours, anecdotes. It’s the most interesting thing, and it’s outside of time. 
What remains of ancient Greece? The myths of ancient Greece.’ ‘The Chernobyl explosion 
gave us the mythology of Chernobyl’93, he continues. As mythology, the Chernobyl disaster, 
like Pankejeff’s catastrophe, is at once event and non-event, occurring, on the one hand, in 
the inaccessible past, and on the other, in imagination. It is unverifiable, committing itself 
neither to pastness nor fiction. Its origin is retrospectively and continually constituted by an 
ahistorical and therefore hypothetical archive. Shimanskiy’s notebook refers to disastrous 
events as ones which cannot be accurately dated, disproved or authenticated. Myth, like 
memory, compresses the time between the inaccessible, unverifiable past event and its ever-
present, Nachträglichkeit recollection and imaginative reinterpretation. Like the 
reinterpretation of the events of ancient Greek myth, the Chernobyl disaster, like Pankejeff’s 
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trauma, ‘is neither a sequence flowing from a reconstructed originary event nor a progression 
positing a fictional event for its own coherence’, but instead ‘resolves the following dilemma: 
how to live without having to say yes or no to reality or fiction while continuing to refer to 
both’.94 To live with the trauma of radiation, the Chernobyl survivor must recollect it in a 
memorised account, but not through photographic or psychoanalytic means, which always 
fail to posit their results as actual, historical events (the photograph or map only provides a 
snapshot of the constantly changing Chernobyl environment, the psychoanalytic session of 
the constantly changing environment of memory). Jan Ceuppens is the author of an essay 
entitled ‘Transcripts: An Ethics of Representation in The Emigrants’, which is a novel by 
German novelist W.G Sebald that recounts the life stories of four fictional emigrants from the 
German past. This past consists of the First and Second World Wars and the Holocaust, 
historical events which occurred before Sebald himself was born. In her essay, Ceuppens 
writes that: 
 
somehow we will always be missing something, something that disrupts or contradicts 
any reading. We are put in a situation where we have to choose between two readings, 
which are equally probable (or improbable), but which are nevertheless mutually 
exclusive. And that is where the text becomes readable, which is to say, unreadable: it 
thwarts understanding. With every new reading of a text, a new unreadability will be 
produced.
95
 
 
 
Where Sebald generationally missed the events he describes in his novel, the Chernobyl 
survivor, who was unaware of the catastrophic events as they occurred, recollects them in 
absentia, belatedly, in the Nachträglichkeit of testimony. Sebald opts for a return to the actual 
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German past through its fictionalisation, positing an account of real events through the 
Nachträglichkeit of the novel genre. Here, the text bears witness to the existence of 
unreadable, actual German trauma. The belated presence of readable trauma fiction, which 
can only ever be about traumatic unreadability, represents or bears witness to history that 
objective, empirical analysis cannot disclose, even if it feverishly attempts to do so;
96
 The 
Emigrants contains many black and white, purposely untitled and unannotated photographs 
which are thus unable to shed any light upon the period they depict. Similarly, Anna 
Badaeva, the Chernobyl re-settler who said that the Chernobyl disaster did not occur due to 
the imperceptibility of radiation, reconsiders her reading, recalling towards the end of her 
testimony how she knew that the event really did take place:  
 
But here’s what did happen. My grandfather kept bees, five nests of them. They didn’t 
come out for two days, not a single one. They just stayed in their nests. They were 
waiting. My grandfather didn’t know about the explosion, he was running all over the 
yard: what’s this? What’s going on? Something’s happened to nature. And their 
system, as our neighbour told us, he’s a teacher, it’s better than ours, better tuned, 
because they heard it right away. The radio wasn’t saying anything, and the papers 
weren’t either. But the bees knew.97  
 
Here, Badaeva switches from the mutually exclusive reading of the Chernobyl disaster as 
non-occurrence to that of its occurrence, where the unreadable imperceptibility of radiation 
becomes readable only through the “sub-factual”, behavioural interpretation of nature – for 
her, a Nachträglich reading of animal testimony that is supplementary to the earlier 
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disavowal of the disclosure of radiation. Anatoly Shimanskiy recollects one of his anecdotes, 
which also concerns the truthful witnessing of the disaster by nature:  
 
The ants crawling along the tree branch. There’s military equipment everywhere. 
Soldiers, cries, curses, swearing, helicopters rattling. But they’re crawling.  
 I was coming back from the Zone and, of all the things I saw that day, the only 
one that remained clear in my memory was the image of those ants. We’d stopped in 
the forest and I stood smoking next to a birch. I stood very close, leaning on it. Right 
in front of my face the ants were crawling on the branch, not paying us any mind. 
We’ll be gone, and they won’t notice. And me? I’ve never looked at them so closely 
before.
98
 
 
For Shimanskiy, the ants, oblivious to the sensory bombardment of other indistinguishable, 
chaotic scenes at the site of trauma, constitute a Nachträglichkeit reading of trauma fiction. 
Shimanskiy looks closely at the ants, which, unlike Badaeva’s grandfather’s bees, show no 
aberrant behaviour that might be a response to radiation. He stands in front of the gaze of the 
animal, which Derrida defines as ‘a gaze that is vacant to the extent of being bottomless, at 
the same time innocent and cruel perhaps, perhaps sensitive and impassive, good and bad, 
uninterpretable, unreadable, undecidable, abyssal and secret’.99 The gaze of the animal, as a 
testimony to trauma, is fictional, unverifiable in and of itself, derived perhaps solely from 
human interpretation. In this interpreted – one might say imagined – sense, animals at 
Chernobyl are traumatised subjects, whose experience of the disaster is similar to the 
unconscious human experience of politically repressed radiation. Like these human survivors, 
who, during the period of the political repression of radiation, were deprived of the power of 
language and understanding with which to describe and assimilate radioactivity into their 
experience of reality, Chernobyl animals are without consciousness of trauma. In his essay 
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‘The Animal That I Therefore Am (More to Follow)’ (1999), Derrida articulates his 
embarrassment of seeing his cat, a naked animal, seeing him naked after he has taken a 
shower. ‘The property unique to animals and what in the formal analysis distinguishes them 
from man’, he writes, ‘is their being naked without knowing it. Not being naked therefore, 
not having knowledge of their nudity, in short without consciousness of good and evil’.100 
Just as the Chernobyl animal is naked without knowing it, it is also traumatised without 
knowing it, or if, in knowing it, cannot say so in a way that satisfies human understanding. 
The gaze of the traumatised Chernobyl animal is ‘the gaze of a seer, visionary, or extra-lucid, 
blind person’.101 It can see trauma that is beyond the perception of and incommunicable 
within the category of the animal. Because this knowledge cannot be assimilated as 
understanding nor counted as evidence in the case for the verification of the event as 
traumatic, the Chernobyl witness realises in the Nachträglichkeit of reading or inventing 
traumatised animal subjectivity that a memory of an event of trauma, which may or may not 
be real, is all that can be possessed. Where Derrida asks provocatively ‘whether animals can 
suffer’,102 a question without a knowable answer, Shimanskiy considers the subjectivity of the 
ants he discovered at the Exclusion Zone: they were there before he arrived and will still be 
there after he has left. This human memory of animal trauma, an inaccessible past in reality, 
is formed through the Nachträglichkeit of imaginative interpretation. It enables the survivor 
to determine a way of living with and therapeutically responding to the symptoms of 
Chernobyl trauma without ever knowing their authenticity or origin. For Derrida, to heal by 
bearing witness and giving form to animal trauma through Nachträglichkeit, ‘to follow and to 
be after’ the animal, ‘begins by wondering what to respond means, and whether an animal 
ever replies in its own name’.103 Sergei Gurin, a cameraman who recorded films of the 
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Chernobyl Exclusion Zone after the evacuation, showed his work to schoolchildren. He 
remembers: 
 
This boy, stammering and blushing, you could tell he was one of the quiet ones, 
asked: “Why couldn’t anyone help the animals?” This was already a person from the 
future. I couldn’t answer that question. Our art is about the suffering and loves of 
people, but not of everything living. Only humans. We don’t descend to their level: 
animals, plants, that other world. And with Chernobyl man just waved his hand at 
everything.
104
  
 
For Gurin, the act of interpreting unacknowledged, unspoken animal trauma, of promising to 
help the animals, occurs by way of responding through the animal’s own testimony – for 
‘man is a promising animal’, Derrida writes, ‘an animal that is permitted to make 
promises’.105 These promises articulate a response that, though it is imaginary and offers no 
concrete solutions to help the animals, reworks the anthropocentric understanding of 
Chernobyl trauma, expanding its definition to include animal sufferers. As a promising 
animal, Gurin, through his filmic language of animals, engenders, like the psychoanalytic 
treatment of the Wolf Man, Sergei Pankejeff, ‘the therapeutic effect of “recollected ideas” 
[which] may have nothing to do with their historical reality’.106 ‘I want to make a film called 
“Hostages,” about animals’, Gurin recalls. He continues, saying: 
 
A strange thing happened to me. I became closer to animals. And trees, and birds. 
They’re closer to me than they were, the distance between us has narrowed. I go to the 
Zone now, all these years, I see a wild boar jumping out of an abandoned human 
house, and then an elk. That’s what I shoot. I want to make a film, to see everything 
through the eyes of an animal. “What are you shooting?” people say to me. “Look 
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around you. There’s a war on in Chechnya.” But Saint Francis preached to the birds. 
He spoke to them as equals. What if these birds spoke to him in their bird language, 
and it wasn’t he who condescended to them?107 
 
Gurin’s promise to animals is to reproduce the language of the animal, to reply in the name of 
the animal, not to condescend but to respond to the animal in a way he imagines it to 
understand. This attempt at an understood response, he imagines, takes the form of the gaze 
of the animal abandoned by humans, culturally repressed through the anthropocentric 
understanding of the disaster’s traumatic impact. Where the radioactive effects of the disaster 
upon the liquidators and original inhabitants of the Chernobyl region were politically 
repressed or downplayed by the Soviet authorities, these same radioactive effects on the local 
wildlife were largely forgotten about or perceived as trivial by reporters, commentators and 
survivors. The repression of animal and human traumas are analogous, perhaps: referring to 
animals, Gurin says, ‘We don’t have any way of giving them the necessary information 
[about Chernobyl]. It’s also a philosophical dilemma. A perestroika of our feelings is 
happening here’.108 This perestroika or restructuring of thought turns towards the imaginative 
interpretation of “sub-fact”, at times the only readable source available.   
 Where Gurin desires to reproduce Chernobyl from an animal’s perspective – an 
invented account of the disaster’s impact that he imagines animals can understand – Anatoly 
Shimanskiy recollects information about Chernobyl based not on provable factual but 
unprovable sub-factual details that instead require interpretation through human imagination. 
He remembers some advice a woman working at a hotel told him: ‘“People don’t believe the 
papers, television, or radio–they look for information in the behaviour of the bosses, that’s 
more reliable.”’109 Here, it is not information but imagination that is reliable; animal sources 
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cannot intend information and human ones intend, if anything, only misinformation.
110
 
However, these sources yield alternative meaning through their reading as non-events, 
behavioural patterns which, like those of Pankejeff, may not refer to actual events but act 
only as symptoms of unverifiable or imaginary ones. In other words, the imagination of 
Chernobyl’s effects upon humans and animals, in the absence of historical, knowable causes, 
founds information about the disaster required to therapeutically reconstitute its traumatic 
absence of understanding or occurrence.      
 Shimanskiy’s notebook records the following anonymous survivor’s testimony: ‘“I 
went back to the village after a year [of evacuation]. The dogs have gone wild. I found our 
Rex, called him. He won’t come. Did he not recognize me? Or does he not want to? He’s 
angry at us.”’111 Here, it is assumed that the dogs in the Exclusion Zone have gone wild due 
to their abandonment by their former owners; they do not or choose not to respond because 
they are angry with them. This fictional testimony of dogs, which assumes the answer to its 
own question of a dog’s disobedience, renders its subjects’ behavioural responses to trauma 
as passive performance, a problematic position where its writer creatively influences the 
reading so that it might lose its convincing reliability. In Trauma Fiction, Anne Whitehead 
writes that: 
 
Trauma fiction problematises its own formal properties, at the level of reference (what 
relation does the narrative bear to reality?), subjectivity (can the traumatised subject 
still say ‘I’ in a way that has meaning?) and story (does the character control the 
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‘plot’, or is he or she controlled by it?). Trauma fiction often demands of the reader a 
suspension of disbelief and novelists frequently draw on the supernatural.
112
 
 
In writing Chernobyl, Shimanskiy’s notebook depicts an imaginary, supernatural world 
where, contrary to reality, dogs possess a readable subjectivity by a creative process beyond 
their control; it is a world in which ‘Foxes and wolves go into the villages and play with the 
children’, and where: 
 
The Chernobylites are giving birth to children who have an unknown yellow fluid 
instead of blood. There are scientists who insist that monkeys became intelligent 
because they lived near radiation. Children born in three or four generations will be 
Einsteins.
113
  
 
The artfulness of man’s imagination, speech and writing allow him to exhort his superiority 
over the animal, which is expanded here to include both animals and human animals; both are 
deprived of speech, understanding and control over their own radioactive destinies. Here, 
man, the promising animal who speaks and writes on behalf of the animal, as Derrida might 
say, names the animals, that is to say, calls them by their names. The survivor who calls their 
dog, Rex, by his name and creates the dog’s disobedient response, at once owns him, saves 
him, and sends him away, condemns him to death; he survives as a memory, a memorial 
connected to the human as a dog to its master, and dies to become lost to recollection, a feral 
animal who cannot or will not return to the world of the living. ‘Every case of naming’, 
Derrida writes, ‘involves announcing a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, the 
longevity of a name that survives whoever carries that name. Whoever receives a name feels 
mortal or dying precisely because the name seeks to save him, to call him and thus assume 
                                                          
112
 Anne Whitehead, Trauma Fiction, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), pp.83-84 
113
 Shimanskiy, ‘Monologue About Writing Chernobyl’, p.129 
96 
 
his survival’.114 It is this creative, ceremonial performance of naming the animals, 
originating, as Derrida writes, in Adam’s naming of the animals in The Book of Genesis, 
wherein man asserts his dominance over them. Through language he brings them to life, 
tames them and sends them dancing towards their deaths. Man is ‘(following), I pursue, I 
track, overcome, and tame the animal’.115 Derrida writes of another mythological man who 
tamed animals: Bellerophon, a hero of Greek mythology who tamed the winged horse 
Pegasus. Bellerophon held Pegasus ‘by the bit, a “golden bit given to him by Athene.” 
Holding him by the bit he makes him dance; he orders him to do some dance steps. I 
underline in passing to this allusion’, continues Derrida, ‘to the choreography of the animal in 
order to announce that, much later, we will encounter a certain animal danciness’.116 The 
Chernobyl survivor recorded in Shimanskiy’s notebook is a verbal choreographer of dance 
steps: the conjured image of foxes and wolves playing with children in the villages around 
Chernobyl is an encounter with this animal danciness, a mythological narrative at once 
taming the Chernobyl animal and defining it as untameable, irrevocably changed and lost by 
the traumatic conditions of the disaster. To those animals that cannot speak of their disastrous 
transformation – the animals that go into the villages and the superhumans waiting to be born 
– the speaking, writing Chernobyl survivor is the master.     
 Another hero of Greek mythology, Orpheus, also exemplifies this mastery. Orpheus 
tamed the animals with narrative in the form of the music he played on his lyre. In the legend 
of Orpheus, Orpheus’ musical skill draws the animals towards him, charming and coaxing 
them to dance, giving them a new lease of life. Similarly, the legend tells of his journey into 
the Underworld to retrieve his dead wife, Eurydice, from Hades. Granted his wish of her 
resurrection, Orpheus disobeys Hades’ express command not to turn around and look at his 
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wife on their journey back to the world of the living. Consequently, Eurydice is returned to 
the Underworld, to death and separation from her husband. Once again, the creator, a male 
gaze, calls forth its subject, calls it to life, and then sends it away again, destroys it. This 
performance of calling forth and sending away the subject, a game of Fort-Da with which to 
attempt its permanent life, enacts what Derrida might call a foreshadowing of mourning,
117
 a 
prediction of life’s failure and the failure to resurrect it. For the animal at Chernobyl, ‘being 
called, hearing oneself being named, receiving a name for the first time involves something 
like the knowledge of being mortal and even the feeling that one is dying. Already dead by 
virtue of being promised death: dying’.118 The third and final section of this chapter will 
introduce this performance of creatively predicting or providing the foreknowledge of death 
at Chernobyl, heralding mourning and melancholy through elegy. 
 
“Rampaging permissively into other people’s sadness”: Prelude to Elegy 
The human animal, laid out in the previous section of this chapter, is muted, tamed, and 
choreographed by the mourner’s testimony. Vasily Ignatenko, a fire fighter who helped 
extinguish the initial blaze at Chernobyl and who died of radiation poisoning a few weeks 
later, is reconstituted after his death in the imagination of his wife, Lyudmilla. ‘Sometimes 
it’s as though I hear his voice’, she recalls. ‘Alive. Even photographs don’t have the same 
effect on me as that voice. But he never calls out to me...not even in my dreams. I’m the one 
who calls to him’.119 Here, the mourner’s recalling of the love object – a creative process of 
resurrecting it as interiorised life – serves to reaffirm the separation between the two that the 
latter’s death has established. Lyudmilla’s memories of her husband as alive, which re-
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establish the fact of his actual death, outline a process of normal mourning wherein the 
subject introjects the lost love object by “casting inside” or memorialising his or her past 
relations with it so as to surmount the loss. During Vasily’s radioactive disintegration in the 
hospital ward into which he was taken after tackling the fire at Chernobyl, Lyudmilla 
memorialises the relationship she once had with him: 
 
He’s sleeping, and I’m whispering, “I love you.” Walking in the hospital courtyard, “I 
love you.” Carrying his sanitary tray, “I love you.” I remembered how we used to live 
at home. He only fell asleep at night after he’d taken my hand. That was a habit of his 
– to hold my hand as he slept. All night. So in the hospital I take his hand and don’t 
let go. [...] I had no idea then how much I loved him! Him...just him.
120
 
 
 In his book Of Jews and Animals (2010), Andrew Benjamin aligns animal being and 
disease with partiality and death, and human being with completeness and immortality. 
‘Animal being’, he writes, ‘is finitude [...] The animal is without soul’. ‘Animals die’.121 
Where the animal that dies of disease is cast out, the human is memorialised, interiorised by 
the mourner as a complete, infinite being. Lyudmilla’s introjection of Vasily, which takes the 
form of the speech act “I love you” and the memories of her relationship with him, attempt to 
restore him as a complete being, with a soul. Her recollection overlooks the process of his 
radioactive decay and extends itself to the timeless space before or beyond Chernobyl, to 
remember just him, without it. In memory, he is thus a human being, a permanent body 
capable of holding hands, thinking and loving, unchanged and undifferentiated by time, 
universal in being beyond it, an essential spirit of sorts. Disease, as Benjamin writes, ‘is an 
instance of particularity. It is, of course, aberrant in relation to the good of the whole (the 
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Universal). Hence; overcoming disease is overcoming aberrant particularity’.122 To overcome 
disease is to restore, if only illusorily, the sum total of what the human is: his body, his acts 
and thoughts of love. There is a conflict between Lyudmilla’s imaginative restoration of her 
husband as a human being and the Soviet State’s premature abandonment of his dying animal 
body. Lyudmilla’s ‘identification of the animal with thought – the animal as thinking thing’ is 
countered by the State’s reassertion of the animal as dying object, which ‘has to be excised 
and forgotten, a doubled forgetting in which the animal both as content though equally as 
presence is forced from view’.123 For the State, Lyudmilla’s husband has been contaminated 
by radiation; his humanity has thus decayed and he must be contained, isolated. ‘“You’re 
young”’, the doctors say to Lyudmilla during her hospital visits. ‘“Why are you doing this? 
That’s not a person anymore, that’s a nuclear reactor. You’ll just burn together.”’124 ‘He 
wasn’t in an ordinary room anymore, he was in a special bio-chamber, behind a transparent 
curtain’, she recalls. ‘No one was allowed inside’.125 Here, the sufferer is denied human 
relations; like the Animals, he is allowed to exist, but without relation. According to 
Benjamin, 
 
Animals are allowed. However, what is allowed – if allowing is understood as a space 
of relation – is a locus indifferent to Dasein [being there] and thus inessential to the 
being of being human. Animal are held within the without relation. This is the space 
therefore in which the preposition ‘with’ is not at work, except to identify the 
inessential’.126  
 
Vasily cannot be with anyone in the bio-chamber. He is objectified as a nuclear disaster, 
identified as an inessential animal being with no discernible human characteristics. This 
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process of isolated death which takes place without relation to the human cannot be 
intervened by the State. Radioactive life, the authorities say, must be set aside and allowed to 
take its inevitable course towards death.       
 This act, while officially presented as a sacred, ritual sacrifice that has the goal of 
purifying the Soviet polity of radioactive contamination, in truth constitutes the mere killing 
of bare life: the destruction of life not as sacrifice but for its own sake, with impunity. This 
latter theory, to be explored in relation to the Chernobyl liquidation in the third chapter of this 
thesis, is outlined in Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life 
(1995). The remainder of this current chapter will explore the mechanisms by which the 
Soviet authorities obscure the killing of bare life with the official image of heroic sacrifice. 
Historically, the sacrifice of the animal inaugurates many aspects of human civilisation. For 
Derrida and Benjamin, the symbolic act of the animal’s sacrifice – naming the animals as 
Adam does, organising them into the ark as Noah does, or literally sacrificing them as Abel 
does – founds the relations of authentic community. As Benjamin writes: 
 
the human death, especially insofar as it is understood as ‘dying’, is linked to 
authenticity, while for the animal the link is to a form of sacrifice and this to the 
provision of that authenticity, a promiser which moves from the animal to the human. 
There is a necessary reciprocity, however. To the extent that the animal’s death 
provides the grounds of authenticity the animal is systematically excluded. The 
animal cannot have therefore an authentic death. It can only die within sacrifice.
127
 
 
The Chernobyl animal’s death, in its secreted manner, is inauthentic. However, its provision 
to community is equally so: its sacrifice fakes not founds a renewed authenticity of 
communism in the wake of the nuclear disaster. For Arkady Filin, a liquidator, State tradition 
of repressing the radioactive effects of the disaster to assert social normality continues when: 
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Our political officer read notices in the paper about our “high political consciousness 
and meticulous organisation,” about the fact that just four days after the catastrophe 
the red flag was already flying over the fourth reactor. It blazed forth. In a month the 
radiation had devoured it. So they put up another flag. And in another month they put 
up another one. I tried to imagine how the soldiers felt going up on the roof to replace 
that flag. These were suicide missions. What would you call this? Soviet paganism? 
Live sacrifice? But the thing is, if they’d given me the flag then, and told me to climb 
up there, I would have. Why? I can’t say. I wasn’t afraid to die, then.128 
 
To have high political consciousness and meticulous organisation at Chernobyl is to be a 
Chernobyl animal without consciousness, meticulously organised by State politics and press. 
Without question, the soldiers sacrifice themselves to the disaster’s radiation, continually 
asserting the return of normal social conditions despite the contrary reality; their sacrifice is 
marked by the red flags which repeatedly attempt symbolically to restore the community of 
Soviet communism, its control over the disaster, and enforce a cessation of mourning. In 
historical terms, the first mourning ends, Freud theorises, when the first murder – of the 
primal father – is restaged by ritual. In his essay Totem and Taboo (1913), Freud writes that 
primal man used to live in primitive hoards, where one elder male claimed sole possession 
and mating rights to all the females of the tribe; ‘All that we find there is a violent and jealous 
father who keeps all the females for himself and drives away his sons as they grow up’.129 
Freud writes that: 
 
One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed and devoured 
their father and so made an end to the patriarchal horde. United, they succeeded in 
doing what would have been impossible for them individually. [...] The totem meal, 
which is perhaps mankind’s earliest festival, would thus be a repetition and a 
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commemoration of this memorable and criminal deed, which was the beginning of 
many things – of social organization, moral restrictions and of religion.130 
 
The first murdered man is consumed to inaugurate fraternal community and social 
organisation. If the totem marks the cessation of sole possession, incest and the subsequent 
crime of parricide, then the mourning of the primal father ends when his death is celebrated 
and commemorated by the totem feast, at which surrogate animals are ritually sacrificed and 
consumed. Freud continues: 
 
The feelings of the sons found a natural and appropriate substitute for the father in the 
animal, but their compulsory treatment of it expressed more than the need of showing 
remorse. The surrogate for the father was perhaps used in the attempt to assuage the 
burning sense of guilt, and to bring about a kind of reconciliation with the father.
131
  
 
Community, then, is maintained by the assertion of the initial act’s completed mourning, 
authenticated by animal sacrifice which takes place at the totem. At the feast, the totem marks 
the burial site of the dead father. If in prehistory the murder and mourning of the primal 
father must be completed for there to be community, then at Chernobyl, as in man’s earliest 
history, fraternity must be continually authenticated by the ritual of animal sacrifice. The 
soldiers’ planting of red flags upon the fourth reactor attempt a kind of reconciliation of 
feelings caused by the initial disaster. This ritualised restaging of Chernobyl’s radioactive 
containment marks its apparent defeat and totemic burial. However, radiation and mourning 
cannot be so easily laid to rest; despite the soldiers’ sacrifice, authentic communism, like the 
red flags that symbolise it, still deteriorates.       
 During the deterioration of Vasily Ignatenko, his wife Lyudmilla resists the State’s 
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demands for her to cease her mourning before it has been properly concluded, in a manner 
that is theorised in Maria Torok’s essay ‘The Illness of Mourning and the Fantasy of the 
Exquisite Corpse’ (1968). The doctors and nurses at the hospital inform Lyudmilla: ‘“You 
have to understand: This is not your husband anymore, not a beloved person, but a 
radioactive object with a strong density of poisoning. You’re suicidal. Get ahold of 
yourself.”’132 Since the introjecting work of mourning has not been concluded, Lyudmilla is 
still emotionally invested in the actual love object, having not fully memorialised it. She 
recalls responding to the doctors ‘like someone who’s lost her mind: “But I love him! I love 
him!”’133 Here, Lyudmilla’s mourning is interrupted and derailed by State intervention, 
which leads to her melancholic refusal to relinquish her investment in the love object, a 
process that was outlined in the theoretical introduction to this thesis. On the one hand, 
Vasily is stored in the bio-chamber as scientific object and isolated for the study of radiation 
necessary for its “defeat” by the State, and on the other, he is a different sort of resource: a 
site of Lyudmilla’s imaginative conjuring and intra-egoistic transferral of his loved humanity, 
gathered through close proximity. Staying with her husband in the bio-chamber for 
uninterrupted twelve-hour periods, she recalls that ‘they [the doctors] photographed him. For 
science, they said. I’d have pushed them all out of there! I’d have yelled! And hit them! How 
dare they? It’s all mine –it’s my love– if only I’d been able to keep them out of there’.134 A 
key symptom of the illness of mourning, identified by Freud in his essay ‘Mourning and 
Melancholia’ (1917), is ‘a loss of interest in the outside world’;135 there is nothing of interest 
to Lyudmilla outside the bio-chamber, and anything that intrudes from outside interrupts her 
own sacrificial ritual. ‘It is by taking flight into the ego that love escapes ablution’,136 as 
Maud Ellmann writes, paraphrasing Freud in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’. Through this 
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action, the subject has access to a painful yet replayable, creatively restageable memory of 
death. ‘Thus’, Ellmann continues, like the rituals of resurrecting the love-object, ‘death is the 
source of invention’.137         
 The ritual of elegy is also a poetic invention of death. Through poetry, the elegist 
performs as the dead to mourn them, temporarily becoming them in an act of verbal 
choreography that recalls Derrida’s animal danciness. Indeed, the elegaic, insofar as it is a 
ceremony to remember and then forget the dead, has parallels with the totem feast held by 
man’s ancestors: the murdered primal father becomes an animal spirit represented by the 
totem, and through ceremonial possession of the sons it is conjured and afterwards cast away 
as an animal. The son becomes and performs as the animal. In his self-authored elegy 
collection Heavy Water: A Poem for Chernobyl (2007), Mario Petrucci writes as the living 
and dead Chernobyl subject, mourning their losses by rewriting their testimony in ‘the 
heightened language of poetry’,138 a language and literature arguably not their own. He asks 
‘how else to honour those who were unable to speak, who were rendered see-through by 
political, social or intellectual neglect, than to remember them – first and foremost – through 
and with the self?’139 Here, Petrucci’s art oscillates between possession of and response to the 
survivor, analogous to Sergei Gurin’s filmic articulation of the animal’s Chernobyl trauma at 
once as imagined first-hand perspective and third-person acknowledgement. Problematically, 
the artist in both scenarios maintains no authentic connection to the Chernobyl subject. It is 
impossible to know, as Derrida might ask, if or how Chernobyl man and animal suffer. The 
former is rendered silent or invisible primarily by political repression and the latter by social 
or intellectual neglect as evinced by the initial widespread lack of Chernobyl animal 
testimony. The late twentieth and early twenty-first-century elegy, Melissa Zeiger reminds us 
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in Beyond Consolation: Death, Sexuality and the Changing Shapes of Elegy (2007), ‘remains 
an object of lofty poetic ambition to some poets’.140 Despite negotiation with and innovation 
within the genre, the modern elegy, like its earlier incarnations, omits as much as it covers, 
and forgets as much as it remembers. Its continued adherence to pastoral conventions of 
people and place, ‘the rude forefathers of the hamlet’141 as Thomas Gray in ‘Elegy Written in 
a Country Churchyard’ (1751) calls them, exclude peasant farmers, shepherds and other rural 
folk from the mourning process through its high, learned style, aesthetically reconfiguring 
and thus sacrificing them in the name of a presumably grander, more significant loss. Petrucci 
similarly and, perhaps, self-referentially, invokes the class-cultural and political debate that 
surrounds elegy. Reading Alexeivich’s Voices from Chernobyl, he says, ‘I was most certainly 
burned’ by its emotional impact. ‘But, with Seamus Heaney’s warning ‘not to rampage 
permissively into other people’s sadness’ ringing in my ears, I was reluctant to pick up my 
pen’.142 However, further into his reading, he ‘began to realise that, one way or another, we 
were all infected by Chernobyl. It was still active. Active in the air we use to speak about it, 
in the blood we use to think about it. I resolved, as far as I could, to listen’.143 Pressed into 
elegy by empathy and poetic social conscience, the poet, sensitive to the world’s loss, 
naturally mourns, and he asks us, through his writing, to mourn with him. Here, Petrucci 
mourns the human loss of life at Chernobyl alongside lamenting the subsequent global 
environmental and social decay. ‘Indeed’, he continues, ‘writing Heavy Water often felt like 
taking dictation. Those men and women; their children whose words prise open your heart 
even as they shatter it: they were so insistent’.144 The insistency of these words, although 
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disembodied and distanced as writing in Voices from Chernobyl, act as a kind of personal 
haunting for Petrucci, their interpreted demand that they be elegised emotionally 
strongarming him into a poet’s illness of mourning. Demand, therefore, inheres as much in 
the poet’s reading as in the read content; for Zeiger, the poet as Orphic culture hero – 
restaging important loss on behalf of society through art – articulates ‘the conflict between 
the erotically charged impulses of the living to remain connected to the dead or aggressively 
disconnect themselves from them’.145 This conflict within the poet between living and dead, 
remembering and forgetting, in short, to elegise or not to elegise, constitutes a personal 
trauma of sorts. To adapt Maud Ellmann’s theory of trauma, Petrucci is compelled to write by 
his response to articulated suffering at Chernobyl, where elegy, an event, short-circuits 
modesty; his guilt in elegising – the sense – comes too late. Petrucci writes:  
 
There was an intensity surrounding the film [Heavy Water: a film for Chernobyl – a 
reading of Petrucci’s elegies in the filmic medium] during its production, partly 
because we needed to meet deadlines for Chernobyl’s twentieth anniversary. It occurs 
to me too, that I was keen for my books [Heavy Water and Half Life] to be launched, 
together, on 26 April 2004, to mark the eighteenth anniversary. Strange how we need 
‘anniversaries’ in order to think or feel about such events, to validate them. In the UK, 
suddenly, Chernobyl’s media currency had been strong. It will be so again, one 
imagines, somewhat cynically, after fifty years. But these calendar years of 
consumption rarely spill over into any significant re-evaluation in a population largely 
disenfranchised from personal activism; rather, all that is probably achieved through 
anniversaries (of a difficult kind) is a sense of public resignation mixed with 
sympathy, or a notching-up of background anxiety levels.
146
 
 
Having rushed to release his work in time for Chernobyl’s twentieth anniversary, Petrucci 
considers only retrospectively, after the event, its impact. He worries that he has cashed in on 
the aesthetic currency of Chernobyl’s coverage in the media without inaugurating any real 
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change in social thought or activity regarding the disaster. This inconclusiveness of 
mourning, which engenders negativity at once upon elegising and not elegising Chernobyl 
suffering, comes to signify the illness of mourning theorised by Maria Torok, as outlined 
earlier in this chapter section. ‘The illness of mourning’, she writes in her essay ‘The Illness 
of Mourning and the Fantasy of the Exquisite Corpse’: 
 
does not result, as might appear, from the affliction caused by the objectal loss itself, 
but rather from the feeling of an irreparable crime: the crime of having been overcome 
with desire, of having been surprised by an overflow of libido at the least appropriate 
moment, when it would behoove us to be grieved in despair.’147 
 
If we read Petrucci’s elegies not only as they appear – as anguished art responding to loss at 
Chernobyl – but as articulations of repressed guilt, they become expressions of a crime 
withdrawn from consciousness. Indeed, this illness of mourning, which Freud calls 
melancholia, is related, he writes in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, ‘to the loss of an object 
that is withdrawn from consciousness, unlike mourning, in which no aspect of the loss is 
unconscious’.148  Like the Wolf Man’s alleged crime, a tale told to Freud through primal 
scenes that secondary characters – mainly women – are employed to support, the study of 
Petrucci through his elegies and other writings perhaps contributes to the privileged centrality 
of masculinity prevalent in elegy studies which Zeiger, among others, is critical of. ‘Scholars 
such as Celeste Schenck and Juliana Schiesari’, she writes, ‘have directed attention to elegy 
as a site of male bonding, power production, and authorial self-identification, and to the 
privileging of male melancholia and concomitant appropriation of mourning by a 
                                                          
147
 Torok, ‘The Illness of Mourning and the Fantasy of the Exquisite Corpse’, p.110 
148
 Sigmund Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, in On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia, translated by 
Shaun Whiteside, (London: Penguin Classics, 2005), p.205 
108 
 
melancholic male poet and culture hero’.149 In this configuration of elegy, the greatest loss is 
not that of the dead or the event of death, but the normal mental condition of the male elegist, 
which must be restored at all costs. It is telling, then, that elegy studies frequently centre 
around the image of the Freudian “working through” of trauma via associated ideas – which 
may be fictional but are nonetheless reflections of the damaged psyche – in an attempt to heal 
the subject. However, a study of Chernobyl trauma must necessarily be about Chernobyl, 
about the event and those caught up in it, not just the anguished, artistic response of the 
psychologically latent and geographically separate privileged male elegist. In reading a 
selection of the Heavy Water elegies to judge Petrucci’s self-accused crime of rampaging 
permissively into other people’s sadness, we must trace their alleged victims: the Chernobyl 
subjects he writes on behalf of. How do his elegies displace them? Is he, like Orpheus and 
other subsequent male poets, guilty of resurrecting the dead only to kill them again through 
his observation? 
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Chapter Two: Chernobyl Fiction: Reading Deconstruction 
 
Given that it is not possible to liquidate the dead and decree definitely: “they are no 
more”, the bereaved become the dead for themselves and take their time to work 
through, gradually and step by step, the effects of the separation.
1
 
  
The dead liquidators of Chernobyl, erased through the process of radioactive decay, are no 
more. It is impossible, however, for witnesses sympathetic to this fact of painful death to 
affirm it, to experience it as real, without experiencing it personally. As personal experience, 
Chernobyl poetry, like memory, enables the poet to restage the liquidators’ deaths as himself, 
dying; he acts as if he dies – as if they die, Jacques Derrida might say, in him. In poetry, the 
dead subject ‘appears only as the one who has disappeared or passed away, as the one who, 
having passed away, leaves “in us” only images’.2 The poet, re-enacting death in the imagery 
of his poetry, hopes to escape his own death by melancholia by performatively completing 
this movement of the dead’s passing away or leaving, this difficult step by step separation 
with them, this overcoming of grief that their death caused. Furthermore, it is the poet, it 
seems, who grieves hardest, is most sympathetic to others who have died. He sees himself, 
without having given the dead prior affection before their death, as closely affined to them 
emotionally. Poets, who are often susceptible to melancholia, perhaps ‘do not consider 
themselves wronged [by the dead] but afflicted with a fundamental flaw, a congenital 
deficiency’3 in emotional self-regulation, which heightens the poetic struggle between 
separation and sympathy. For Mario Petrucci, author of the elegies compiled in Heavy Water: 
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A Poem for Chernobyl (2007), ‘poems […] are agents of difficulty as much as of peace’.4 In 
the difficult quest for peace, for separation with the dead through the heightened language of 
poetry, the dead are a malevolent force of sorts; they draw the poet and his readers towards 
them. If they are successful, they undermine the attempted separation process from grief. 
Conversely, as public servant and culture hero, the poet must save from the dead both himself 
and the readers sympathetic to his cause. In these internal, opposing movements, the Orphic 
allusions and gender politics of elegy as outlined by Melissa F. Zeiger once again combine 
and come to the fore. In The Argonautica (3 B.C) by Apollonius, the Argonauts sail past the 
island of Anthemoessa, home of the Sirens. The Sirens’ sweet songs bewitch passing sailors, 
causing them to drop anchor and come ashore; ‘often from many had they taken away their 
sweet return, consuming them with wasting desire’.5 In order to rescue the Argo’s crew from 
this fate, one of the Argonauts, Orpheus, ‘stringing in his hands his Bistonian lyre, rung forth 
the hasty snatch of a rippling melody so that their ears might be filled with the sound of his 
twanging; and the lyre overcame the maidens’ voice’.6 Before the other crew members are 
entranced by the sweetness of the Sirens’ songs – whose designs of ‘wasting desire’ are 
analogous to the melancholic inability to resist death and to die, through excess emotion, 
alongside the dead – Orpheus’ sweeter melody triumphs over it, drowns it out. He puts a 
distance or gap between the Argo and the Sirens. The myth has two analogies. Firstly, its 
representation of male survival through the musical destruction of female subjectivity recalls 
the elegiac practice of mourning through art – historically a male preserve – which signifies 
the love object only to confirm one’s separation from it. Secondly, it mirrors the 
psychological survival of the subject through the ego’s defence against instinctual forces of 
the id. By overpowering the Sirens’ song with his music, Orpheus performatively works 
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through the separation from them, sublimating the Argonauts’ libidinal desires for the 
feminine to male-oriented socio-cultural norms enshrined in art. He thus opens the gulf 
between death-dealing woman and life-giving man so contentious in elegy studies.  
 Where Orpheus successfully defends against a collective disaster through music, 
Petrucci represents Chernobyl survivors’ experiences of the nuclear disaster by poetically 
restaging what this chapter will read as their varyingly successful psychological responses to 
it. Lyudmilla Ignatenko’s testimony of her husband Vasily’s radioactive disintegration, 
analysed in the previous chapter, is reconstructed by Petrucci’s elegy ‘Every Day I Found a 
New Man’. Writing as Lyudmilla, Petrucci describes caring for Vasily in the hospital: 
 
The black of his forearms and thighs 
cracked like pastry. His eyelids swelled so tight with water 
he could not see for skin. The lightest sheet peeled away  
fat as flypaper, the slightest edge of thumbnail was to him 
more vicious than any cut-throat – if I moved his head it 
streaked hair down the pillow as though he were a used match, 
if I pressed a knuckle in – our wedding flesh – the indent 
remained like hot grey putty, he coughed bile, acid 
froth and lungs, shreds of stomach and liver and still he 
stayed – refused that first, that last, step onto the Jacob Ladder. 7  
 
Here, Lyudmilla’s heartwrenching descriptions of her disintegrating husband are poetically 
heightened; he is called forth in simile as a used match and hot grey putty, and the Jacob 
Ladder conjures, as allegory, his refused death which thus sustains mourning. The ego, Anna 
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Freud writes in The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (1936), ‘does not merely think, it 
acts’.8 Acting upon his subjects’ behalf, Petrucci not only restages but sometimes rewrites 
their responses to radioactive death. He defends Lyudmilla in poetry against the melancholia 
she suffered in reality, sublimating her painful, prolonged interpretation of Vasily to his 
bodily performance; in the elegy, emphasis is placed on the opposite force to that of her 
testimony: rather than the dying Vasily’s psychological impact upon Lyudmilla, it is his 
disintegrating body and her physical impact upon it – her edge of thumbnail or pressing 
knuckle – that takes centre stage. Her complex psychology is de-emphasised to make way for 
this poetic, performative body; it is a body that not only reacts but also acts, for here it is he, 
not she, who refuses his death. Here, her ego is restaged as utilising the external object of 
poetry ‘in dramatising its reversal of real situations’.9 ‘The denial of reality is also, of course, 
one of many motives underlying [...] games of impersonation’,10 Anna Freud continues. 
Without sublimation of Lyudmilla’s melancholic symptoms, her mourning would be, and was 
in reality, interminable, an illness. Poetic sublimation, mirroring psychic sublimation, denies 
this reality; it ‘pertains rather to the study of the normal [patient] than to that of neurosis’,11 
displacing Lyudmilla’s mourning ‘which propels itself as if it were an instinct’.12 Through 
Petrucci’s act of poetic impersonation – an external force of intervention analogous to the 
action of the survivor’s ego – Lyudmilla achieves a more decisive victory over mourning than 
her actual testimony accounts for. In elegy, she declares this victory by claiming separation, 
saying ‘Go. I love you. But Go’.13 This is a conclusion of grief that in reality has not taken 
place.            
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 Petrucci’s sublimation of anguished female expression to poetry seemingly deprives 
the testified experience of melancholy, or more accurately, Orpheus-like, constitutes a more 
beautiful, clearer copy that drowns out the original. Lyudmilla’s original testimony is at times 
disordered and distorted; it retrospectively refers to her interminable, wordless wails, which 
are painful to read. ‘I was like a dog, running after them [the nurses, to let her into Vasily’s 
biochamber]. I’d stand at their doors for hours, begging and pleading’.14 These symptoms of 
unrestrained libidinal desire for reunification with the love object somehow bypassed the 
ego’s observation – some testimonies preserve these symptoms of female trauma15 – whereas 
Petrucci’s adaptation of events through poetic device, reining in interminability and 
obscurity, creates a sanitised interpretation of grief. His work, like that of Orpheus, is 
analogous to the ego as the seat of observation, and, through sublimation, ‘gives us a clear 
and undistorted picture of the instinctual impulse concerned, of the quantity of the libido with 
which it is cathected and the aim which it pursues’;16 its invention through simile and 
allegory prescribe an interpretable meaning to grief, and its climax and conflict resolution 
lays out a process of mourning, which, once complete, can be set aside. As the Argo stays its 
course and passes Anthemoessa, the poet and his readers can pass grief by. Julia Kristeva, 
expanding upon the Freudian sublimation of depression and melancholia in her book Black 
Sun: Depression and Melancholia (1989), writes: 
 
Sublimation’s dynamics, by summoning up primary processes and idealisation, 
weaves a hypersign around and with the depressive void. This is allegory, as 
lavishness of that which no longer is, but which regains for myself a higher meaning 
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because I am able to remake nothingness better than it was and within an unchanging 
harmony, here and now and forever, for the sake of someone else.
17
 
 
Petrucci’s sublimation of melancholia through its poetic idealisation, creating an Orphic 
hypersign appearing superior to all other signs,
18
 diverts attention away from the actual 
melancholic vacuum of someone else, for the sake of this someone else, which would 
otherwise lure them in. Petrucci writes as Lyudmilla: ‘When his [Vasily’s] breath shut,/ when 
he began to cool – then – I called for family’, a second denouement of coping that puts paid 
to interminable depression. After his death, ‘I felt myself/ the wrong side of a door – a 
partition thin as plywood, thinner, as though/ you could hear everything that was going on 
inside. [...] Have you ever been the wrong side/ of that door, knowing all you needed was the 
key and you could walk straight in? That’s how it was. We were that close’.19 Here, ‘Every 
Day I Found a New Man’ restages a defensive mechanism of the ego – the screen memory – 
attempting sublimation of the complex relationship between the actual speaker and the dead 
object by invoking an imaginative and ideal separation between them. As in psychoanalysis, 
‘the observer’s attention is now diverted from associations to the resistance, i.e., from the 
content of the id to the activity of the ego’;20 the elegy attempts to shift focus from the 
activity of libidinal investment to its distraction, brought about by the intervening screen. 
However, every separation or repression of the object of inarticulable mourning indirectly 
invokes it. Language circulates the contained and barred experience, at once screening it off 
and obliquely referring to it. Elegy’s ‘allegorical hypersign’, in relation to Sarah Kay’s 
writings on Kristevan melancholy, ‘in signalling the absence around it, acknowledges the 
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inexpressibility of the Thing that haunts all language. The absent thing is always the absent 
Thing’.21 The Thing Kay refers to here is the remainder of the Lacanian Real: the objet petit a 
or inaccessible object of desire that drives interpretation. Despite Vasily’s separation from the 
living world, his absence is imaginatively sustained in language by the elegy’s Orphic 
speaker as a haunting experience, an enticing yet hostile, unknowable Thing which tempts the 
id with gratification of libidinal desire. When the imagined screen door between Lyudmilla 
and her dead husband is erected, its properties that ultimately withhold access to him – its 
thinness, its absent means of entry, its penetration by sound alone – are the very ones which, 
at the same time, imply his continued presence. Vasily’s haunting presence behind the door is 
necessarily a haunting of language itself; language compulsively sustains it as an experience 
of imagination by designating only its inaccessibility and unknowability, ‘drawing attention 
to the constituent failure of all signs’22 to describe the ghost as such. Language is unable to 
exorcise Vasily’s haunting presence; his identity has degenerated but not disappeared, leaving 
behind an absent presence, a black hole that is invisible yet there, that eludes the words 
assigned to it. Like the Thing, it is indescribable yet ‘inscribed within us without memory, the 
buried accomplishment of our unspeakable anguishes’.23 Survivor, poet, speaker and reader 
do not possesses a conscious understanding of Vasily’s ghost; there is no memory of it save 
for its peripheral, imagined effects, and it is this – and not Vasily’s death – that truly 
anguishes us. Primeval man, ‘being confronted with the intellectual mystery of death’, Maud 
Ellmann writes in her introduction to Freud’s ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917), is the first 
to experience trauma as guilt, an emotion marked by the dead object’s continued haunting of 
imagination. In Freud’s essay, Ellmann continues, ‘it was not death as such, he urges, but the 
ambivalence of the survivor, loving and hating the dead object, which drove our primal 
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ancestors to think’.24 In the elegiac articulation of thought, the haunting of the speaker’s 
memory by the dead engenders an anguished struggle in language between a series of 
ambivalent emotions. In elegy, the speaker painfully oscillates between forgetting and 
remembering the dead object, hatefully rejecting and lovingly rejoining it, and staying on one 
side of the imagined barrier and attempting to cross over to the other; all ‘this at once locates 
my ill’, as Kristeva writes, as ‘being in the imagination. A dweller in truncated time, the 
depressed person is necessarily a dweller in the imaginary realm’.25 Where in the imaginary 
realm of myth the Argonauts successfully remain in their boat, fighting off the libidinal 
temptation to drop anchor and head for the Sirens’ shore, the poetically impersonated 
Lyudmilla living as the speaker in ‘Every Day I Found a New Man’ ultimately restages 
victory over remaining in love with the dead object, successfully breaking away from it. As is 
apparent in Lyudmilla’s poetic impersonation, adaptation, foreshortening and distortion of 
traumatic experience is required for the depressed person to forget and thus overcome the 
dead object, complete mourning and free themselves from their guilty ambivalence which 
emerges from its abandonment.         
 In mourning, one seeks the satisfactory conclusion of the laborious process and thus a 
return to behavioural normality through the ego’s necessary invention of psychic resistance, a 
secure border where more often than not painful ‘associations which put the ego on its 
defence are simply dismissed’, as Anna Freud writes. After the successful mourning of the 
dead object, she continues, ‘all that the patient feels is a blank in consciousness. He becomes 
silent’.26 However, in the truncated time of elegy – a foreshortening and intensification of 
mourning – the poetic and pleasurable indulgence of painful associations often overtakes the 
psychic necessity of their refusal, where the excluded object, emotionally enlarged by being 
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elegiacally restaged, becomes ‘massive, weighty, doubtless traumatic because laden with too 
much sorrow or too much joy’, in Kristeva’s words. In defence against it, to continue her line 
of argument, ‘an overinflated, hyperbolic past fills all the dimensions of psychic 
continuity’.27 In the Chernobyl elegy ‘Fence’, Petrucci writes as a disembodied representative 
of Soviet authority, inspecting a farm fence that separates land with radioactive topsoil from 
land where this topsoil has been removed. Here, the fence is enlarged in imagination, 
marking the intensified, unavoidable yet indescribable trauma of radiation, restageable only 
in its comparison to fictional images: ‘You must forget/ that soil is like skin./ Or interlocking 
scales/ on a dragon’.28 In the elegy’s intentional omission of factual information about 
radiation, exaggeration fills understanding of protective measures with rhetoric: ‘Imagine a 
sheet/ of glass coming down/ from the sky. It’s easy,/ no? On this side/ you can breathe/ 
freely. [...] That side/ you must wear a mask/ and change the filter/ every four hours’.29 Here, 
the imagined fence – massive, weighty, itself traumatic in its heightened description as 
blockade against radiation – cannot fail to be noticed, whereas in the actual delineation of 
irradiated and clean land as testified to by Chernobyl survivors, a simple fence as protective 
layer against trauma can easily be loosed from memory.
30
 The elegy, unlike the ego, invokes 
trauma instead of defending against it; the poetic speaker allows him or herself to be attacked 
whereas the psychic self ensures their protection by forgetting. According to Kristeva, 
‘instead of functioning as a “rewards system”, language, on the contrary, hyperactivates the 
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“anxiety-punishment” pair’.31 In ‘Fence’, the hyperactivation of trauma overpowers the ego’s 
function as nullifier; its articulation as excess triumphs over its absence in memory, invading 
the silence the staged ego might have secured there. The elegy acts as anxiety as well as 
punishment, exposing the ego’s reward of safety as suspect. It confronts radiation through 
restaging the protective measures of actual government instruction, foreshortening and 
overemphasising them: ‘This side of the fence/ is clean. That side/ dirty. Understand? [...] 
Dirty/ Clean – is all that matters/ here’.32 It bears witness to the indisputability and over-
decisiveness of actual instruction, intent in warding off and dismissing from the site of 
memory the panic radiation might cause. ‘I understand, but I have to write up a protocol...’33 
recalls a commanding officer of soldiers responding to observed cases of radioactive 
contamination, including those of former Pripyat residents re-entering the city to smuggle out 
their contaminated belongings. ‘They don’t have the proper documents’, the officer recalls. 
‘The back [of the truck] has a canvas cover. We lift it up, and I remember this clearly: twenty 
tea sets, a big dresser, an armchair, a television, rugs, bicycles. So I write up a protocol’.34 He 
does not say if he confiscated these goods or not. In restaging this ego-like attempt at the 
protection of a secure border, ‘Fence’ imitates its ‘enquiry which proceeds like a monologue, 
without interruption, [and] is not altogether free from [the] danger’35 of guilt. ‘One is too 
easily tempted’, Freud writes in his essay ‘The Future of an Illusion’ (1927), ‘into pushing 
aside thoughts which threaten to break into it, and in exchange one is left with a feeling of 
uncertainty which in the end one tries to keep down by over-decisiveness’.36 Through 
intensified poetic rhetoric, the elegy articulates this uncertainty as radioactive contamination; 
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radiation breaks through to the safe side of the excessive, imagined screen as an irrepressible 
effect of over-decisive disregard. By asking us to forget that irradiated soil is interconnected 
like skin or dragon scales and thus exceeds containment, ‘Fence’ imaginatively reconstructs 
the ellipsis in and of actual decisiveness, where, in its ineffective inconclusiveness, one is left 
with the protocol of writing uncertain of itself. In both reality and its elegiac reconstruction, 
uncertainty follows the act which attempts to ward it off; what appears to be confronted and 
sublimated by over-decisive instruction is instead repressed and returned automatically as 
experienced uncertainty. Were such a psychic defence against free association of the painful 
object or idea to succeed in reality, sublimation of radiation into straightforward clean and 
dirty oppositions would simply remove the instinctual impulses from their context, while 
retaining them in consciousness,
37
 to paraphrase Anna Freud. Through sublimation, radiation 
would shed its negative complexities of contamination. However, in the repression of 
radiation through over-decisive testimony or elegy, the subject ‘suffers secondarily through 
the consequences of the neurosis which repression has brought upon it’, relieving ‘it of the 
task of mastering its conflicts’.38 Without mastery of its identity, the undetectable body of 
radiation remains unconscious; it is free to return to consciousness unannounced and haunt 
imagination. In ‘Fence’, the similes of skin or dragon scales act merely as approximations of 
otherwise indescribable radiation, imaginative indicators of its invisible presence; they do not 
signify the essence of radiation as such, only its unstoppable activity. The speaker is thus split 
between the consciously imagined nature of radioactive contamination and its inaccessible 
source, in short, between haunting as trauma and its withdrawn origin.    
 In ‘The Breath’, an elegy which reconstructs the Chernobyl liquidators’ post-
liquidation paranoia surrounding the possibility of their radioactive contamination, radiation 
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haunts the air as an imagined, possible contamination; it is a staged effect of withdrawal from 
consciousness of a definite, knowable one: 
 
  the odds are still on my side – aren’t 
they? with me, whose breath maybe 
  didn’t slide in that day with its fizzing 
speck of cargo, to bank in my lung 
  its bastard atom. So not me after 
all? Not impossible. Is it. Or even 
unlikely? That I didn’t? Didn’t take 
that one wrong breath.
39
 
  
The speaker in ‘The Breath’ demonstrates that Chernobyl’s available ‘reality is too strong for 
him. He becomes a madman, who for the most part finds no one to help him on carrying 
through his delusion’.40 The speaker’s agonised questioning of whether they are contaminated 
or not indicates a lack of answers, so that neither dirty nor clean can be confirmed; once again 
the complexities of radioactive spread have been repressed by the State, leaving the 
survivor’s imagination to oscillate between the two possibilities. To return to ‘Fence’, the 
question, ‘You ask – What if my cow/ leans over the fence?’ has no answer. ‘Personally I 
say/ it depends which end. But/ we have no instructions for that’.41 ‘In the case of poetry’, as 
Petrucci writes, commenting on his elegising act, ‘there is no doubt that language constantly 
falls short of experience – but miraculously so’.42      
 Poetry, like survivor testimony before it, is unable to provide an authentic account of 
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interaction with radiation, of what will result from interaction; it can only fill the gaps in this 
understanding by imaginatively staging the subjective speculation of possibilities. As 
Orpheus’ miraculous music reacts to the Sirens’ song by playing over it, turning it into an 
abyssal sound that it fills simultaneously, ‘writing’ according to Maurice Blanchot, ‘is a 
fearful spiritual weapon that negates the naive existence of what it names and must therefore 
do the same to itself’.43 In the contest of sound, Orpheus’ music, as a negator of the Sirens’ 
song, its inverse opposite, runs the risk of being negated alongside it; one must imagine the 
Sirens’ song after its negation, and Orpheus’ music, the instigator of this negation, is 
arguably nothing but the opening of a gap in experience and memory. The artist, for 
Blanchot, ‘transforms into forces of consolation the hopeless orders he receives; he saves 
with nothingness’.44 Where Orpheus saves the Argonauts with nothingness, Petrucci 
transforms the hopeless order of radiation’s disclosure and defence into the only consolation 
available – the knowledge that such an order is impossible to fulfil and thus should not be 
heeded. What moves the tale, be it epic or elegy, is not the inarticulable gap into which 
experience and memory have fallen into and perhaps filled, but the literary or poetic 
‘transformation demanded by the empty fullness of this space’.45 
 
L’écarts: The Impossible Mourning of Chernobyl 
In his preface to The Impossible Mourning of Jacques Derrida (2006), Sean Gaston writes 
that ‘at the outset, from the start, at the origin, there are gaps in experience. Imagination fills 
the gaps’.46 Jacques Derrida’s notion of impossible mourning, which was explained in the 
theoretical introduction to this thesis, describes the narcissistic, violent process of 
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interiorising the other that has been separated from us by the gap constituted by the other’s 
traumatic experience. The process of interiorisation, of identifying the other’s trauma in order 
to mourn and surmount its painful impact upon us, necessarily involves imagination: we 
cannot truly comprehend the other’s trauma, since it was insufficiently or inconsistently 
assimilated by the other at the outset, leaving gaps in witnessing memory. For Derrida, 
imagination unethically reconstitutes these gaps; interiorisation can only occur by reducing 
the complex aporia of the other’s experience into communicable, sequential narrative – an 
invention of properties that were absent in the other’s original reception of the event.  
 At the outset or origin of the Chernobyl disaster, as we have already seen, there are 
gaps in experience; the initial explosion of Reactor Four was like a supernova, producing a 
core of dark matter, of intense, inaccessible grief analogous to Kristeva’s melancholic black 
sun. Petrucci, imaginatively reconstructing the shattering reality of loss caused by Chernobyl 
and echoing the survivor’s ensuing trauma, seems to be saying: ‘I am trying to address an 
abyss of sorrow, a noncommunicable grief [...] the impossible meaning of a life whose 
burden constantly seems unbearable, save for those moments when I pull myself together and 
face up to the disaster’.47 To preface his elegies spoken in Heavy Water: A Film for 
Chernobyl (2007), Petrucci’s speaker asks: ‘Imagine you have just seen what no one else has 
ever seen, knowing that soon, everyone will see it. Or even that you saw only the face of a 
father or brother who saw it but has no words for it, except in their eyes’.48 Here, to imagine 
Chernobyl, to face up to and fill the disastrous void with elegy, is to reproduce grief without 
means of consolation, without understanding, in short, to reproduce only the symptoms of 
trauma. Trauma, for Petrucci’s speaker, is the event ‘not fully perceived as it occurs’,49 the 
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dreamlike apparition ‘that one might see, that is, without knowing it’,50 without having words 
for it. Trauma constitutes ‘the inescapable gaps that cannot be bridged, that cannot be 
filled’,51 where language falls short of experience, where experience cannot be described as 
such. How then, to convey these unfelt feelings? By listening to the gap, Gaston suggests. 
‘There can be no meaning’, he says, ‘no signification without a gap, without a gap that 
cannot be bridged. But there can also be no meaning, no signification [...] without a gap that 
cannot be put to work’.52          
 The elegy ‘Black Box’ describes the observation of an unnamed woman who 
witnessed the Chernobyl disaster when she was younger by her curious boyfriend, who 
attempts to capture her traumatic experience by asking her questions and interpreting her (for 
him, unsatisfactory) responses by writing them down. Petrucci puts the unworkable gap to 
work, at once listening to it, bearing witness to its unworkability, and restaging a failed, 
disrespectful attempt to appropriate a Chernobyl survivor’s traumatised and thus impossible 
testimony. Rather than distort another’s melancholic gap by rewriting it as bridged, ‘Black 
Box’ is a responsible response to testimony; ‘only a response that opens rather than closes the 
possibility of response is a responsible response’,53 according to Kelly Oliver. The elegy 
restages but does not rewrite reality; it bears witness to the unworkable testimony of Katya 
P., who witnessed the Chernobyl disaster as a child and as an adult had a boyfriend who was 
fascinated by it. Her testimony is unworkable because it is riddled with uncloseable gaps; 
only in an irresponsible response are we ‘always trying to close the gap’.54 Katya P.’s 
boyfriend irresponsibly responds to her experience of the disaster, trying to close its gaps by 
remembering what was never originally memorised, what will thus, in its reproduction, 
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become an exaggerated trauma fiction. In her unworkable testimony, Katya P. recalls the 
origins of this trauma fiction as follows:  
 
He [her boyfriend] just wanted to see it and remember it, so he could draw it later on. 
And I started remembering how he used to ask me what colour the fire at the station 
was, and whether I’d seen cats and dogs that had been shot, were they lying on the 
street? Were people crying? Did I see how they died? After that ... I couldn’t be with 
him anymore. I couldn’t answer him.55 
 
 After being interviewed by Svetlana Alexievich for Voices from Chernobyl, Katya P. says to 
her: ‘I don’t know if I’d want to meet with you again. I think you look at me the same way he 
did. Just observing me and remembering. Like there’s an experiment going on. I can’t rid 
myself of that feeling. I’ll never rid myself of it’.56 Katya P. bears witness to the unbridgeable 
gaps in her experience that make testimony inconclusive, inaccessible, impossible, by 
revealing her boyfriend’s questions that cannot be answered and her subsequent sense of 
distrust that cannot be shaken. She herself makes the analogy between boyfriend and 
interviewer as intrusive trauma archivist and artist that Petrucci reconstructs in his elegy. 
Nevertheless, unlike the boyfriend, Alexievich and Petrucci observe the gap without 
foreclosing or exaggerating it, acknowledging reality rather than replacing it with a more 
arresting, fictional copy. Testifying to experience is painful; in itself, testimony reveals la 
béance or l’écart, which Alan Bass translates ‘as “the gap,” and one could also translate it as 
“gaping,” as the gaping, opening wound.’57 ‘It is this gaping opening, “opening itself”’, 
Gaston continues, the opening of oneself, of one’s wounds, through testimony, which is a 
painful but necessary prerequisite of opening a responsible response. ‘And while a 
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responsible response begins in acknowledging another person’s reality, it also performs the 
dialogic constitution of reality itself’.58       
 Petrucci acknowledges Katya P.’s impossible, painful reality – which she testifies to 
and thus opens – of being asked questions by her boyfriend that have no answer; he poetically 
reconstructs the couple’s dialogue, writing in ‘Black Box’: ‘He’d [the speaker’s lover] 
inquire over dinner – jaw set in intense/ nonchalance he thought I couldn’t decipher –/ So. 
What colour did it burn? What colour/ precisely?’59 She ‘noted the lustre in those coins of 
eyes/ as he made the base salute of a shirtsleeve dragged/ across lips, excused himself to the 
bathroom/ to lick the stub of his pencil, spend a breathless/ minute sprawling apocrypha in 
that journal/ jammed behind the cistern’.60 Here, the lover, through his intense attempts to 
appropriate and, with those coins for eyes, cash in on the gap, is only present to write. He 
constitutes his existence by writing – a narcissistic, violent and moreover impossible 
mourning – by drawing out and internalising the speaker’s mortality, by drawing out ‘The 
Reactor’, she says, ‘in me after all’.61 ‘Even before the death of the other’, Derrida said in an 
interview in 1990, ‘the inscription in me of her or his mortality constitutes me. I mourn 
therefore I am. I am – dead from the death of the other, my relation to myself is first of all 
plunged into mourning, a mourning that is moreover impossible’.62 Petrucci restages this 
violent, impossible mourning, impersonating Katya P. and describing the reactor as ‘A 
searing/ rod of black so stuck in my crop/ it made me fall for someone like him [the speaker’s 
lover]: grim receiver who’d/ piece together my pain and publish the results. Perhaps I hoped 
he’d draw it out – bloodied/ from between my ribs’.63 ‘For Jacques Derrida’ Gaston writes, 
quoting from Derrida’s The Work of Mourning, ‘mourning is inescapable, dangerous – and 
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impossible. Mourning always risks a ‘narcissistic pathos’, a ‘reappropriation’ and 
cannibalistic consumption of the other’.64 The lover appropriates and consumes the bloodied 
body of the traumatised Chernobyl survivor, eating away at the radioactive, impossible black 
rod – as if it were a meal served at a table – dangerous yet enticing. He has a hunger for it. 
The speaker continues: ‘I ran true. Told him what I had seen there. Seen/ with my mind – that 
freedom is not an absence/ of control. But he just leant closer as I blanched/ a perfectly good 
chicken in salt water then/ threw out the scum – three times. Those monitor/ eyes widened. 
Salt gets it out, I told them’.65 Despite the analogy of her preparing her trauma for 
consumption, her lover cannot understand nor appropriate it. Being unlike salt, he cannot get 
it out, cannot extract it from her; the gap remains unarticulated, unfillable. It spreads 
uncontrollably, dangerously, like the ingestion of contaminated chicken, across the distance 
between her and him. However, the lover repeatedly departs from the table to write his own 
version of her traumatic experience. He takes time out and departs from the unbridgeable gap, 
goes behind her back to write something else, something apocryphal, fictional. ‘In French,’ 
Gaston reminds us, ‘the gap diverges, deviates; it is at once a noun (écart) and a verb 
(écarter). Un écart: a distance, a space, a gap, an interval, a difference, a deviation, a 
departure. Faire un écart: to swerve, to jump, to leap aside’.66 This continual departure from 
and return to the site of impossible, unbridgeable testimony itself constitutes a gap between 
the speaker and the lover, between the former’s experience and the latter’s appropriation of it, 
between the inaccessible origin of trauma and its rewritten return. Where ‘Freud is fascinated 
with the pattern of suffering that characterises the lives of certain individuals, so that 
catastrophic events seem to repeat themselves for those who have already passed through 
them’,67 ‘Black Box’ realises and restages the inconclusiveness of another’s testimony, never 
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finished completing itself, always, for the witness, caught in a process of traumatic 
appropriation and intertextual mutilation, a series of returns that is a repeated rewriting. ‘By 
departing from the source text’, Anne Whitehead writes in her book Trauma Fiction, 
‘intertextual fiction can suggest that the past is not necessarily always fated to repeat itself, 
but that alternative futures can be posited and played out. Intertextuality is thus, like trauma, 
in a curious and undecidable wavering between departure and return’.68 To attempt to 
reproduce and complete testimony as a definitive, singular work is impossible, inappropriate 
and traumatic. In writing, as in mourning, there is no individual, identifiable subject present, 
and no monument to grief can be erected in the present to mark it. Gaston writes that:  
 
There (are) only traces and these visible-invisible, past-present traces have fallen 
outside of consciousness, they have been ‘unwittingly’ left behind: ‘they are always 
witnesses in spite of themselves.’ They are witnesses that are never entirely in the 
archive, nor simply outside of the archive. They are witnesses of the archive that 
threaten the subject and monument alike, the subject as monument: mal d’archive, as 
Derrida calls it (archive fever).
69
  
 
In ‘Black Box’, Petrucci, impersonating Katya P., reconstructs her anxieties of being 
objectified, of becoming an experiment: ‘I was raw data. His something-for-nothing box’.70 
Here, the speaker is rendered not as an individual person but a multiplicitous resource, a 
deconstructed yet apparently recordable store of information unwittingly left behind by the 
disaster that witnessed it despite being only an object; the lover can keep coming back to it, 
free of charge, to collect and consume. However, his archive fever, this repeated inability to 
construct, once and for all, a fully monumentalised version of her story, eventually ceases. In 
imitation of Katya P.’s decision concerning her relationship with her boyfriend, the speaker 
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says, referring to her lover, ‘I ditched him. Couldn’t see then that he was right’.71 He becomes 
an ex. If Derrida were to read this elegy, he might say, here: ‘this is what I call the ex-
appropriation [the appropriation by the ex], the appropriation caught in a double bind: I must 
and I must not take the other into myself; mourning is an unfaithful fidelity if it succeeds in 
interiorising the other ideally in me, that is, in not respecting his or her infinite exteriority’.72 
The lover’s unfaithful fidelity, of trying to accurately yet secretively reproduce the contents 
of her gap in his ideal words, impossibly, is punished with the relationship’s termination. 
Where the lover disrespects the gap, creating his own gap by departing from and returning to 
it in his attempts at its appropriation, Petrucci, reconstructing this scene of disrespect towards 
the gap, thus respects it, retaining Katya P.’s infinite exteriority. The gap, Gaston writes, has 
further meanings in accordance with this: ‘Mettre, tenir, rester à l’écart: to keep back, to hold 
back, to stay in the background, to remain on the margins’.73 By listening to and performing 
Katya P.’s gaping testimony, her being subject to interrogation and objectification, Petrucci, 
writing from the sidelines, reinstates her subjectivity. He does this not by attempting to 
appropriate it as her boyfriend does, but by restaging its collapse into the gap, bearing witness 
to the moments before and after its destruction. This replayable, reversible memory of sorts, a 
second witnessing of the event by elegy, ‘enables the subject to reconstitute the experience of 
objectification in ways that allow her to reinsert subjectivity into a situation designed to 
destroy it’.74 Also, her boyfriend tries to fill the gap of the Chernobyl disaster by asking her 
to recollect her experience and memory of it even though it is lacking, whereas Petrucci 
restages this failed provocation to rememorate, and the absences in recollection that follow. 
‘It is the performance of testimony’, Kelly Oliver writes,  
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not merely what is said, that makes it effective in bringing to life a repetition of an 
event, not a repetition of the facts of the event, or the structure of the event, but the 
silences and blindness inherent in the event that, at bottom, also make eyewitness 
testimony impossible. In other words, what makes testimony powerful is its 
dramatisation of the impossibility of testifying to the event.
75
 
 
Elegy dramatises the impossibility of the event, of its testifying and mourning. It 
demonstrates that which was but which can never be, which can never be remembered or 
recorded save for its absence. Chernobyl, it seems, is all a gap. From the experience and lack 
of memorisation of its initial disastrous occurrence to its rememorisation in eyewitness 
testimony and second-hand elegy, the event presents ‘an impossibility for bridge builders of 
the gap, who build bridges with traffic lights, armed checkpoints, and gaps that can be 
bridged and put to work’.76 Testimony and elegy bear witness to the attempted containment 
of Chernobyl, the deconstructive force of radiation, and the screens and fences at which one 
is signalled to stop, where one is checked by psychic or political defensive forces.  
 Testimony and elegy ought to say, we must surely think, that the task of appropriation 
is impossible, that Chernobyl is absolutely other, absolutely exterior to us, separated by an 
utterly unbridgeable gap in the survivor’s experience and memory which ultimately resists 
explanation and consolation. All that results in one’s attempted bridging of the gap is archive 
fever: at best, contamination by guilt follows the prolonged attempts at the impossible, and at 
worst, one indulges in the other’s inappropriately interiorised, fragmented grief. But is the 
alternative – impossible mourning – really any better? In their introduction to Derrida’s The 
Work of Mourning, editors Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas lay out this conundrum. 
They write: 
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interiorisation is never completed, and, because of this reorganisation of space, 
remains in the end impossible. According to Derrida, interiorisation cannot – must not 
– be denied; the other is indeed reduced to images “in us”. And yet the very notion of 
interiorisation is limited in its assumption of a topology with limits between inside 
and out, what is ours and what is the other.
77
 
 
In his final elegy, ‘Envoy’, Petrucci echoes this conundrum – of what is interior and what is 
exterior, of what is ours and what is the other, letting all the possibilities play out poetically. 
Referring to the impossibility and archive fever of elegising Chernobyl, it begins with the 
lines: ‘Take our words. Enrich them./ They are already active – but enrich them./ This is 
dangerous. May even be impossible./ They are dispersed through a great mass/ and you may 
need to quarry this vastness/ to elicit one bald grain’.78 Restaging the indecision between 
interiorising and exteriorising the other, appropriating them or leaving them at a distance, he 
writes: ‘You may have to detach yourself./ Use robots and machines./ But at the end – after 
immense effort – you/ will forge from our cries a single silver rod./ You will put it on display 
behind a screen’.79 The speaker’s suggestion implicates at once interiorisation and 
exteriorisation; the Chernobylites say that in order to transform them into images in us 
readers, we must maintain physical and emotional distance to their trauma as implied through 
the imagined use of automatons. They are at once in us, part of our memory as readers of 
poetry, but sanitised, at a remove behind a protective screen. ‘You will have to control and 
subdue it’, they say, implying maintenance of both physical and psychological defence, 
‘contain it with great care. Many will not wish/ to have it near them. Or their children. You 
will/ protect yourselves with suits. Put your ear to it/ and hear it hum. It will make you 
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shudder’.80 The externalised and internalised other meet, the former reverberating within the 
latter – a transferral, through sound waves, leaving a series of sensations in us. Here is a 
mourning that many will not wish, nor wish to pass on to their children. They must ask 
themselves, as Derrida asks us in Memoires for Paul De Man (1989): 
 
where is the most unjust betrayal? Is the most distressing, or even the most deadly 
infidelity that of a possible mourning which would interiorise within us the image, 
idol or ideal of the other who is dead and lives only in us? Or is it that of the 
impossible mourning, which, leaving the other his alterity, respecting thus his infinite 
remove, either refuses to take or is incapable of taking the other within oneself, as in 
the tomb or the vault of some narcissism?
81
 
 
On the one hand, we can choose not to have the Chernobyl dead in or near us; we can refuse 
them and so keep them at a remove, perhaps in the tomblike vault of a museum display case. 
On the other, however, we can choose to listen to the dead and ask: “how do they make us 
feel?” They make Petrucci write elegies, and his audience in ‘Envoy’ trembles at the thought 
of the disaster. Both these imaginative acts are derived not from trying to tell the story of the 
dead – this ‘is something you cannot write’82 – but from listening to and imagining the dead, 
which instead, ought to arouse emotions of pity within us. ‘As Derrida writes, according to 
Rousseau, ‘we neither can nor should feel the pain of others immediately and absolutely, for 
such an interiorisation or identification would be dangerous.’ The imagination ‘awakens’, 
‘arouses and limits’ pity. It protects and preserves us from an excess of sympathy’.83 To listen 
directly to Chernobyl survivors, to ask them how it was, would be dangerous; to listen 
secondarily with imagination, however, would be to bear witness to their pain through how 
we think it ought to impact upon us and how that thought, performed, emotionally affects us. 
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For Petrucci, readers of ‘Envoy’ should shudder. This is signified where he writes ‘Your 
scientists will marvel. Your politicians/ quake’.84 ‘In the end’, Gaston writes, ‘imaginative 
sympathy leaves us with only the imagination, which fills a gap while exposing a gaping 
opening that cannot be filled’;85 in ‘Envoy’, the gap of how to respond is filled and bears 
witness to the other, uncloseable gap – the gap of the other who experienced Chernobyl, who 
testified and thus willingly left him or herself open to response. In ancient Greece, ‘Aristotle 
had already argued that when feeling the pain of another who has suffered an undeserved 
evil, we rely on our own past memories or future expectations of enduring such a pain to feel 
pity’.86 If Orpheus were an ethical mourner, he would not listen to the Sirens directly, for this 
would be too dangerous. But he would imaginatively remember them, subjectively filling the 
gap in memory left by his overriding music while exposing the distance he consequently put 
before them. He would thus interiorise them on the one hand and keep them at a remove on 
the other; ethical mourning is to do both, simultaneously.      
 The following section of this chapter will explore the horror film Chernobyl Diaries 
(2012). In particular, it will analyse the extreme tourist protagonists’ journey into the 
Exclusion Zone and their attempted closure, through photography, of the gap in experience 
and memory left in the aftermath of the disaster. It is not the protagonists but the film, the 
following section will argue, that performs ethical mourning; they attempt to fill the gap 
whereas it exposes the notion that the gap cannot be filled. Where the protagonists rely only 
on their own experiences, photographs, and memories – in short, their archive – of Chernobyl 
to attempt understanding of the disaster, the film, observing this journey of attempted 
discovery, demonstrates that it is impossible. Chernobyl, the film suggests, is objectively 
unrepresentable; the real Chernobyl contains the Lacanian Real, and Chernobyl Diaries 
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acknowledges this notion, restaging it with imaginative sympathy. The film bears witness to 
and keeps the inarticulable gap open, maintaining its fundamental inaccessibility. 
 
The Archive of Chernobyl Diaries 
Jacques Derrida in Archive Fever provocatively enquires, ‘Is the psychic apparatus better 
represented or is it affected differently by all the technical mechanisms for archivisation and 
for reproduction, for prostheses of so-called live memory, for simulacrums of living 
things?’87 The psychic apparatus at Chernobyl, by which we might mean the witness’s mental 
recording and faculties of recollection, is affected by the traumatic experience of the nuclear 
disaster; as we have already seen, it is only able to reproduce a fractured, incomplete memory 
of the event. ‘I remember it in flashes, all broken up,’88 Lyudmilla recalls in her interview for 
Alexievich’s Voices from Chernobyl. Another interviewed survivor, Lena M., who was 
relocated to Kyrgyzstan after the disaster, maintained that people visiting Chernobyl do not 
understand it. ‘This fear that they have here in Chernobyl, I don’t know about it. It’s not part 
of my memory’.89 Here, Lena M.’s fear has been repressed, a common psychic response to 
trauma in which the conscious understanding of a painful event has not been attained or 
retained at the time of its occurrence. Echoing adults suffering from neuroses incurred, as 
Sigmund Freud theorised, by childhood sexual traumas rendered immemorial through their 
occurrence prior to the subject’s understanding of sexual life, Chernobyl trauma’s 
immemorial nature is engendered by the survivor’s inability to understand radiation. 
Radioactivity at Chernobyl, at once psychologically excessive and politically repressed – 
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dwarfing conscious understanding but also censored in books at nearby public libraries, 
Soviet news media and over-decisive instruction – is, like a childhood sexual trauma, a silent 
gap or space in the survivor’s memory of the past. Derrida’s enquiry into the representation 
of the psychic apparatus, ‘which, in what is already a psychic spacing, cannot be reduced to 
memory as conscious reserve, nor to memory as rememoration, as act of recalling’90 by a 
hypomnesic, technical archive, is echoed in the failed orthographic and photographic 
representations of Chernobyl, as has been argued in chapter one of this thesis. The codes and 
conventions of recording Chernobyl in photography and writing fail to convey the event of 
the disaster; no structuring technology foraying into this traumatic past can recollect it. The 
past disaster does not impress upon but violently punctures the memory archive, penetrating 
it with what this event really is – a gaping void – and provides nothing for it to show upon its 
return to the present. Where Igor Kostin’s photos return black, Lyudmila Polenkaya, a village 
teacher evacuated from the Zone, remembers: 
 
In those first few days, there were mixed feelings. I remember two: fear and insult. 
Everything had happened and there was no information: the government was silent, 
the doctors were silent [...] Chernobyl opened an abyss, something beyond Kolyma, 
Auschwitz, the Holocaust. A person with an axe and a bow, or a person with a 
grenade launcher and gas chambers, can’t kill everyone. But with an atom...91  
 
 These abyssal gaps opened up in the archive by Chernobyl, be they in eyewitness interview 
or graphic depiction, signify at once radiation’s overwhelming, deconstructive presence and 
its absolute unrepresentability. The unadaptable past event of the disaster, as an event of 
psychic trauma and political repression, leaves in its wake a literal and psychological 
archaeology of immemorial ruins that entices the possibility of further archival explanation 
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through exploration, ‘a movement of the promise and of the future no less than of recording 
the past’.92 For Derrida, the archive ‘is a question of the future, the question of the future 
itself, the question of a response, of a promise and of a responsibility for tomorrow’,93 for 
tomorrow the event of trauma will be rememorised. However, rememorisation never comes; 
the archive yields only a series of failed investigations into the repressed past. Like witnesses 
to a traumatic and immemorial event who cannot consciously recollect it, archival 
investigations are ‘called upon to investigate apparently inaccessible sources of meaning’94 at 
Chernobyl. For Nicholas Rand, ‘the investigation of sealed-off traumas, that is, of 
inaccessible mental “graves”, can take many forms’.95 Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok’s 
theory of the psychic grave or crypt is given somewhat literal expression at Chernobyl by the 
plant’s Sarcophagus, a giant concrete tomb housing the destroyed Reactor Four from which 
the explosion originated; it is a sealed-off, off-limits interior space designed to prevent further 
radioactive contamination of the outside. In The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of 
Psychoanalysis (1994), Abraham and Torok contend that psychic ‘incorporation results from 
those losses that for some reason cannot be acknowledged as such’.96 The architecturally 
incorporated reactor remnant functions as inaccessible material evidence of the disaster’s 
occurrence, analogous to the psychic repression of the event or the politically repressed 
evidence of its radioactive effects; the cause of the disaster, therefore, like the missing 
memories pertaining to it, cannot be recollected. However, when the archive’s technological 
recording of Chernobyl physically fails or is refused access to the site of disclosure, one 
ought to bear witness to the subsequent reproduction of the gap in memory. In Mario 
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Petrucci’s elegy ‘Powder/Stone’, which bears witness to, among other events, Igor Kostin’s 
attempt to develop and publish his photographic findings of Chernobyl, we are told: 
 
[...] See how the film 
  They bring is black – their pictures 
all black. They tried to repaint our village 
  but whichever shade they chose came out 
black. Their tapes are hiss. The radio 
  hiss. Their videos are white noise 
without the noise. Hear how the phone 
clicks into silence. Notice how there are 
no orders.
97
 
 
The intertextual archive of Chernobyl employs technological recordings of “live” 
memory on audio and video tape that reproduce nothing and simulacra of things that were 
never there to bear witness to the Chernobyl survivor’s absent memory.    
 The horror film Chernobyl Diaries (dir. Parker. Bradley, 2012) conceives of the 
investigation into Chernobyl by its tourist protagonists as fruitless, using the representational 
strategies of horror cinema’s found-footage phenomenon to demonstrate the undisclosability 
of results. This investigation takes the form of extreme tourism, a sightseeing and 
technological recording of dangerous spaces of past traumatic violence for thrilling pleasure. 
Here, found-footage, in the form of the tourists’ photographs and video recordings of the 
represented Chernobyl, substitutes the Derridean psychic apparatus of conscious memory for 
an archive of technical memory; archive fever, that tendency towards erasure and obliteration 
that, following Derrida, both simultaneously founds and renders impossible any attempt at 
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archivisation, enters the physical and psychic space where no conscious memory exists, and 
the film in the horror mode stages its failure to rememorise this space. Found-footage, as it 
pertains to the film, articulates the capitalist impotence to liberate a global understanding of 
the post-communist world, demonstrating the former’s economic subjugation of the latter and 
imagining the consequences that this act engenders. The fictional, supernatural violence as a 
function of Chernobyl Diaries’ horror, in which tension is accrued through the partial or 
hallucinogenic appearance of fictional Chernobyl survivors in found-footage and spent 
through their assault on the tourist protagonists, identifies and textually responds to the 
actual, economic violence as a function of extreme tourism.     
 Both diegetically and non-diegetically, Chernobyl is referred to as a tourist “hotspot”; 
according to Russia Today, ‘more than 10,000 tourists visit Chernobyl and its surroundings 
each year, and Forbes Magazine has called the dead zone one of the world’s most exotic 
tourist destinations’.98 Extreme tourism’s increased financial investment in Chernobyl is an 
economic response to perceived global interest in the market for Chernobyl memory 
(evinced, some sources claim, by anniversaries and comparisons with similar crises 
elsewhere).
99
 Through advertising, extreme tourism creates the promise of Chernobyl 
memory (in exchange for money) from its very absence; the designation of a mnemic “dead 
zone” employs the illusory and infinitely repeatable experience of founding recollection. Like 
a stock exchange in which ‘“abstraction” is not only in our financial speculators’ 
misperception of reality, but [...] is “real” in the precise sense of determining the structure of 
the material social processes’,100 extreme tourism’s speculation of absent but desired 
Chernobyl memory has real determining power in that it ensures the profitable conditions of 
Chernobyl’s continued immemoriality. The extra features of the Chernobyl Diaries DVD 
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release contains a fictional infomercial entitled ‘Uri’s Extreme Tours’. Here, Uri, the film’s 
tour guide character, claims to ‘specialise in exciting trips in Ukraine and Russia, [...] to 
places no other company will take you’.101 His newest package, he announces, is a trip to 
Pripyat, the former home of the workers and families of Chernobyl. The commercialised 
space of Pripyat, sold in the infomercial as an abandoned, forgotten and sealed-off “ghost 
town,” is waiting to be unlocked through Uri’s unique brand of tourism; his extreme tour 
offers visitors an experience that no other company offers: the town’s ruined apartments, 
shops and other local amenities alluringly presented as resistant to physical access and 
memorisation are forced open for business, arranged into a series of exclusive sights, 
memorable moments and photographic opportunities. ‘Therein resides the fundamental 
systemic violence of capitalism,’ as Slavoj Žižek writes. Where the violent intrusion and 
exploitation of space claims to serve popular demand, ‘violence is no longer attributable to 
concrete individuals and their ‘evil’ intentions, but is purely objective, systemic, 
anonymous’;102 if Uri’s extreme tour exploits the traumatic Chernobyl past for profit, he 
cannot be held personally accountable since he is responding to the unbiased system of 
market forces and not his own personal interests. Following Derrida, we might say that 
fictional and real extreme tourism in and around Chernobyl creates a certain archive fever – 
that is, the need to capture and document the past – in the name of financial profit. This sort 
of systemic violence residing in the archive of Chernobyl and its investment in memory 
capital is critically assessed by a range of textual responses; where Chernobyl Diaries’ 
fictional Chernobyl survivors respond to the systemic violence of intrusive and exploitative 
tourism through an act of physical violence that sees them stalking and killing off the extreme 
tourists one by one, actual survivors’ oral responses to the investment of global capital in 
Chernobyl memory display their anxieties about its socio-cultural impact upon local life. 
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‘Can you help us?’ rhetorically asks Arkady Bogdankevich, a rural medical attendant to the 
Chernobyl survivors of a village on the outskirts of the exclusion zone. ‘No! Then why did 
you come here? To ask questions? To touch us? I refuse to trade on their tragedy. To 
philosophise. Leave us alone, please. We need to live here’.103 Tourism penetrates the 
isolation of Chernobyl, exposing it to the archival creation of memory which attempts 
recollection of the disaster and its effects through an intrusive, objectifying tourist gaze upon 
the survivor which denies them their dignity. ‘What’re you writing there?’ another survivor, 
who wishes to remain anonymous, demands to know. ‘Who gave you permission? And 
taking pictures. Put that away. Put the camera away or I’ll break it’.104 Echoing Žižek’s 
writing in his book Violence, the conflict between Chernobyl survivor and tourist:  
 
distinguishes two opposite but complementary modes of excessive violence: 
the ‘ultra-objective’ or systemic violence that is inherent in the social 
conditions of global capitalism, which involve the ‘automatic’ creation of 
excluded and dispensable individuals from the homeless to the unemployed, 
and the ‘ultra-subjective’ violence of newly emerging ethnic and/or religious, 
in short racist, ‘fundamentalisms’.105 
 
The Chernobyl survivor’s outburst of verbal or physical subjective violence is a response to 
their automatic objectification and exploitation as a resource of Chernobyl memory they 
would prefer not to be known; again, in Žižek’s words, the survivors are forced into this violent 
defence against the objective violence of tourism, which constitutes ‘the direct reign of 
abstract universality which imposes its law mechanically and with utter disregard for the 
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concerned subject caught in its web’.106 This conflict is reconfigured in Chernobyl Diaries as 
one in which Chernobyl survivors, as ultraviolent and unknown subjects, purposely situate 
themselves beyond the memory-recording apparatus of the archive and the social norms of 
conventional habitation and behaviour. In so doing, they articulate the death drive of archive 
fever; where the extreme tourists attempt technologically to archivise, record and rememorise 
the represented Chernobyl regardless of the danger and death its inhabitants present to them, 
the psychic apparatus is equally frustrated, obstructed and ultimately annihilated by the object 
of its investigation. This doubleness of archive fever is, as before, hinted at in the testimonies 
of actual Chernobyl survivors. ‘They’ve written dozen of books’ about Chernobyl, says 
Sergei Sobolev, Deputy Head of the Executive Committee of the Shield of Chernobyl 
Association. ‘Fat volumes, with commentaries. But the event is still beyond any 
philosophical description’.107 Here, the desire to archivise and memorise the event is due to 
its immemoriality and imperceptibility; the extensive archive is exhausted, ended, without the 
subject being adequately explained.        
 In Chernobyl Diaries, the extreme tourists’ journey takes them through what Georges 
Bataille might call a heterogeneous world; from the city of Kiev to the abandoned town of 
Pripyat, the tourists’ presence and its archivising gaze is threatened and compromised by a 
myriad of social forms that cannot be reduced to homogenised understanding. ‘The 
heterogeneous world’, writes Georges Bataille, constitutes ‘the numerous elements or social 
forms that homogenous society is powerless to assimilate: mobs, the warrior, aristocratic and 
impoverished classes, different types of violent individuals or at least those who refuse the 
rule’.108 On a night out in Kiev, the female tourists – Amanda and Natalie – are confronted in 
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the street by a group of local young men, who take an amorous and unwanted liking to them. 
When Chris, Natalie’s boyfriend, and his older brother Paul – who are accompanying the 
women – happen upon the scene, violence threatens to erupt; a heated exchange in Ukrainian 
– which Paul but none of the other tourists can speak – ensues before the two groups go their 
separate ways. In a similar scene which takes place the next day during Uri’s extreme tour, 
Uri’s tour van is halted by two soldiers at one of the military checkpoints en route to Pripyat. 
After Uri gets out of his van and starts talking to one of them in Ukrainian, the other slowly 
circles it, ominously observing the tourists inside. ‘“I don’t know what they’re saying,”’ says 
Chris, attempting to interpret the body language of the soldier talking to Uri. ‘“But this guy’s 
saying no.”’109 Due to the linguistic barriers in these two scenes, the threat of violence cannot 
be dispelled nor its origin assimilated; throughout the film it is a heterogeneous yet ultimately 
hostile response to the intrusive presence of tourism. ‘The very term heterogeneous’, writes 
Bataille, ‘indicates that it concerns elements that are impossible to assimilate; this 
impossibility, which has a fundamental impact on assimilation, likewise has an impact on 
scientific assimilation’.110 Throughout their journey through the heterogeneous Ukraine, the 
tourists’ sustained archival investigation and its painful yet persistent encounters with 
threatening barriers, blockages and disavowals of meaning foreshadow the actual violence to 
come; in a repetition of previous warning signs, the soldiers deny Uri’s tour van access to 
Pripyat, but the military checkpoint is circumvented via an alternative, secret route, and when 
the tourists and their guide finally reach Priypat, they and their scientific tools of 
technological assimilation become the targets of physical violence. Derrida writes that ‘one 
associates the archive, as naturally one is tempted to do, with repetition, and repetition with 
the past. But it is the future that is at stake here, and the archive is an irreducible experience 
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of the future’;111 attempted archivisation as represented by Chernobyl Diaries – the inability 
to disclose meaning and its very denial of this failure – is an experience of the subjective 
violence yet to come. In the film, the represented archive repeatedly ignores its illegitimate 
investigation into Chernobyl, reconstructing at once the seemingly infinite interest in the 
market for Chernobyl memory and its rejection by local populations. En route to Pripyat, Uri 
explains, first in Ukrainian and then in English, that at Chernobyl, ‘nature has reclaimed her 
rightful home’.112 Where archivisation in the form of tourism intrudes upon and translates 
ruined, reclaimed space into pleasurable spectacle through photographic opportunity, 
seclusion and solitude is shattered through its very recording. During the on-foot exploration 
of Pripyat, Paul breaks the stillness by proclaiming ‘silence. Nature really has taken over’;113 
Chernobyl Diaries bears witness to extreme tourism’s simultaneous, contradictory 
preservation and puncturing of the exclusion zone’s undisturbed isolation, where, as Derrida 
writes, the commercial ‘conditions of archivisation implicate all the tensions, contradictions, 
or aporias we are trying to formulate here’.114       
 The tourists’ ill-fated journey into Pripyat to found Chernobyl memory through its 
archivisation recalls Abraham and Torok’s psychological aporia presented through their 
theory of the crypt; for the protagonists of Chernobyl Diaries, as for patients of mourning, 
‘everything unfolds as though a mysterious compass led them to the tomb wherein the 
repressed problem lies’.115 What lies behind extreme tourism’s desire to archivise the 
politically repressed Soviet past is analogous to the patient’s desire to memorise their 
psychologically repressed traumatic losses; in both cases, ‘actual events are treated as if they 
had never occurred’.116 On the one hand, the various aporistic mechanisms encountered by 
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investigation repress meaning and on the other, investigation represses the meaning of these 
mechanisms; in the film and the reality it reconstructs, tourism’s intrusion of the politically 
repressed and physically blocked exclusion zone constitutes not only ‘the forced entry of a 
penetrating, digging force, but [also] the violated sepulchre [that] itself was never “legal”.’117 
By ignoring the warning signs that would otherwise break off their journey, the tourists 
discredit the notion that what is there at its end cannot be disclosed.    
 At Pripyat, Uri’s van is sabotaged and rendered immobile when the tour group is out 
sightseeing on foot. That night, the group spend the night in the van, and Uri and Chris go 
outside to investigate movement and noises in the darkness. Uri is dragged off by undisclosed 
assailants and Chris returns to the van with a badly wounded leg. In both scenes, the 
perspective framing of the film purposely obscures the cause of violent events, occurring as 
they do either off-camera or in darkness. The following morning, Amanda, Paul and Michael 
– another extreme tourist – attempt to find out who or what caused the damage and injury 
sustained. Paul assures that his younger brother Chris was attacked by dogs, to which 
Amanda replies doubtfully: ‘“dogs didn’t do that [...] he [Uri] said there was something else. 
What was he talking about?’”118 As the trio investigate the dark, sealed-off, tomb-like 
buildings for Uri’s body, the film’s perspective framing, mimicking the first-person 
perspective mode of their frantic search by utilising camera techniques associated with the 
found-footage horror phenomenon (whip pans, extreme close ups, eye level shots and so 
forth), continues to withhold the cause of violent events from the visual archive; although the 
tourists find Uri’s dead and mutilated body, the ‘what’ or ‘who’ responsible for it remains 
undisclosed. Amanda, the last of the three tourists to leave the room into which Uri’s corpse 
has been dragged, catches glimpses of shadowy figures. In a prolonged moment of dread that 
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precedes a jump scare, she tentatively reaches for a pistol that Uri was carrying; upon 
grabbing it, the shadowy figures start screaming, and Amanda runs out of the room before 
she is (or we are) able to fully see them. The representation of repeated archivisation 
confronts only the phantomatic residue of Chernobyl, a catastrophic event rendered 
immemorial by the timeless void of witness trauma. ‘In Hamlet,’ Maud Ellmann writes, ‘the 
murder of the father occurs in the prehistory of the play, unwitnessed and unverifiable’; ‘the 
event of the nuclear disaster, which similarly never ‘takes place or time’ in memory ‘is re-
enacted time and again’119. Where ‘the image of the phantom’, as Abraham and Torok argue, 
‘points to an occasion of torment’ and ‘a memory [...] buried without legal burial place’120 
like Old Hamlet’s murder, the phantomatic presence of Chernobyl Diaries’ fictional 
survivors is a hallucinatory after-effect of the unwitnessed and unverifiable Chernobyl past. 
Actual Chernobyl memory fails, an event evinced by the witness testimony of Lyudmilla 
Ignatenko and Lena M. who remember not ‘an accident, a catastrophe [...] But [...] a war’;121 
‘we were at war against the radiation’,122 Igor Kostin recollects. Similarly, the result of 
repeated attempts by extreme tourism to translate the immemorial past into authentic present-
day memory and experience, Chernobyl Diaries suggests, is fiction. In the film and the 
reality it represents, the archive stands only for fiction: that which cannot be seen takes the 
shape of that which was never there; the unseen or unremembered disaster is re-imagined as 
violent combat with an unseen enemy. For Derrida, the archive as ‘a translation maintains 
above all its own fiction, it maintains the true fiction that translation is possible. It is this 
fiction, both hopeful and frightening, promising communication where none by definition 
should be possible’.123 In Chernobyl Diaries, the hopeful and frightening attempt at 
translation of Chernobyl by the tourists’ digital cameras maintains the film’s own fiction: the 
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fiction of the film’s survivors symptomatic of translation itself. The morning after the night 
Uri is killed and Paul injured by unknown attackers, Amanda looks over her photographs of 
Chernobyl, stored on her digital camera. In one image of an abandoned apartment, a partially 
visible figure stands at a window, archived but up to this point not acknowledged, captured 
but not confronted.  
 
Chernobyl Diaries, 2012 
The partial figure is placed not by the tourists’ sight but their technology, viewable only on 
the camera’s digital screen using its zoom function; here, it is by technology that fiction, in 
the absence of fact, is founded. Echoing the untranslatable opacity of Igor Kostin’s 
photographic witness memory of the Chernobyl disaster, the figure emerges from the black 
canvass of failed disclosure; it is the staged symptom of the cryptic apartment aperture that 
signifies inaccessible interiority, a scene analogous to the anguished appearance of Old 
Hamlet’s ghost upon the ramparts of Elsinore. The ghost says to Prince Hamlet that he is 
‘Doom’d for a certain time to walk the night, [...] Till the foul crimes done in my days of 
146 
 
nature / Are burnt and purg’d away’124 but cannot tell the secrets of his prison-house, the 
trauma that ‘Would harrow up thy soul; freeze thy young blood; / Make thy two eyes, like 
stars, start from their spheres’.125 Prince Hamlet is forever out of joint with Denmark’s 
inaccessible history and forced to identify with its endocryptic object that he may or may not 
hallucinate; the archive of Chernobyl Diaries, similarly, founds unverifiable memory in the 
phantom’s partial photographic reproduction where unmediated experience of the represented 
Chernobyl past fails.           
 In the film, the image of the survivor bears witness to the product placement of 
extreme tourism wherein the emplacement of fiction at Chernobyl that is not in reality there 
entertains the illusion of authentic Chernobyl memory, an archive of advertisement that ‘is 
out of place at the very least, if inoffensive, evidently misconstrued’.126 Anatoly Shimanskiy, 
a journalist, recalls that in order to maintain commercial interest in Chernobyl, ‘the papers 
and magazines compete to see who can write the most frightening article. People who 
weren’t there love to be frightened. Everyone read about mushrooms the size of human 
heads, but no one actually found them’.127 This investment in Chernobyl horror and fantasy is 
a symptom of the inaccessible, actual Chernobyl past. Chernobyl Diaries deterritorialises the 
production of desire for Chernobyl memory; each article, analogous to what Michel Foucault 
in the preface to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus calls ‘the poor technicians 
of desire – psychoanalysts and semiologists of every sign and symptom’, would reduce the 
multiplicity of desire for Chernobyl memory ‘to the twofold law of structure and lack’,128 
where writing signifies something at Chernobyl which turns out not to be there. Where the 
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subject of the article is disclosed in its completeness, offered to memory and then disproven, 
Chernobyl Diaries’ survivor-subject is always a partial object, connected to continuous 
deterritorialised flows of desire ‘that are by nature fragmented and fragmentary’;129 the film 
at first presents the singularity of the desired memory’s site through its apparent appearance 
in the photograph, but then shatters this already questionable totality through the following 
flow of film in which partial images of the survivor stalk the eye. Subverting the egoistic 
deduction and reduction of trauma to a single primal scene that is easily explainable in 
psychoanalysis by the Oedipal ‘daddy-mommy-me’130 triangulation, Chernobyl Diaries 
knows it cannot represent authentic Chernobyl experience and so represents Chernobyl 
experience as it authentically is: a disastrous explosion of archived images that ‘have a 
sufficient charge in and of themselves to blow up all of Oedipus and totally demolish its 
ridiculous claim to represent the unconscious, to triangulate the unconscious, to encompass 
the entire production of desire’;131 the one experience, archived as a totality, always produces 
structure and lack, but the many as an incomplete yet continuous flow of desire or memory 
conversely avoid the disclosure of disprovable results. The extreme tourists’ journey through 
the heterogeneous world of Chernobyl Diaries’ is a literary desiring-machine in the horror 
mode; its dark, disorientating, labyrinthine passages, inaccessible rooms and silent refusals of 
complete disclosure blow up psychoanalysis into schizoid parts:  
 
produced as asymmetrical sections, paths that suddenly come to an end, 
hermetically sealed boxes, noncommunicating vessels, watertight 
compartments, in which there are gaps even between things that are 
contiguous, gaps that are affirmations, pieces of a puzzle belonging not to any 
one puzzle but to many
132
.  
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While psychoanalysis, at least as it was articulated by Melanie Klein, ‘was 
responsible for the marvellous discovery of partial objects, that world of explosions, 
rotations, vibrations’,133 it cannot rid itself of the notion that they are part of one traumatic 
event and can therefore be reassembled, totalised. Chernobyl Diaries’ extreme tourists also 
cannot abandon this way of thinking. 
 
Chernobyl Diaries, 2012 
During their second night stranded in Pripyat, the tourists see the lone figure of a little girl, 
standing in the middle of the road with her back turned to them. Paul slowly approaches her, 
illuminating her with his torch; he says “hello?”, first in English and then in Ukrainian, to 
which she does not respond. In the tense moment of investigation and non-disclosure of 
identity, silence is at once a gap and a flow of deterritorialised events that are disparate and 
unrelated yet sequential. Paul gets closer to the figure of the little girl, not knowing how she 
will react to his approach. Before the solution to this puzzle is realised, the scene’s tension is 
broken; another figure, shrouded in darkness at the bottom of a staircase, grabs an 
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unsuspecting Natalie from beyond the frame, dragging her out of sight. It is tempting to 
assume, as the tourists do, that the figure of the child was a decoy that allowed the other 
figure to snatch one of the tourists from the group; that the events throughout the film – from 
the sabotaging of Uri’s van and the wounding of Chris to the partial appearance of the 
Chernobyl child – originate from a single desire: the prevention of the tourists’ departure. In 
each scene, the tourists’ thoughts run along the lines of: “I know what has happened is part of 
a larger, single event, even if I have no proof of this”; they are analogous to the 
psychoanalytic claim that each neurosis the subject possesses is part of a single origin of 
trauma, where ‘schizoparanoid partial objects are related to a whole, either to an original 
whole that has existed earlier in a primary phase, or to a whole that will eventually appear in 
a final depressive stage (the complete Object)’.134 But this way of thinking is never 
vindicated. The fragmented testimonies of actual Chernobyl survivors cannot place the 
disastrous event in memory, ‘in our human experience or our human time-frame’;135 the 
entire origin of the disaster cannot be disclosed. Rather, the survivor concludes: “I know 
Chernobyl happened, but I have no memory of this.” Where analytic reading discloses only 
fragments symptomatic of endocryptic content, Chernobyl Diaries represents partial events 
through its intentionally limited perspective framing, externalising it and endowing us all 
with a found-footage subjectivity. Unable to see or unite all the events that take place, the 
film ‘continually detaches them, continually works them loose and carries them off in every 
direction’136 through its distracted, disoriented journey. Towards the end of the film, the 
remaining tourists, Amanda and Chris – who have not yet been killed by the Chernobyl 
survivors – are blinded by their prolonged exposure to radiation. The pair stumble along dark 
corridors in their attempt to escape from Pripyat, but instead they head deeper into it, 
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eventually arriving at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Here, radiation strips the subject of 
its ego, enacting profound ego-loss. It detaches the senses of perception from each other, 
breaking down their biological unity which makes up the human ‘in order to perceive what is 
nonhuman in man, his will and his forces, his transformations and mutations’.137 The 
radioactive disintegration of the body and the textual disintegration of investigation thus 
transform desire into schizo components; the archive of Chernobyl Diaries, in its 
fragmentation of one Chernobyl experience into many, bears witness to the actual failure of 
projects that the disaster left behind: the political and psychological rehabilitation of its 
survivors shattered by trauma, and the global capitalism that attempts to reshape, restage and 
territorialise for profit its archaeological remains. Through Amanda and Chris’s journey, the 
film stages the confrontation between the two differing versions of archive fever: on the one 
hand, the attempt to further these projects, to memorise, memorialise and capitalise on the 
disaster by revisiting and recording it, and on the other, the destruction or disintegration of 
the recording archive at archivisation, driven to its own death. This unresolvable tension 
within archive fever is represented by the film’s use of the found-footage phenomenon, where 
the archive’s impossible task to capture truth – a task that it cannot complete nor escape and 
recover from – is reconfigured as a horror encounter with Chernobyl from the perspective of 
the extreme tourist characters and their technological recording devices in which nothing 
survives. Chernobyl today, as ‘the very stone that earlier had sought to limit storms is nothing 
more than a milestone marking the immensity of an unlimitable catastrophe’,138 an obelisk 
that designates an excessive flow beyond comprehension and consumption. As Amanda and 
Paul’s extreme tour through Pripyat ends unending, its contract of memory cut short by their 
mortality and outliving them, their final moments of radioactive disintegration and stumbling 
archivisation portray a ‘feeling of explosion and a vertiginous weightlessness [which] 
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surround an imperious and heavy obelisk’.139 Their walk is that of the schizophrenic’s, which 
Deleuze and Guattari famously announce ‘is a better model than a neurotic lying on the 
analyst’s couch’.140 In their final moments, blinded by the radiation which realises all 
epiphany as impossible, the tourists represent the ultimate anti-Oedipus, an archive of the 
failure to realise. 
 
Chernobyl Cryptonomy and the Soviet Science Fiction Writer as Detective in Adam Roberts’ 
Yellow Blue Tibia 
Like the Wolf Man, that figure of trauma and repression first treated and addressed by 
Sigmund Freud in his psychoanalytic study ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’, 
Chernobyl survivors suffered a sudden impact of enduring violence in the form of an 
explosion that lacked a definite, clearly witnessed origin or order of events. It engendered 
collective trauma which still demands the impossible act of disclosure in psychoanalytic 
readings of eyewitness memory and testimony, a task adapted in the entertainment outlets of 
Chernobyl fiction. The Chernobyl explosion’s occurrence, repressed psychologically in 
eyewitness accounts and politically by contemporary Soviet authorities, yet presents an 
unimaginably colossal yet unknown process of radioactive degradation. This disaster, a 
primal scene, is denied as a trauma while manifesting traumatic symptoms upon its people, 
landscapes and literature. As before, it is possible to witness in the Chernobyl subject both 
the analysand and analyst displaced by the disaster; the quantity of radiation dwarfs any 
conscious conception of time, creating an unimaginable future, an unreachable narrative end, 
which Anatoly Shimanskiy describes as ‘some completely unseen thing [which] can enter and 
then destroy the whole world’; the nuclear disaster is an all-consuming black hole where 
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‘…my consciousness couldn’t go. I couldn’t even understand anymore: what is time? Where 
am I?’141 This disorienting lack of any reliable information concerning the Chernobyl disaster 
denies access to its originary causes, withholding narrative origins. Shimanskiy recalls the 
State response to the disaster: 
 
Stalin’s old vocabulary has sprung up again: ‘agents of the Western secret services,’ 
‘the cursed enemies of socialism,’ ‘an undermining of the indestructible union of the 
Soviet peoples.’ Everyone talks about the spies and provocateurs here, and no one 
talks about iodine protection. Any unofficial information is considered foreign 
ideology.
142
 
 
Spies, detectives, stories and languages of the past, secret codes and their translation; all these 
features of a text form the basis of an attempt to disclose the content and location of a primal 
scene. Through the fictional search for an originary explanation of the Chernobyl disaster in 
Adam Roberts’ novel, Yellow Blue Tibia (2010), the decrypting of words, texts, and the 
translation of scientific theory into plot and character, and Russian speech into English 
challenge the archive’s feverish attempts to prove that traumatic ‘experiences which have 
played an important pathogenic part, and all their subsidiary concomitants, are accurately 
retained in the patient’s memory even when they seem to be forgotten – when he is unable to 
call them to mind’.143 Archivisation, then, it claims, is also impossible. In an act of ethical 
mourning, which keeps the other at an infinitely inaccessible remove from analysis, the novel 
examines the existence of a fundamentally inauthentic primal scene, a fictionalised 
Chernobyl kernel necessitated by the disaster’s traumatic excess. Restaging at Chernobyl 
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problems arising from the Wolf Man’s psychoanalytic reading, it replays and bears witness in 
fiction to the traumatic symptoms caused by the undisclosable originary traumatic event; for 
it, as with all ethical mourning, the impossibility of the disaster cannot pass without 
comment. Thus, Yellow Blue Tibia, following what is suggested of Freud’s Wolf Man 
analysis in Jacques Derrida’s essay, ‘Fors’, fictionally reconstructs the impossibility of the 
Chernobyl disaster’s disclosure by imagining alternative possibilities of its occurrence, 
keeping open and bearing witness to the imperceptible non-event or event horizon of reality 
which witnessing can only describe as ‘…what took place without taking place, without ever 
having been present, “of what has never been”’. In the alternative event in and of fiction, 
‘there is a memory left of what has never been’.144 Yellow Blue Tibia’s fictional memory of a 
fictional event, then, tasked as it is with imagining disclosure of Chernobyl’s radioactive 
Real, displaces ‘the whole question of origins, to suggest what Peter Brooks might call 
another kind of referentiality, in that all tales may lead back not so much to events as to other 
tales, to man as a structure of the fictions he tells about himself’.145    
 The following section explores the role of the Soviet Science Fiction writer, his 
literary construction of a fictional Chernobyl origin and its traumatic effects, and his role as 
both psychoanalytic analysand and analyst or detective. As writing, Brooks claims, leads 
back to another fiction and not an event, Freud famously returns to the Wolf Man case study 
to question the truth of his subject’s primal scene as a psychoanalytically verifiable 
occurrence; the origins of the Chernobyl disaster in Yellow Blue Tibia, mirroring this, emerge 
from the traumatised imagination of the Soviet Science Fiction writer. As Brooks says: 
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…Freud will with the case-history of the Wolf Man have discovered “detection” and 
its narrative to be extraordinarily more complex and problematic, like the plots of 
Modernist fiction, and indeed inextricably bound up with the fictional.
146
  
    
 
The novel’s narrator, Konstantin Andreiovich Skvorecky, is one of five Russian 
Soviet Science Fiction writers called together at a hidden dacha by Josef Stalin in 1946, just 
after the Great Patriotic War. The writers are tasked with creating a convincing alien threat: a 
story of imminent disaster that would unite the Soviet peoples. If Sergei Pankejeff’s repressed 
history of neurosis and trauma is examined through Abraham and Torok’s disclosure of his 
magic word, tieret, then Stalin requires the Soviet Science Fiction writers to construct a 
history out of words that justify his plans for the advancement of a global communism 
through the destruction of its enemies. The meaning of tieret, at once to “scrape”, “scratch”, 
“rub” and “wound” becomes, for Abraham and Torok, ‘the rich orderly polysema of an 
unspeakable (hidden, crypted) word [that] had to be lurking behind a regular – in spite of a 
certain amount of play – series of cryptonyms’.147 Stalin’s justification of warfare with the 
various ‘cursed enemies of socialism’ must unite the fragmented scenes of conflict that 
follow under its single reason for engagement. Its meaning lies behind what he calls ‘the 
universal communist struggle’, and within ‘“the nature of Marxism itself,”’ according to Ivan 
‘Jan’ Frenkel, one of the writers Stalin enlists. For Frenkel:  
 
“…in the very fabric of dialectical materialism…life consists of conflict, of enemies 
all about us who cannot be appeased and who must be destroyed. After war comes – 
not peace, but more war. And we are gifted here! Gifted by historical necessity! 
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Gifted by the news that we shall be the ones to shape this new war. This next war! It 
will be ours! War and war!”148 
 
Here, the dialectical materialism of socialist conflict reconfigures the psychoanalytic search 
for a magic word engendering and animating all the scenes of the subject’s psychic life; the 
enactment of various traumatic scenes as explained, for example, by tieret, – a word with 
multiple meanings – becomes a Soviet Science Fiction narrative able to unite all worldly 
differences in the global struggle for communism. The Wolf Man’s magic word, for Abraham 
and Torok at least, discloses ‘the association of the wolf with sexual pleasure obtained by 
rubbing’149 within even the scenes of the subject’s historically unverified past. The Soviet 
Science Fiction writers, however, invent the words that explain global experiences of the 
artificially induced state of war necessary to perpetuate communism, and the problems of 
creating universally satisfactory evidence of a credible alien threat pose themselves early on 
in the project: 
 
We wrote detailed accounts of alien atrocities. We had them villainously blowing up a 
city – New York, as a first choice...Then we had second thoughts, for such a stunt, we 
reasoned, would be hard to fake; and if the Red Army were actually to bombard New 
York into dusts and shards then we would have been the authors of mass death. So 
then we toyed with the idea of aliens attacking Siberia; some remote and inaccessible 
place where the story could not be easily falsified. But Asterinov voiced the obvious 
objection. “Our brief is to unite humanity against this monstrous alien foe!” he said. 
“Why should humanity care if these aliens blow up a few trees in Siberia?” [...]
 “Somewhere else,” I suggested. “Ukraine, maybe. Latvia perhaps. Let’s decide 
that later.”         
 “The Ukraine has been almost depopulated,” agreed Frenkel. “What with the 
famine and then the war. Let us have the aliens blow up some portion of the Ukraine. 
That would be the best option.”150 
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The fictional origins of Chernobyl in the novel, as they unfold in accordance or opposition to 
the project, cannot reconstitute from the void any verifiable evidence as to the disaster’s 
already-disappeared truth. Like the wounds of all Chernobyl fiction, Yellow Blue Tibia must 
opt for either one of two methods of reconstruction: it can either repress the knowledge of its 
subject’s inaccessibility and then reproduce infinite forms of supplementarity in 
investigation, or bury this call to investigation in its supplement that denies Chernobyl 
trauma. In either case, Chernobyl literature and its authorship experience the fundamental 
absence of the disaster’s origin that remains irretrievable from within its void of meaning; it 
is always only ever a question of how to supplement and then what to do with 
supplementarity. In Yellow Blue Tibia, the experienced trauma of the Soviet Science Fiction 
writer, arising from the fictional origins they create, is estranged from the very form that 
conjures it, writing, where the encountered truth of trauma and elucidation of emotion are 
buried within literature.        
 Traumatic memories of the Great Patriotic War are occasionally indicated in the 
Science Fiction authors’ creative process of writing. While the experience of the external 
world is isolated in the intransitivity of fiction that in no way refers to it directly, the 
indication gestures towards a burial of traumatic memory in the content of the project. 
Deciding what form the alien aggressors will take, Nikolai Nikolaivitch, one of the writers, 
suggests that ‘“corpses can be scary,”…“Not – living corpses,’ he added, and I [Skvorecky] 
realised he was not making a suggestion, but was instead wrapped in the coils of memory. 
“Dead ones.”’151 Here, the literature of Soviet Science Fiction acts as a vessel for the return 
of the repressed past. Just as the project unwittingly agitates its writers’ memories of the war, 
so too does it reveal the inaccessibility of the Chernobyl origin in its content, a supplementary 
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fiction for the reader or analyst that never was and for the characters is yet to come. 
Skvorecky suggests writing into the story: 
 
“Radiation aliens. Sentient emanations of poisonous radiation.” The others 
contemplated this.         
 “A little insubstantial, perhaps?” offered Nikolai Nikolaivitch. “To be really 
scary, I mean?”        
 “But they would have machines. As we have tanks and planes, they would 
have robots and killing machines; but inside – they would be only waveforms of 
poisonous radiation [...] We decided that their weaponry would be atomic – very up-
to-the-minute, this, for the mid-1940’s. You must remember that there had been no 
official notification of the American atom bomb attack on Japan; our version of 
atomics was that of science fiction from the 1930’s. But [the dacha guard commander] 
comrade Malenkov personally approved this part of our design. We could imagine 
why; that such a threat would justify the Soviet Union in the accelerated development 
of its own atomic weaponry.”152 
 
By substituting investigation of the inaccessible origin of Chernobyl for invention of its 
fictional supplement, the novel reveals the existence of the remainder through repression. 
Two forms of fictionally staged repression and its disruption ensue: of the project by Josef 
Stalin when the writers are told by his guards that he no longer requires it, and of the invented 
Chernobyl origin these writers create; Yellow Blue Tibia represses this knowledge through 
encryption of its own Science Fiction story-within-a-story. In both cases of Roberts’ novel’s 
fictionally staged repression, then, repression reveals the remainder of repressed memory, the 
excess that was not remembered, or, in the novel’s depiction of the Stalinist era, 
unremembered. Indeed, State coercion to forget acts as a form of memory erasure, akin to 
Abraham and Torok’s ‘mental landscapes of submerged family secrets and traumatic tombs 
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in which, for example, actual events are treated as if they had never occurred’.153 In the novel, 
Comrade Malenkov says to the writers: 
 
“You are to forget everything you have done here,” […] “Everything. Comrades, 
understand me: it is a matter of supreme importance to the Soviet Union that you tell 
nobody of your time here. You did not write these elaborate stories. You did not 
discuss this matter. You never met Stalin. This sojourn never happened. Do you 
understand?”154 
 
The second volume of the novel is set in 1985, shortly before the Chernobyl disaster. 
Doctor James Tilly Coyne, an American nuclear physicist visiting Moscow, says to 
Skvorecky that nuclear power stations make him feel ‘“worried. Vulnerable...If I were an 
invading alien force – well, I would be looking down upon a spread of fantastically powerful 
bombs, that my enemy had thoughtfully arranged right in the heart of his territory, just 
waiting for me to trigger them.”’155 The writing of such an extraterrestrial threat attempts to 
unify a globally fragmented communism, but under an erroneous premise. Man’s supposedly 
increasing knowledge of the atom – observable in the proliferation of his nuclear power 
plants – cannot credibly unite him; nuclear power and its weaponisation is a weakness and 
not a strength against invasion. Instead of providing a clear plan of defence and 
counterattack, it reveals only the misguided attempts throughout history to harness the atom. 
In the novel, the Chernobyl power plant, like the aliens that supposedly desire to destroy it, 
embodies not the solidarity between communists in the Soviet Union and the rest of the 
world, nor the collective, cumulative knowledge and use of the atom, but the absence of such 
factors; the atomic power of Chernobyl differs from that posited by the Soviet Union’s 
Science Fiction of the 1930s or the unofficial rumours of American atomic weaponry used on 
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Japan during the Second World War. Throughout the history that Yellow Blue Tibia 
reconstructs, the atom always signifies something in excess of understanding. As Skvorecky 
and a companion of his, a nuclear physicist named Saltykov, search Reactor Four of the 
Chernobyl power plant for signs of alien sabotage, he remarks that: 
 
There was something uncanny about being the sole human being in so enormous an 
enclosed space. ‘It’s like a film set’, I said to myself. There was a continuous noise 
that was more hiss than hum, and a pervasive if hard to identify sense of pulse, or 
sentience, as if the entire reactor were alive. This was not so comforting a thought. I 
tried to put such thoughts out of my head.
156
 
 
Here, Skvorecky perceives the unseen and unsettling presence of the atom in the empty space 
of the Chernobyl Reactor that appears to contain it. The reactor, like a Derridean crypt, can 
stage what ‘“take[s] place” [...] only by producing concealment – that is, the (crypt) effect of 
interiority’,157 accomplished by ‘constructing a system of partitions, with their inner and outer 
surfaces’.158 What takes place inside the reactor, either the process of power generation by 
nuclear fission or the alien attempt to sabotage it, is produced by its concealment in 
architecture; the ‘gigantic concrete column that supported the distant roof [...] wrapped 
around with a spiral staircase like the snake around Asclepius’s staff’, and the reactor ‘core 
[...] cooled by water injected through it’,159 are crypt walls producing the effect of interiority. 
Pumped into the core, Saltykov explains, is water as steam at a temperature of three hundred 
degrees, generating the hissing noise that Skvorecky interprets as an indication of the 
reactor’s sentience. Saltykov says that ‘“these things run themselves [...] the best thing to do 
is leave them alone. The last thing you want is some foolish operator tinkering with the 
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controls.”’160 The functioning of the reactor, then, acts as absent knowledge, contained yet 
inaccessible within the crypt, in the architecture of the reactor itself; the explanation, 
investigation and observation of its function discloses not the planned destruction of ‘some 
portion of the Ukraine’ by the radiation aliens as described in the repressed Science Fiction 
project nor the destruction of Chernobyl through the tinkering of its controls, only the absent 
understanding of these possible events through their encryption in the reactor’s interiority. As 
Skvorecky looks into one of the spent fuel pools, he notices ‘a black case, no bigger than a 
suitcase. The bomb, of course’. He observes that 
 
It was three quarters of the way down the wall, suspended on a single cable. I squatted 
down, and gave the line a tentative tug. It did not feel too heavy. The thought crossed 
my mind that this might not be the bomb after all, but rather an ordinary piece of 
power-station machinery. I pulled again with the notion of retrieving whatever-it-was 
and finding out. In retrospect this was foolish of me, for of course the line could have 
been booby-trapped, but that chance did not occur to me. Given all that I know now, 
from my privileged perspective, looking down upon a completely different mode of 
existence, and with all the benefits of hindsight – of what we know about Chernobyl, 
and the precariousness of the cage that contained its nuclear dragon – it is hard to 
justify such a cavalier attitude.
161
 
 
The ‘what we know about Chernobyl’, the disclosure of ‘what takes place’ within its cases, 
cages and crypts, is hidden in a completely different mode of existence, accessible only from 
a privileged perspective. In ‘Fors’, Derrida designates the inaccessible contents of interiority 
as ‘…a certain “beyond place”, “non-place” or “no-place” which, he tellingly describes as 
“the other place”’.162 Unable to gain access to this place, the Chernobyl investigator cannot 
disclose the origins of the disaster; investigation into or tinkering with the power-plant’s 
functionality cannot distinguish between the normal and abnormal behaviour of the atom, nor 
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set the rules under which it operates.        
 Chernobyl symbolises at once the inner corruption of power and its outward 
appearance of stability within the Soviet Union; nuclear and political power are analogous in 
the novel. Power, as Doctor Coyne remarks, is ‘“a word with many meanings. I visit Soviet 
power stations.”’163 The suitcase-like container holds a cluster of standard Soviet-army issue 
RGD-5 grenades, placed in the spent fuel pool by Skvorecky’s old writer friend Ivan Frenkel, 
now a KGB officer determined to act out in reality what he and the other writers had created 
in fiction so as to unite the peoples of the world in a communist struggle against the 
perceived alien threat. When one of the grenades is detonated by comrade Trofim, Frenkel’s 
bodyguard, Skvorecky recalls: 
 
I heard just the start of a roar; no more than a split second before it vanished entirely 
from my sensorium, or else before my sensorium vanished entirely. The material 
solidity of the space we were in was deconstructed and reconstructed as light, clear 
and bright and warm…A process of replacing every single one of the carbon atoms in 
my body with photons; and a reverberating pulse that swarmed upon the net of my 
nerves…Out of perfect whiteness and the perfection of the light a single point of 
sensual connection began to coalesce; one unsullied, soprano musical note, a musical 
note as pure as mathematics, like an angel singing, a spirit-entity heralding my arrival 
in a new place.
164
 
 
To experience first-hand the instant of the explosion in Reactor Four, to access the precise, 
singular origins of the Chernobyl disaster and the new, other place in the crypt as described 
by Derrida’s ‘Fors’, one must be atomically deconstructed. As luck would have it, Skvorecky 
survives the explosion by being blown into the pool, and wakes up in a Kiev hospital. 
Between these two corporeal states of physically and psychically solid identity, Skvorecky, in 
a dream set at the dacha where he and the other writers were instructed by Josef Stalin to 
                                                          
163
 Roberts, Yellow Blue Tibia, p.84 
164
 Roberts, Yellow Blue Tibia, pp.200-201 
162 
 
work on the Science Fiction project, encounters the floating letters ‘SF’. He views these 
cryptic letters from the reverse and in Cyrillic as opposed to Latin characters. They thus read 
as this: 
 
Ф C 
They are translated as FS and then as a fragment split between two words, Josef Stalin:  
 
иocиФ Cтaлин 
[ JoseF Stalin ] 
 
Jody Castricano asserts in her monograph, Cryptomimesis: The Gothic and Jacques 
Derrida’s Ghost Writing, ‘the term cryptomimesis draws attention to a writing predicated 
upon encryption: the play of revelation and concealment lodged within parts of individual 
163 
 
words’.165 Here, as with the Wolf Man’s posterior view of his copulating parents or family 
servant scrubbing the floor – actions signified by the Russian word tieret – the translation of 
language and the perspective of its enshrined scene encrypts content; the dreaming state of 
existence within the opened radioactive crypt is an altered, Foucauldian one in which 
‘meaning never coincides with an event; and from this evolves a logic of signification, a 
grammar of the first person, and a metaphysics of consciousness’.166 Here, Skvorecky meets 
Josef Stalin – or one of the radiation aliens in a robot suit that looks like Josef Stalin – who 
then discloses the reality and nature of his kind: 
 
“Many people believe that aliens lurk in the shadows, hide away. That they only 
emerge at night, like vampires.” […] “No! No! Aliens come from the stars, not from 
the darkness between the stars. We come precisely out of the light. It is simply our 
brilliance that is harmful to you. That’s all. And who has been more harmful than 
I?”167 
 
 It is only in the blinding flash of radioactive light inaccessible to conventional reading where 
Stalin’s tyrannous, extraterrestrial existence in the novel becomes known. Protected from 
sight by the encrypting shell of man-made machines, radiation in the novel thus demands an 
alteration of the metaphysical and psychic existence of the witness so as to convert sight out 
of its absence; like Abraham and Torok’s theory of readability, radiation and Skvorecky’s 
dreaming state:  
 
does not define the act of reading but attempts to create avenues for reading where 
previously there were none. More radically, it demonstrates that interpretation is 
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possible even in the face of obvious obstruction. Such a theory is primarily concerned 
with converting obstructions into guides to understanding.
168
 
 
As tieret, ‘without betraying anybody, allowed the Wolf Man to achieve real or sublimated 
sexual gratification’, the dreaming state, the state that dreams, enables its subject ‘to live 
without having to say yes or no to reality or fiction while continuing to refer to both’.169 For 
Derrida, the Marxist state is itself a sublimated secret that maintains the paradox of its 
existence and non-existence, where ‘one must assume the inheritance of Marxism, assume its 
most ‘living’ part, which is to say, paradoxically, that which continues to put back on the 
drawing board the question of life, spirit, or the spectral, of life-death beyond the opposition 
between life and death’.170 As Ivan Frenkel reminds the recuperated Skvorecky, ‘“We have 
stopped imagining Communism, and so it is decaying all around us.”’ He asks ‘“what is 
Communism, but a dream of a whole people? If an individual dreams utopia, he is just a 
dreamer. But once an entire people dream it, it becomes a reality.”’171 Marxist struggle, like 
the identification of the traumatic events that disrupt it, their terrestrial or extraterrestrial 
causes and the magic word, Josef Stalin which unites them, must be allowed to function as a 
floating or phantasmic signifier that crosses the divide between the subject’s unconscious and 
conscious topology, between fantasy or actual encounter in dreams and consciously 
experienced reality. ‘Fantasy and perception, insofar as they are memory traces,’ as Abraham 
and Torok say, ‘form an indissoluble unit’;172 the unit leaves a mnemic trace called forth by 
its conscious reimagining. For Frenkel, ‘the only thing that can save us is a world capable of 
                                                          
168
 Derrida, ‘Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok’, lii 
169
 Derrida, ‘Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok’, lviii 
170
 Derrida, Jacques, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, 
translated by Peggy Kamuf, (London: Routlage, 1994), p.54 
171
 Roberts, Yellow Blue Tibia, p.275 
172
 Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of Psychoanalysis, p.92 
165 
 
collectively willing those aliens into our observation’173 – a world of unconsciously 
experienced or imagined trauma rendered conscious through global communism’s 
imaginative revolution.         
 The fictionalized origins to traumas of the Soviet Union are amalgamated and 
maintained against betrayal of both their truth and their falsehood, their material and 
immaterial nature, by the sublimated magic word and the action of its signified concept, Josef 
Stalin. Regardless as to the feasibility of exhuming magic words of actual individual 
Chernobyl survivors through the cryptomimetic reading of their dreams, the disclosure of a 
universal cause of the disaster through a single magic word is, in reality, a distinct 
impossibility. The irretrievable origin of the Chernobyl disaster, like other Soviet traumas, 
engenders a multiplicity of traumatic experiences shared by its survivors. Unlike the fictional 
possibility that Stalin is the origin of Chernobyl trauma, the lived experiences of the disaster 
once again cannot be attributed to a single source. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in their 
essay entitled ‘1914: One or Several Wolves’ (2004), hold Freud accountable for misreading 
his Wolf Man case study. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that Freud’s misreading occurs in his 
monistic interpretation of the Wolf Man’s unconscious, a site, the essay’s authors claim, that 
is fundamentally heterotopic. For Freud, they say: 
 
there will always be a reduction to the One: the little scars, the little holes, become 
subdivisions of the great scar or supreme hole named castration; the wolves become 
substitutions for a single Father who turns up everywhere, or wherever they put 
him.
174
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 The scar, or Abraham and Torok’s magic word that later signifies it, is a reduction of the 
many to the one: the single, omniscient, omnipresent father. If General Stalin is the instigator 
of destruction, death, the single source of the Soviet Union’s traumatic history, then Freud, 
like a similarly militaristic figure, commands and marshals the Wolf Man’s past, orders and 
parades its ranks, and extricates its losses. Deleuze and Guattari oppose the psychoanalytic 
conception of the traumatised unconscious as a site of convergence, akin to a root or source 
from which a tree or series of symptoms grow. Instead, they propose the conception of 
schitzoanalysis, of the unconscious as a rhizome, a multitude of extended roots and shoots. 
‘The rhizome’, they say, ‘operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots’.175 
 
Psychoanalysis cannot change its method in this regard: it bases its own dictatorial 
power upon a dictatorial conception of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis’s margin of 
manoeuvrability is therefore very limited. In both psychoanalysis and its object, there 
is always a general, always a leader (General Freud). Schizoanalysis, on the other 
hand, treats the unconscious as an acentred system, in otherwords, as a machinic 
network of finite automata (a rhizome), and thus arrives at an entirely different state 
of the unconscious.
176
  
 
In reality, the rhizomatic, acentred nature and traumatic knowledge of radiation’s effects 
cannot be traced back to a single source. Cryptomimetic readings of individual Chernobyl 
survivors may or may not locate the functioning words or actions of their trauma, but the 
disclosure of a community’s shared origin in a magic word or thing is an impossible act. If 
Deleuze and Guattari perceive Freudian psychoanalytic practice as unfit to justify its claim 
for a singular cause of trauma or neurosis, then globally unified communism as Yellow Blue 
Tibia depicts it struggles to collectively recall or represent an individual reality where 
radiation aliens were responsible for the Chernobyl explosion.   
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 Rhizomatic traumas, multiple shifting perspectives, access routes, a grammar of the 
first person and a metaphysics of consciousness; the following chapter will explore how 
Chernobyl is expanded as a setting to realise new rhizomes of trauma, imagined by second 
hand eyewitnesses of the zone through a series of visual and virtual perspectives, narrative 
modes and genres. This second-hand eyewitnessing, a term by which we might refer to 
witnesses only belatedly present at Chernobyl, in its aftermath, having not been there at the 
origin, includes the first person videogame S.T.A.L.K.E.R: Shadow of Chernobyl (2007), and 
the novels The Dead Lake (2014) by Hamid Ismailov and All That is Solid Melts Into Air 
(2014) by Darragh McKeon. 
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Chapter Three: The Long Chernobyl: The Preamble and Intergenerational Aftermath 
of Trauma 
 
The Two Catastrophes of the Human: Communism...  
One of the most significant catastrophes of the twentieth century has been the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Supposedly caused by a series of sudden, violent shifts (in economic and 
ideological organisation, scientific development and urban expansion), Soviet communism’s 
dissolution – a traumatic event in its own right – left deep psychological scars upon 
populations across the USSR. The Chernobyl disaster, seen by many within the Soviet Union 
as a crisis point or death knell of the regime, is an earlier casualty of some of these same 
massive traumas (the power plant’s hasty construction to meet rising energy needs was 
chronically underfunded, and thus the complex was dangerously obsolete upon initialisation). 
The fatal financial and technological blows upon Chernobyl and Soviet communism 
themselves stem from more protracted causes, however. For some critics of the USSR, the 
Chernobyl disaster was an inevitable result not only of the Union’s rapid overinvestment in 
nuclear energy to supply its developing member countries, but also of long-term political 
corruption and moral degeneration, which permitted this precarious industrialisation. Reports 
on the running of the out-of-date Chernobyl power plant bear witness both to its dangerous 
operation beyond its recommended capacity to place its output on a level par with other, more 
modern nuclear stations, and the political demands to meet energy supply targets at all costs. 
In his recent article ‘Tourism, Construction and the Ongoing Crisis at Chernobyl’ (2014), 
Alexander Nazaryan summarises the narrative of the Chernobyl disaster as follows: 
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Very briefly: a shoddy Soviet reactor, moderated by graphite instead of water; a 
turbine generator coastdown test that senselessly called for the disabling of all 
emergency systems; the reactor’s fall into an “iodine valley” and the consequent 
poisoning of the reactor by xenon-135; the incompetence and impatience of the 
plant’s managers, especially of Anatoly Dyatlov, a supervising engineer who 
stubbornly drove the test forward and would later serve prison time for his role in the 
night’s events; the indefensible lifting of all but six of the 211 control rods; the reactor 
going prompt supercritical; the inability to fully reinsert the control rods, leading to 
steam explosions and graphite fires; a biblical pillar of radioactive flame surging into 
the sky.
1
 
 
This ill-advised coastdown test, performed in aid of increasing Chernobyl’s output to serve a 
growing demand for electricity, is reconstructed in David Thorpe’s illustrated novella Doc 
Chaos: The Chernobyl Effect (1988). In it, Aleksandr Akimov, a nuclear technician in charge 
of the test, assures himself of the reactor’s excellent quality: 
 
This was a serious experiment. The men were excited. Forefront of science. Boldly 
going. The Pripyat station is a pioneer and must remain so. It is going to be the 
biggest in the world. It has on-load refuelling systems. It is highly efficient. Above all 
it can produce just what Russia wants in the cold war against the imperialists. The 
situation is harmless now. The plant is just ticking over. This power under our control.  
It is the power that fuels the sun. It is the building blocks of reality. And it is under 
my control. I’ve got an erection. I wonder if Anatoliy has. If I succeed in this little 
experiment perhaps I will be promoted. I might join the Academy of Sciences or 
become Minister of Energy and Electrification. I might eventually receive the Order 
of Lenin. Nothing can go wrong. This is a safe plant.
2
 
 
Akimov’s misplaced confidence in the plant’s safety and its ability to outperform the energy 
production of the West runs in tandem with a more personal hubris: his desire for career 
advancement and boasts of sexual potency. He has been having an affair with a married 
woman, Petra. He gambles the excitement of their relationship against its public discovery, 
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and this parallels the risk-reward of carrying out the test. At the controls of the reactor while 
the test is in progress, he remarks to himself: 
 
I love to feel this power in my hands. A nuclear power station is the ultimate woman. 
That’s what I sometimes think. When she goes critical I think of her as having 
multiple repeat orgasms. Petra. God what a bitch she can be when she’s on heat. 
Should I really drop her? Can’t we just be more careful? It is my job to keep her 
purring away. And she behaves beautifully. I know her inside out. She is safe now. 
And if I touch her there she will become excited. And if I touch her there she will 
calm down. So I touch her there. I just need to see how much the temperature will 
increase. I pull the boron control rods out there. Then I stick these up in her here.
3
  
 
As Akimov’s conflation of the sexual and the technological in this extract reveals, Chernobyl 
is a catastrophe of the human, caused by the actions of self-interested individuals egotistically 
weighing technical limits against personal gain. However, as was the case in reality, pressure 
is also put on the plant’s energy production capabilities by the political system at large. 
Before the test begins, Akimov is told by the plant’s director ‘“If you fail now in our express 
task, we will have to wait another year before we can repeat the experiment. [...] And if that 
happens, then Moscow will be very displeased.”’4 The novella couples the Soviet 
bureaucracy’s criminal impatience for results with the lead technicians’ oversight of the 
plant’s technical limits, reconstructing the implication that both groups, in their different 
ways, are guilty of causing the accident.       
 When the disaster occurs, it is at once a physical blow and a blow to political 
confidence. In Darragh McKeon’s novel All That is Solid Melts Into Air (2014), the Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers informs staff at a Moscow hospital via communiqué that an 
accident has occurred at Chernobyl: 
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“For your information, there has been a fire reported in Reactor 4 of the Ukrainian 
nuclear-power plant Chernobyl. The incident is under control but we have reports that 
the damage may be significant. However, I can reassure you that this incident will not 
stop the advance of nuclear energy.”       
 The last line is startling: it sits far outside the usual linguistic format of official 
communiqués. They are defending nuclear energy, as if anyone had questioned it, as 
if they were in the midst of a debate. Statements always come as unambiguous 
information. The Politburo communicates with orders or blank generalities [...] 
They’re saying it to reassure themselves. Something catastrophic must have 
occurred.
5
 
     
This unexpected defence of nuclear energy exposes a Žižekian Event,6 ‘a traumatic intrusion 
of something New which remains unacceptable for the predominant view’.7 Due to the Party’s 
relentless propagandising of nuclear power as “the peaceful Soviet atom,” nobody in the 
Soviet Union thought to question the proliferation of nuclear power stations or assurances of 
their safety; the very idea that something could go catastrophically wrong with them was 
denied outright by all but a few.
8
 The novel suggests that this baseless optimism and routine 
vagueness results from long-term political decay, which dismisses legitimate concerns as 
“alarmist, Western agitation,” inadvertently enabling the catastrophic failure of Chernobyl 
and in many ways by extension, Soviet communism. A socially subterranean, rhizomatic 
trauma in its own right, the spread of this slow political and moral degeneration is obfuscated 
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not only by the Soviet system’s own rhetoric – ‘a conspiracy of ignorance and obedience’9 – 
but also the traditional, Western events-based model of trauma, which is equally blind to the 
enduring, traumatic conditions that long predate a resulting, sudden instance of disastrous 
occurrence. Michael Rothberg argues in his preface to The Future of Trauma Theory: 
Contemporary Literary and Cultural Criticism (2014) that:    
 
The slow violence of climate change [both ecological and political] does not only 
require a shift in temporal perception away from the shattering event of classically 
conceived trauma; it also requires a recalibrated understanding of humanist history 
and subjectivity that displaces (without entirely eliminating) the positions of victim 
and perpetrator.
10
 
 
The Soviet subjects’ overarching exposure to systemic propaganda and obscurantist pseudo-
legalese displaces or restructures what constitutes a victim or perpetrator of trauma, following 
this new theory of slow violence. The authorities’ political action blurs (without erasing) the 
clear definitions of victim and perpetrator; Chernobyl, Vasily Nesterenko reports ‘is already 
history – the history of a crime’.11 This crime, of obfuscating the actual extent of the disaster 
– always already in motion as an extension of the existing climate of political repression – 
has, in a way, no true perpetrators, only Party members maintaining the corrupt status quo. 
Vladimir Ivanov, the former First Secretary of the Stavgorod Regional Party Committee, 
says: ‘I’m a product of my time. I’m not a criminal’.12 He continues:  
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the papers write that the Communists fooled the people, hid the truth from them. But 
we had to. We got telegrams from the Central Committee, from the Regional 
Committee, they told us: You must prevent a panic. And it’s true, a panic is a 
frightening thing.
13
 
 
Ivanov was ordered by his superiors to mollify any public concerns surrounding the disaster, 
preventing the frightening Event of mass panic by submitting to the old Soviet system: the 
slow violence of forced positivity and propaganda. He remembers: ‘We were all part of that 
system. We believed! We believed in the high ideals, in victory! We’ll defeat Chernobyl! We 
read about the heroic battle to put down the reactor that had gotten out from under man’s 
control’.14 Regarding his motivation of the liquidators, he recalls shouting:  
 
“Brothers! If I run away, and you run away, what will people think of us? They’ll say 
the Communists are deserters.” If I couldn’t convince them with words, with 
emotions, I did it in other ways. “Are you a patriot or not? If not, then put your Party 
card on the table. Throw it down!”15  
 
While the anonymity granted by the Soviet system does not excuse these individual acts of 
partisan blackmail and coercion, ‘The problem [of widespread political corruption] was so 
huge, and concerns so many people, it was hard to know where to start. There was also no 
one to blame, nobody whom you could point at for being the culprit’,16 as Robert van Voren 
writes in his book On Dissidents and Madness: From the Soviet Union of Leonid Brezhnev to 
the “Soviet Union” of Vladimir Putin (2009). For Sam Durrant, writing in his essay ‘Undoing 
Sovereignty: Towards a Theory of Critical Mourning’ (2014), ‘Rather than imagining a 
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traumatised collective psyche, trauma studies is on surer ground when it theorises the state’s 
role in the process of subjectification’.17 Following Durrant, the study of trauma at Chernobyl 
ought to unearth the traumatic repercussions of widespread Soviet political corruption, which 
has a tendency to dwarf and thus obscure individual outbursts like Ivanov’s, in order to 
implicate the State as a whole, highlighting ‘the importance of understanding trauma as an 
inevitable part of our ideological construction as subjects, our subjection to the state and the 
myriad forces of modernity’.18 Ivanov’s political subjectification of the liquidator as patriot 
or deserter is echoed in All That is Solid Melts Into Air. The novel represents the power 
plant’s staff and emergency response teams claimed by the Chernobyl disaster as “bare life” – 
the Homo sacer theorised by Giorgio Agamben
19
 – who are casually thrown at the radiation 
willingly believing the Soviet heroic rhetoric of victory over the escaped atom. A regiment of 
soldiers mobilised as liquidators are reduced to mere bodies or automatons, stripped of their 
humanity, as they prepare to enter the power plant to seal off the destroyed reactor:  
 
Rubber facemasks have been delivered and Grigory orders everyone to wear them. 
They put them on and all traces of personality are erased: everyone now moves and 
walks with a sinister sameness, an inhuman mien. Hair becomes important for 
identification purposes. Vygovskiy recognises people by remembering their hair; 
blond or black, crew-cut or curly. Voices filter through the masks as if disembodied.
20
  
 
                                                          
17
 Sam Durrant, ‘ Undoing Sovereignty: Towards a Theory of Critical Mourning’, in The Future of Trauma 
Theory: Contemporary Literary and Cultural Criticism, p.92 
18
 Durrant, ‘ Undoing Sovereignty: Towards a Theory of Critical Mourning’, p.93 
19
 In Agamben’s theory, the Homo sacer or sacred man is a figure of Roman law: an individual who is banned 
from civil society, deprived of all rights, and can be killed by anyone with impunity, but not sacrificed in 
religious ritual. Agamben updates the Homo sacer figure to describe the twentieth-century reduction of 
subjects by State power to “bare life”, considered as mere bodies to the exclusion of basic human rights 
(humanitarian aid, legal representation, free speech etc.). His argument, outlined in Homo Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) reads the extermination of the Jews in Nazi 
concentration camps as a twentieth-century example of the destruction of the Homo sacer, before applying 
the concentration camp as a paradigm to later political bodies. 
20
 McKeon, All That is Solid Melts Into Air, p.81 
175 
 
The body of the Homo sacer – its hair colour, in this extract – is its only form of identity and 
individuality. Here, the role of mere bodies is to protect public life against radiation via 
containment and liquidation measures – a making live of this public and letting die of 
liquidators,
21
 to use Michel Foucault’s theorisation of the biopolitical in his March 1976 
lecture at the Collège de France, ‘Society Must Be Defended’. The soldiers’ trauma, 
outwardly observable as an inhuman mien, is a symptom of being ideologically marshalled 
by the State into bare life. In both the novel’s reconstruction of Chernobyl’s “deactivation” 
and the actual cleanup, the traumatised soldier as Homo sacer is at once totally enthralled by 
the State’s narrative myth and dissociated from reality, ‘so socially identified with’ the heroic 
world and ‘completely numb to [experience]’.22 ‘And in those times [of trauma resulting from 
catastrophe] the Russian shows how great he is. How unique’, one of the soldiers interviewed 
for Voices from Chernobyl recalls. ‘We forget the bad parts and remember that’.23 This 
patriotic ethos is reconstructed in McKeon’s novel, albeit in a tone that is open to 
interpretation, one we might read as ironic. At the end of the first day of liquidation, Grigory, 
sitting under a statue of Prometheus in Pripyat, says the following to a soldier, who sits down 
beside him, offering a cigarette: ‘“I’m a surgeon. I never expected to live through a day like 
this.”’ The soldier responds with: ‘“You remember, my friend, what comrade Lenin told us: 
“Every cook has to learn how to govern the state.””’24 Here, the traumatic experience of the 
disaster’s aftermath is thinly-disguised by Soviet political rhetoric. Lenin’s words fail to lift 
the pair’s spirits, and the anxious atmosphere continues as we are told: ‘They finished their 
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cigarettes in silence’.25          
 The novel depicts, we will now see, that the Soviet subject as bare life has already 
been established long before the occurrence of the nuclear disaster. This is courtesy of the 
monotonous, repetitive procession of everyday, propagandised Soviet life,
26
 which is 
experienced at all levels of Soviet society. Every Saturday, Grigory, a surgeon at the Moscow 
hospital, has to endure an 
 
interminable meeting. The sound of paper being shuffled. Monotone speeches. 
Grigory sits in a hospital committee room at the weekly gathering of department 
heads. They each have assigned chairs, all wearing the same suit they had worn the 
previous Saturday, and the one before that, and the one before that. He sits and listens 
and has no idea of the time. These meetings can take hours, speaker after speaker; the 
same statements being uttered; the same political posturing.
27
 
 
In this excerpt, the arrangement and appearances of bodies are unchanging as are the 
modulation of voices and the topic of speeches. Like the body of the liquidator at Chernobyl, 
medicine in the hospital serves political purposes before those of trauma relief. Speakers’ 
presentations reveal  
 
Balance sheets taking precedence over patients, buying inferior equipment because it 
looks good, even if it brought with it tangible medical problems, the total subjugation 
of all their medical decisions to the whims and protocols of directives from the 
Secretariat.
28
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The novel repeats this disclosure of the State’s domineering intervention in all humanitarian 
or scientific affairs in its representation of the Chernobyl explosion, which is a disavowed 
political trauma of the New: the frame-changing idea that something unacceptable or 
inconceivable has occurred. As the reactor overheats and explodes in the novel,  
 
The operators pick themselves up, dazed. There is a task, a function. What to do? 
Surely there’s a button, a series of codes, a procedure, always a procedure. 
Miraculously, they find the operating manual, damp but useable. They locate the 
section, Ears numb from the piercing alarm. Eyes streaming. A section. Scanning 
through pages. A title: ‘Operational Procedures in the Event of Reactor Meltdown’. A 
block of black ink, two pages, five pages, eight pages. All the text has been wiped out, 
paragraphs hidden behind thick black lines. An event such as this cannot be tolerated, 
cannot be conceived, such a thing can never be planned for, as surely it can never 
happen. The system will not fail, cannot fail, the system is the glorious motherland.
29
 
 
The power plant, as in Thorpe’s novella, metaphorically represents something else. Here, it is 
the Soviet political system, which, like the plant, cannot tolerate the pressure of a meltdown – 
it too fails. Had it not been for the censorship of the emergency operational procedures 
section of the plant’s operating manual – a method of directly controlling opinions about 
nuclear power – the Chernobyl disaster might have been limited or prevented. Chernobyl was 
always already doomed, however, as instructions on procedural responses to the event of 
reactor meltdown, like the voices warning against the carrying out of dangerous tests at the 
plant or its absence of safety regulations, were silenced from the beginning. ‘The same holds 
for Soviet Communism’, as Žižek reminds us: ‘it is clearly insufficient to say that, in the years 
of Brezhnev, communism ‘stagnated’, it ‘exhausted its potentials, no longer fitting new 
times’; what its miserable end demonstrates is that it was a historical deadlock from its very 
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beginning’.30 This is the theory of long, slow trauma, a mapping of trauma, ‘not to one 
historically locatable event but to history itself, as one long catastrophe’.31 Indeed, the checks 
and balances on political power, which, if in place, would have laid down clear guidelines 
defining acceptable safety regulations and output limits of nuclear power plants, were present 
at the very beginning of communism, in The Communist Manifesto. These limits on the 
intervention of politics in all affairs were discarded by the adoptive Soviets from the outset. 
Soviet communism failed as soon as it aborted its task of dismantling ‘the carrying on of 
industries for the account of private individuals, [...] the wage system, [and prevented the 
conversion of] the state into a more superintendence of production’.32 What Marx and Engels 
in The Communist Manifesto term the ‘requirements of Truth; not the interests of the 
proletariat, but the interests of Human Nature, of Man in general’33 appear to exist only after 
the Chernobyl disaster, after the dissolution of Soviet communism. Those who returned to 
their evacuated villages against the authorities’ orders, where nature reclaimed her rightful 
home in the absence of human society, say: ‘we have the best kind of Communism here – we 
live like brothers and sisters’.34 One states: 
 
I have two bags of salt. Who needs the government? Plenty of logs – there’s a whole 
forest around us. The house is warm. The lamp is burning. It’s nice! I have a goat, a 
kid, three pigs, fourteen chickens. Land – as much as I want; grass – as much as I 
want. There’s water in the well. And freedom! We’re happy. This isn’t a collective 
farm anymore, it’s a commune. We need to buy another horse. And then we won’t 
need anyone at all.
35
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Following the shift from collective farming or Stakhanovism to communal self-rule free from 
the centralism of land, livestock and wage distribution, the villagers live, in spite of the 
radiation, in a dream utopia beyond the influence of government. The dream appears real, 
while it lasts. However, each villager, which ‘belongs to no class, has no reality’, figuratively 
‘exists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy’.36 The existence of this ideal or true 
communism is short lived, as the reality of radiation shatters it and begins to affect both the 
villagers’ physical and mental health; ‘It’s not just the land that’s contaminated, but our 
minds. And for many years, too’,37 a letter written by a Chernobyl evacuee reads. Actual life 
in the zone becomes impossible: ‘the chickens had black cockscombs, not red ones, because 
of the radiation. And you couldn’t make cheese. We lived a month without cheese and 
cottage cheese. The milk didn’t go sour – it curdled into powder. Because of the radiation’.38 
True, post-Soviet communism, then, like the authenticity of its Soviet counterpart, never 
properly existed; it was also a fantasy that never really began. Where Soviet communism was 
doomed from the beginning by political and moral degeneration, the villagers’ post-Soviet 
brand of communism fell foul of the radioactive conditions carried over from its prehistory. 
The slow, traumatising of irradiated nature within the Exclusion Zone can thus be conceived, 
paradoxically, as both victim and perpetrator of radioactive death, irreversibly poisoned by 
and poisoner of mankind. With this in mind, the next section will closely analyse Thorpe’s 
illustrated novella, Doc Chaos: The Chernobyl Effect, specifically the subjectivising of nature 
by science into a productive worker body that breaks free from human control and wreaks its 
revenge upon us. 
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...And Nature 
In the times before we possessed an understanding of the Earth’s geological forces, as Žižek 
reminds us in the feature-length documentary Examined Life (dir: Astra Taylor, 2008), we 
obfuscated our powerlessness against natural disasters by inventing various reasons to 
explain their origins. When something traumatic happened in nature, such as a tornado or 
tsunami, we were compelled to assign meaning to it in order to sidestep the realisation that 
there was nothing we could do to prevent it. For example, interpreting a natural catastrophe 
as divine punishment makes it easier to comprehend in the aftermath (in which a plan of 
action is formulated and then collectively followed: the Gods were angry and therefore we 
must appease them, etc.). Here, the catastrophe is ‘not just some terrifying blind force – it has 
a meaning’.39 A variant of this theory of ecology as ideology is practiced in the aftermath of 
the Chernobyl disaster, where the catastrophe is rationalised not due to our inability to 
understand it, but due to our disavowal of it. The confrontation of its true, scientific cause 
would force us to completely reconsider our methods of energy production, something that 
the Soviet Union, by then heavily dependent on nuclear power, was unprepared to do. Rather, 
for the Party authorities to sustain the belief that nuclear power remained a viable, safe source 
of energy on behalf of the USSR’s populace, Viktor Brioukhanov and Nikolai Fomin, 
respectively the Chernobyl power plant’s manager and its chief engineer, were singled out as 
culprits of the catastrophe. Each was stripped of his Party membership and sentenced to ten 
years of labour camp internment. Igor Kostin writes in his book Chernobyl: Confessions of a 
Reporter: at ‘their closed trial, lasting a few weeks in Chernobyl and ending in July 1987 [...] 
Brioukhanov was reminded that, at the time of activation of reactor Number Four, he had 
neglected certain indispensible checks’.40 This interpretation of the disaster as a punishment 
for individuals’ neglect becomes a cover-story for the systemic disregard of the plant’s 
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crucial safety regulations. These measures exist for good reasons, since nuclear reactions, in 
their essential, uninterrupted nature, are incredibly destructive; these colossal, unimaginable 
events naturally occur all the time in realms beyond our everyday experience: in the sun and, 
occasionally, in naturally-formed uranium deposits on Earth. At Chernobyl, All That is Solid 
Melts Into Air suggests, these regulations were indeed collectively ignored. Vladimir 
Andreiovich Vygovskiy, the chief advisor to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, informs 
Grigory about America’s Three Mile Island incident while they are present at the Chernobyl 
liquidation coordination meeting at the Party Headquarters in Pripyat. Vygovskiy says that 
the Three Mile Island plant  
 
had an accident. Seven years ago, this was. Not a catastrophe, but a big problem, a 
serious incident. But the Americans learned from it. After the accident they put in 
place a safety system, one that would anticipate problems instead of just fixing things 
when they were already broken. I read of these changes, I studied their developments. 
I said to myself we need to do something like that here. I brought my proposals to the 
committee, but before I could present them formally, there were conversations in 
corridors, I was pulled into doorways. There was much talk about me, they said. They 
might decide to downgrade me, they said. Not outright threats – you know the way – 
just talk. So I did the smart thing, I withdrew my recommendations. I reworded my 
critique. I did as the entire nation has done. I stayed silent. I backed away. Because I 
did this, they made me chief advisor to the ministry.
41
 
 
This multitude of dissuading voices that Vygovskiy encounters, which causes him to retract 
his proposed revisions of nuclear power plants’ safety protocols, implicates not individual 
leaders but the Soviet authorities at large in discounting the possible dangers of nuclear 
power in favour of national unity; ‘we are all guilty’42 of this mentality, Grigory replies to his 
comrade, echoing the sentiments of Thorpe’s novella Doc Chaos: The Chernobyl Effect 
regarding the subject, which were analysed in the preceding section. In reality, the Chernobyl 
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supervisors refused to learn from even their own earlier mistakes: on 29 September 1982, a 
fuel channel blockage in the plant’s Reactor One caused a partial meltdown when the 
operator accidentally closed the flow control valve. No safety measures were subsequently 
devised to counteract future operator errors of this sort, and the incident was kept from the 
public’s attention. One of the causes of the 1986 disaster, Alexander Shlyakhter and Richard 
Wilson claim in their article ‘Chernobyl: the Inevitable Results of Secrecy’ (1992) was a 
‘failure to study “precursors” of the accident (partial meltdown at the Leningrad nuclear 
power plant in October 1975 [and at the] Chernobyl Unit I accident in September 1982)’.43 
The closed trial of Brioukhanov and Fomin after the 1986 disaster, ‘where Soviet technology 
was cleared of any wrongdoing’,44 declared that the Event was an avoidable result of the 
omissions of a few – a sustainable blow to the Soviet system – thereby obfuscating the reality 
that Shlyakhter and Wilson expose: ‘the complete failure of the Soviet system to manage 
modern technology in a safe manner’.45 Exonerating the system after the disaster, the trial 
blindly declares Soviet communism’s ‘attempts to contain/control this excess of madness [of 
nuclear power], to renormalize it, to re-inscribe it into the normal flow of things’46 successful. 
  Thorpe’s novella, Doc Chaos: The Chernobyl Effect, situates this dangerous short-
sightedness at the global level, detailing humanity’s overall complacency in its scientific 
adaptation of nuclear power. The novella is, its subtitle reads, ‘the autobiography of Doctor 
Unknown Chaos, a Record of some Notable Events in the years between 1950 and 1986 with 
Further Consequences’.47 This autobiography of the nuclear as New, a history of disavowed 
dangers which explode into our reality, is mirrored by the autobiography of the titular 
individual, Doc Chaos. The novella’s premise is that the life of this person is the human 
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embodiment of the introduction and catastrophic progress of the nuclear age; both nuclear 
power and Doc Chaos, as this section will argue, serve human needs which are at once 
necessary as everyday essentials and excessive. The juxtaposition of daily twentieth century 
life and extreme, destructive requirement is depicted by the novella in society’s harnessing of 
nuclear power, a raw natural process contained within and directed from a nuclear reactor. 
Doc Chaos narrates:  
 
A little while after my sixth birthday something happened. On October 17, 1956, the 
country celebrated the dawn of a progressive new era. There was much international 
trumpet-blowing about it on the radio and in the magazines and newspapers. Her 
Majesty, the Queen of Normalism, Elizabeth II, switched power from the Calder Hall, 
Magnox nuclear reactor onto the national grid. For the first time in history, people 
were cooking their egg and bacon on energy derived from the same source as that 
which powered the sun itself.
48
  
 
Here, the ceremonial, documented uptake of nuclear power for modern living is juxtaposed 
with an assessment of its true nature: it is an artificially generated energy, a manufactured 
double of excessive, unimaginable natural resources. This comparison hints at the 
precariousness of our actions here, and, as at Chernobyl, the slightest transgression of certain 
limits, whether by human error or other, less immediate causes, can result in chaos. Doc 
Chaos himself mirrors this configuration, since he too is an unnatural phenomenon. In his 
infancy he is contained in artificial casing, and his emergence from it is accompanied by his 
propensity for unexpected violent outbursts. He claims: ‘I am a Post-Natural Phenomenon’.49 
As a prematurely born British baby in 1950, he is sustained by medical intervention provided 
by the newly-set up National Health Service, ‘cocooned [...] inside a techno-mother, the 
opposite of moist and dark and squidgy, walled with plastic and steel, fed by chemicals, 
                                                          
48
 Thorpe, Doc Chaos: The Chernobyl Effect, p.14 
49
 Thorpe, Doc Chaos: The Chernobyl Effect, p.61 
184 
 
oxygen and electricity’.50 He continues to live unnaturally, a symbol of the human defiance of 
nature akin to the technological reproduction of nuclear power: ‘I was a sickly child’, he 
narrates. He recalls: 
 
By strict Darwinian practice, I should not have survived. I would never have been 
allowed to live according to the laws of natural selection. I was coaxed through a 
whole litany of diseases: influenza, chickenpox, chronic bronchitis, excema, asthma 
(complicated by the bronchial infections), tonsillitis, appendicitis, pneumonia, 
pneumoconiosis, mumps, glandular fever and whooping cough. Apart from this, I 
suffered from cerebral palsy, a condition I was born with, which meant that I had only 
a modicum of control over various muscles and had to wear enormous braces over my 
legs, which certainly made it harder to fall over and, because of their weight, 
encouraged the development of stamina and endurance.
51
 
 
When he starts school, this strange-looking yet highly intelligent child is an introduction of 
the New, hated by and ambivalent towards his classmates, whom he terms “normals”. ‘My 
contemporaries knew there was something odd, deficient and special about me so I would be 
bullied and picked on mercilessly’,52 he narrates. Furthermore, he recalls:  
 
From an early age I was segregated at school upon the arbitrary basis of biological 
features, some of which were only latent. Boys isolated in such a way are encouraged 
to be cruel. My difference from themselves was something they could not tolerate. 
“Moron! Moron! Moron!” I learnt early on the narrow, piggish-minded basis of their 
normalism and rejected it there and then. “Moron! Moron! Moron!” My reaction was 
merciless. They did not expect a cripple to fight back. To use his leg iron as a 
weapon.
53
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This intolerable Event of the New to normality, which explodes upon provocation into 
sudden violence through unexpected means, mirrors a contemporary crisis of confidence in 
nuclear power: the Windscale nuclear incident of 1957.
54
 For Chaos:  
 
When the truth about the events at Windscale Number One plutonium-production 
reactor on 8-12 October 1957 eventually emerged almost twenty years later, I had 
already changed my mind about nuclear power, so I was no longer surprised by what 
had happened. It seemed perfectly to be expected. It is normal. But it is the sort of 
normality that Normalism hates to admit exists.
55
 
 
As with the closed trial at Chernobyl, the unpredictable Newness of nuclear power which 
emerges as humanity gets to grips with it does not deter its further scientific adaptation. After 
the Windscale Reactor One accident, Chaos’s father reassures his son, saying ‘as nuclear 
power was a new technology there were bound to be mistakes early on’.56 Here, the New is 
subsumed into the new: normalism hubristically attempts to accommodate the first dangerous 
anomalies of the developing technology of nuclear power by interpreting the Windscale 
accident as merely a minor, acceptable setback. Seeing this Event for what it really is, Chaos 
argues that the threat of nuclear disaster is the state of (disavowed) normality, which restages 
forces it cannot fully control. He illustrates this premise, saying: ‘In fact what happened at 
Windscale was a series of blind stumblings that might just as well have been made by a drunk 
trying to drive a car without its lights on. I.e., it was totally normal’.57  
 Normalism’s disavowal of imminent nuclear chaos involves an abjection of its waste 
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or excess bi-product, the unusable error in the trial that Windscale and other early reactors 
represent. For Julia Kristeva, abjection, ‘the jettisoned object, is radically excluded and draws 
me toward the place where meaning collapses’.58 Chaos recalls the following event, occurring 
shortly after the Windscale accident:  
 
I remember going for a walk round one of my favourite haunts, down by the stream 
near Bluebell Wood, when my nostrils were more than mildly offended by the rancid 
smell I associated with old school milk bottles left lying in the playground. Examining 
the stream I found that the land was flowing not with milk and honey, but just with 
the former, and that what’s more it had gone off and the stench was appalling.59  
 
The smell of irradiated, soured milk draws the young Chaos towards the site of Windscale’s 
abjection, which is also the site of confusion: he ‘had a vision of a nuclear power plant being 
used to make milk instead of cows (being used to make milk), and of something going wrong 
and the milk coming out poisoned so they had to throw it away’.60 Following Kristeva, 
meaning collapses in repugnance of ‘A “something” [...] about which there is nothing 
insignificant, and which crushes me. On the edge of non-existence and hallucination’.61 The 
act of discarding this milk incurs what Kristeva terms the improper or unclean: ‘Loathing an 
item of food, a piece of filth, waste, or dung’, she writes, ‘is perhaps the most elementary and 
most archaic form of abjection. When the eyes see or the lips touch that skin on the surface of 
milk [...] I experience a gagging sensation and, still farther down, spasms in the stomach’.62 
In Kristeva’s psychoanalysis, this ‘milk cream, [which] separates me from the mother and 
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father who proffer it’,63 echoes the discarded milk at Windscale, which acts as a catalyst for 
the separation of Chaos from the world of adults and their mistakes. Regarding the accident, 
he asks: ‘Why else would this happen? They shouldn’t let stupid people work the machines 
[...] I would do better’.64 Chaos rises to his challenge, becoming a brilliant neurosurgeon in 
adolescence – one who has in his pursuit of knowledge and perfection completely 
disregarded the limits of ethics. He becomes an amoral force of pure science, wishing to be 
‘Neat and orderly. Precise and scrupulous. Without room for error and absolutely 
foolproof’.65 On the subject of his reclusive high school years, he recalls the following: ‘I 
began to study medicine, after having mastered neurology. I knew my experiments bothered 
my tutors so I performed them in private’.66 In adulthood, after being awarded a PhD by 
Oxford University ‘for some piddling piece of research so trivial I can’t remember what it 
was’,67 he trials the act of brain transplantation between two homeless men, Eric and 
Malcolm, both of whom he picked up outside a doss house in Wigan. Eric’s ‘brain did 
survive’ the transplantation procedure, ‘Although it was sadly unable to activate the body of 
Malcolm [...] mainly because the spinal cord was improperly connected’.68 After the 
operation, Chaos reports: ‘It could still recognise me, it could speak. I won’t repeat the foul 
language it uttered for fear of besmirching his noble reputation. It could blink and even lick 
its lips’.69 An abject body that is between Eric and Malcolm, neither fully one nor the other, 
‘“I” is expelled. The border [between the two identities] has become an object’.70 This failed 
experiment is followed by a series of further abjections, of Chaos’s “noble” science, by the 
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BMA, when they hear of his horrific experiment. At his subsequent trial before the board of 
the BMA, he is informed of the charges and punishments brought against him:  
 
“Doctor, you stand accused of gross malpractice, illegal medical research, 
endangering patients’ lives, neglecting your duties in favour of your private 
obsessions, assault, attempted manslaughter, kidnapping, stealing corpses from the 
morgue, bribing officials, namely coroners, and of breaching just about every clause 
of the BMA Code of Practice. [...] You seem to be a perversion, lacking in any sense 
of honour, and like all perverts seek to taint others with your own disease. You are 
hereby expelled from this Association, disbarred from practice for the rest of your 
natural – or unnatural – life, and you will shortly be hearing from the police in 
connection with your other crimes.”71 
 
Through his malpractice, Chaos exposes the abject or outside of ethical science – not only 
what it refuses to tolerate but also what it tolerates and disavows, hides within itself. ‘In this 
sense, then,’ to quote Judith Butler in Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex, 
‘the subject is constituted through the force of exclusion and abjection, one which produces a 
constitutive outside to the subject, an abjected outside, which is, after all, “inside” the subject 
as its own founding repudiation’.72 As Chaos sees it, science internalises an unethical aspect, 
contradicting itself and constructing ‘the excluded and illegible domain that haunts the former 
domain as the spectre of its own impossibility’.73 This impossibility, Chaos announces at his 
trial before the board, is readily apparent:  
 
“Your morality preaches the benefits of science. But its results are choked cities, sick 
oceans and forests, death and the suffering of millions of creatures, human and non-
human. Be warned, arrogant sightless rulers of this imminent hell, by your 
hypocritical judgement of my futuristic researches into adapting the human being to 
the environmental needs of a drastically altered future, altered by your very selves, 
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your own terrible fate is hereby cast and that future is irrevocably mine!  
 For I am the true face of your morality. I have discarded your dishonesty and 
hypocrisy. I pretend nothing. And so, I am the face of the future. I am Pure Science 
made flesh. If you condemn me, you are condemning yourselves. Like they say, if you 
can’t stand the heat, get out of the kitchen.”74 
 
Science, though it upholds an authorised code of ethical practice, has a detrimental and 
irreversible ecological effect on the planet. Nuclear power plants have polluted the cities, 
oceans and forests, heralding the imminent yet disavowed environmental hell that Chaos 
warns of. After being disqualified by the BMA, he realises that ‘From this point on, an 
alternative identity began to become apparent to me. One that would bring my point home 
much better, and one with which I might, one day, merge. Therefore, I started to rewrite my 
own past’.75            
 In a chapter entitled ‘Empire State (Pseudo-Autobiography 2)’, Chaos narrates a 
lengthy timeline of the proliferation, technical advancement and failures of nuclear power 
plants in first-person, from the point of the reactions. It is revealed that by 1973,  
 
17 countries hooked into the world with 167 reactors (holiday homes for lucky me) 
churning away at 61,000 MWe [Mega Watt electrical], piling up that nuclear waste. 
But it wasn’t enough. More! I wanted more! The world’s most useless commodity – 
but not to me. Cooling ponds throughout the world filling up with burning deadly 
waste, nobody knows what to do with it. Anal culture of England says give it to us, 
we love shit here, the worse the better. [...] March ‘75: Brown’s Ferry plant in deepest 
Alabama (my largest mansion so far). A technician’s candle and a draught of air cause 
a fire that eventually spreads into the reactor causing $80m worth of damage, 18 
months out of commission and the kind of interior decor I love! Sept. ’77: At 
Hunterstone B plant they forgot about the makeshift pipe they’d rigged in the cooling 
system. Upon depressurisation it causes £14m worth of damage and a several month 
shutdown. March ‘78: At Rancho Seco near Sacramento, California, a technician 
drops a lightbulb on a control panel. The panel shorts. Readings go haywire bouncing 
from one end of the dial to the other. The computer responds to these wrong readings. 
The reactor core shoots up and down in temperature and pressure, Steam generators 
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dry up. Others feed water instead of steam into the turbines. Valves open and shut at 
random. Sounds like my sort of paradise. The bulb only cost 25 cents. Bargain.
76
  
 
Here, Doc Chaos is the discursive embodiment of the pure nuclear reaction, a force that 
always gravitates towards chaos. The destructive realisation of nuclear power within the 
plants, which echoes the violent transgression of moral science by Doc Chaos’s brain 
transplantation experiment, ‘emerges within the system as incoherence, disruption, a threat to 
its own systemacity’.77 This disruption of the systems of nuclear technology and ethical 
medical practice result from man’s scientific overexploitation of nature. The Events of 
nuclear emergency and brain transplantation, though they must be abjected, are inextricable, 
the novella reveals, and play a necessary role in the scientific progress towards the irradiated, 
apocalyptic future, defined by Doc Chaos as ‘lust for control over the uncontrollable, as long 
as you remain’.78 In order to remain, he informs us, the human race, that his experimented-
upon bodies are the ones that matter. The terrible future is indeed irrevocably his, since ‘the 
whole point of brain transplantation is to assume a completely new body – for whatever 
reason; age, self-abuse, disease, or, in my own case, to avoid detection by my enemies’.79 The 
survival of consciousness via the continual switching out of bodies as they burn out is 
necessary to survive in the disease-rife age of the drastically altered future, which is heralded 
by the occurrence of as-yet imminent global ecological catastrophe. This age echoes Butler’s 
‘“unlivable” and uninhabitable zones of social life’,80 which are here biological in nature. 
This catastrophic future, whether it is radioactive or polluted in some other way, forms ‘a 
domain of abjected bodies, a field of deformation’, which fails ‘to qualify as the fully 
human’. Furthermore, it ‘might force a radical rearticulation of what qualifies as bodies that 
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matter, ways of living that count as “life”’.81 What really matters here, then, is not bodies at 
all, since all biological life will degrade beyond usability, but matter itself – life which is 
beyond the body. After performing the perfected brain transplantation operation on himself, 
Chaos remarks: 
 
it becomes possible, with training, using bio-feedback techniques mapped to advanced 
visualisation meditation, to manipulate one’s energy field.    
 After the fourth transplantation, and extensive sessions involving the 
manipulation of brain wavelength using electrodes attached to computers 
programmed with my own ideal brain encephalograph patterns, I developed an 
uncanny control over my host body, and also over my own energy field. For example, 
I was able consciously to control my autonomic nervous system and extend my 
sensory field up to a meter beyond skin level.
82
 
 
This extension of consciousness beyond the physical confines of the body provides Chaos 
with the key to life in the “unlivable” future, which grants access to a radical re-articulation 
of the human. ‘Not only do bodies indicate a world beyond themselves,’ Butler writes in her 
book’s preface, ‘but this movement beyond their own boundaries, a movement of boundary 
itself, appeared to be quite central to what bodies “are”’.83 As Chaos escapes his own bodily 
boundary, or at least that of his current host body, he exclaims:  
 
I became convinced I was onto something! Enlightenment experiences flooded my 
mind, I would lose all sensation of location. Place and differentiation became fuzzed. 
Everything was energy. And I saw, in a vision, at the basis of it, the root, if you like, 
the handle on which consciousness is pinned: dna. In other words, sex.  
 Sex had been up till now the sole means of transmitting consciousness from 
one body to another, using the medium of dna. There was something in dna that 
allowed it the privileged function of being able to host immanent consciousness. But 
now I had found a way around that. All I had to do was loosen a bit of my 
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consciousness, manufacture a piece of dna with the properties I required, and match 
the two together.
84
 
 
What bodies “are” – consciousness pinned to dna – can be transmitted not just between 
bodies, but spread across all matter. Chaos’s newfound science enables him to see that: 
 
Mankind is not the centre of the universe nor can one-dimensional logic hope to 
describe the wonder of the repeating patterns of the fractal-infested, morphologically 
resonating, quantum leaping, multi-dimensional energy fields that we perceive as 
material and spiritual reality.
85
 
 
This discovery at once mirrors and subverts Sandor Ferenczi’s plan for psychoanalysis. In his 
Clinical Diary, as Ruth Leys informs us in Trauma: A Genealogy, Ferenczi  
 
imagined using psychoanalysis to end the “chains of acts of cruelty”, which 
perpetuate ruthlessness and self-assertion, thereby creating a world based on harmony 
and trust. “Is progress possible to a point where selfish (passionate) tendencies are 
entirely renounced?” he asked, and answered: “Only if the centres of self ceased to 
exist as such, and, if separate individuals (atoms, etc.) were to come to the 
‘conviction’ that it is better not to exist as separate beings. Unification of the universe 
at an ideal point.”86 
 
Chaos’s experience of the universe beyond human perception, which consists of decentred, 
universalised matter spread across repeating patterns of energy fields, differs from Ferenczi’s 
vision of psychoanalysis benefiting mankind. Where Ferenczi’s decentred, selfless self 
renounces passion alongside psychological and material individuality ‘to propose the ethical 
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priority of the “not-I” or feeling of universality represented by the child or wounded adult’s 
capacity for selfless immersion in the other’,87 Chaos’s universality is a passionate, purely 
selfish destructiveness:  
 
I come to destroy because I have the secret of birth. I come to destroy because I adore 
lust. Don’t panic I am a doctor. I am Pure Science incarnate, made flesh. I am 
curiosity, empiricism and naked lust without respect for anything but self-interest. I 
love knowledge with no respect for consequences. I’ll infect everyone equally.88 
 
For Chaos, the unification of the universe at an ideal point, which infects everyone equally, is 
the Chernobyl disaster, the origin of the global ecologically catastrophic future. After 
meeting, falling in love with and marrying another scientist, Jo, who, like himself, has 
perfected the science of brain transplantation and matter transfer, Chaos narrates: ‘I had 
already planned the best honeymoon for him/her a scientist and lover ever could, a night that 
would truly go down in the world’s history. The date was 25 April 1986’.89 Through 
manipulation of their energy fields to engage with the universalised matter, the couple kick-
start the Chernobyl Reactor Four meltdown:  
 
This, Jo, is pure love. We are surrounded by steam. The hissing of its escape is like a 
pit of vipers. The pipes begin to rupture. A hydrogen bubble forms as steam meets 
zirconium and immediately explodes. Concrete rains everywhere. The explosions rip 
into the hall above. We are climaxing together. It is beautiful. It is frightening. 
 A 200 tonne crane smashes down onto the core. The light ripples and 
shimmers, coruscates brilliantly with the explosions and the blue light of the 
radioactivity in the escaping, vaporising water. We are in control. I rule. I command. I 
am powerless. I am victimised. I glitter with variety. Some of me lasts only 
microseconds as I change and run up and down the nucleic ladder. I glitter with the 
anti-Christmas tinsel of lanthanum-140, ruthenium-103, caesium-137, iodine-131, 
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tellurium-132, strontium-89, strontium-90, and yttrium-91, such poetic names. 
Elsewhere I leave behind uranium-235, -238, -237, plutonium-239, -240, -241 and -
242. The alchemical philosopher’s stone has been achieved. I am yellow with gold 
and uranium oxide.
90
 
 
Chaos and Jo extend rather than end the “chains of cruelty” or radioactive decay. The ideal 
point of universal unification, which leads to the increase in global background radiation 
caused by the disaster that affects populations around the world, is an explosive, traumatic 
transformation of atomic matter – a selfish immersion, contrary to Ferenczi’s selfless 
psychoanalysis, in the other, in us. Seeing the dangerous radioactive remainder released by 
the Chernobyl explosion as the offspring produced by his atomic union with Jo, Chaos 
remarks: 
 
At first, in the surrounding Ukraine countryside showers of our children fall. They are 
instructed upon contact with humans to go straight for the thyroid gland! [...] Many 
more must make that sacrifice before the transformation of the human race is 
complete. Mutatis mutandis!
91
  
 
Mutatis mutandis – changing only that which needs to be changed via radioactive 
contamination and mutation – at once prepares and punishes us for the catastrophic, 
“unlivable” future that we have allowed for ourselves. ‘Ordinary people were punished, and 
for what?’ Chaos asks. ‘For believing lies, fairy tales, for failing to use the future properly. 
For settling for less than being able to make decisions about how their lives are supplied. For 
letting me build my homes, have my way. For bearing witness to my supreme 
omnipotence’.92 For Chaos, the radioactive bodily disintegration of the world’s population is 
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not really a destruction of life but an ascension, not a disabling but ‘an enabling disruption, 
the occasion for a radical rearticulation of the symbolic horizon in which bodies come to 
matter at all’.93 At the end of the novella, bodies, through their degeneration, come to matter 
only as alternate matter: the matter, instead, of the universal energy field that Chaos and Jo 
have merged with. Although the corporeal matter of human bodies degenerate in ‘The 
successive waves of deaths [that] occurred up to years or decades afterwards’,94 
‘Radioactivity is a superior form of matter to human life matter because it modifies it’, Chaos 
claims. ‘It is the next stage on the evolutionary scale. It is absolutely destructive. Or, to put it 
another way, absolutely creative’.95  
 
Phantoms of the Landscape in All That is Solid Melts Into Air and The Dead Lake 
The traumatic decaying of nature into one disavowed universality is also depicted in All That 
is Solid Melts Into Air. As well as reconstructing the authorities’ frantic attempts to deal with 
the nuclear disaster, the novel portrays the Event’s impact on one Ukrainian family, who live 
on a farm on the outskirts of Pripyat. This focuses on the story of the teenaged Artyom and 
his search for his father, a fire fighter who helped to tackle the blaze at Reactor Four, in the 
wake of the disaster. In the aftermath of the explosion, when Artyom’s father departs to 
attend to the burning reactor, the rest of the family is evacuated to Minsk, Belarus. Later, 
after hearing about casualties suffered by the emergency response teams sent to Chernobyl 
and fearing his father may be among them, Artyom searches the junkyard on the outskirts of 
the city for the rubbish collector, Maksim Vissarionovich. This man knows which hospital 
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the Chernobyl fire fighters were sent to, and thus becomes essential to Artyom’s search. The 
junkyard is an intolerable site of decay, a universalisation of abject matter:  
 
Gulls dropped down from the sky and skimmed over a vast synthetic territory, a 
seascape that was entirely comprised of things discarded. Bulbous plastic bags, strings 
of electrical cable and soggy cardboard boxes were congealed into a single, 
amorphous mass.
96
  
 
The State harnesses the process of decay to abject its waste, to cleanse itself of the improper 
or unclean and thus go on living. ‘I expel myself, I spit myself out’, it might say. ‘I abject 
myself within the same motion through which “I” claim to establish myself’.97 The novel’s 
reconstruction of this mass abjection of matter in the junkyard, in which ‘Bulldozers surfed 
the waves of slosh, surging uncertainly against the semi-solid waste [...] and backed up 
against a concrete wall and spat out [...] chewed-up contents’,98 also occurs at the individual, 
bodily level. After getting a lift in one of the vehicles across the site,  
 
Artyom opened the cab door and the air slithered into his nostrils, leaving a filmy 
residue against the back of his throat. He had never smelled anything like it. He 
clasped his hand to his nose and breathed only into the cupped space of his palm.
99
 
 
Despite the necessity of this continual renewal for social and biological survival, the abjected 
domestic waste is disavowed. Personally confronting its existence is a new experience for 
Artyom; as with all abject material, rubbish is imprisoned in ‘a deep well of memory that is 
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unapproachable and intimate’,100 and recollected only in its literal return to the repulsed 
senses. Rubbish, without being confronted in this way, is unthinkable. For Artyom, the 
junkyard ‘was not a place he could ever have imagined, a place so man-made’.101 This 
disavowal of the abject mirrors earlier events in the novel, which were discussed in the 
previous sections of this chapter: the authorities’ exclusion from the social body of abject 
material, namely the claims of the undermanagement or mismanagement of nuclear power. 
Here, to quote Kristeva, ‘It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but 
what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules’,102 such 
as Vygovskiy’s revisionist proposals that disturb the Soviet hierarchy and the limits to what 
one can advocate. However, the unclean, unhealthy body returns with a vengeance: it is 
incurred in the authorities’ frantic efforts to normalise the catastrophe, to stabilise the 
situation and thereby prevent widespread panic. Artyom’s father, poisoned by the radiation 
when helping to extinguish the fire at Reactor Four, must be abjected and disavowed, 
imprisoned within a series of silent barriers: a hospital. ‘Reabsorbed into the trajectory of the 
Idea [of developing nuclear technology]’, to further quote Kristeva, ‘what can defilement 
become if not the negative side of consciousness – that is, lack of communication and 
speech?’ The abject, radioactive, decaying body of Artyom’s father is situated beyond ‘a 
border of discourse – a silence’.103 Both actual testimonies of fire fighters’ loved ones and 
their fictional reconstruction in McKeon’s novel highlight this shifting of contaminated 
liquidators’ bodies to behind figurative and literal walls of silence: ‘The doctors kept telling 
them they’d been poisoned by gas. No one said anything about radiation. And the town [of 
Pripyat] was inundated right away with military vehicles, they closed off all the roads’,104 
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Lyudmilla Ignatenko, the wife of liquidator Vasily, recalls in interview. In All That is Solid 
Melts Into Air, Artyom and his sister Sofya, accompanied by their mother and Maksim to the 
hospital that their father is being held in, notice that ‘There was nobody else there. The place 
was wrapped in silence. The only sounds were the echoes of footsteps that rang through the 
corridors. It was disconcerting to see a public building so empty’.105 A series of physical and 
verbal barricades confront the group, which must be negotiated: ‘At the front door of the 
hospital they used the last gold tooth to bribe their way into the building’,106 a set of which 
Maxim gave to the family for such a situation. He departs after he ‘slipped some money into 
Artyom’s mother’s hand’107 for her and her children’s financial security. Following this, 
 
In the corridor on the third floor the attendant introduced them to the nurse. She took 
Artyom’s mother aside and spoke to her quietly. As their conversation continued, 
Artyom watched his mother edge away from her, palms raised, as if she had just 
walked into the cage of a wild animal.
108
 
 
For Artyom and Sofya, this verbal obstacle outside the room their father is being held in 
proves harder to navigate than the earlier physical one. At a remove from the situation, both 
physically and in terms of their limited understanding of their father’s condition. Artyom 
‘heard the woman say, “His skull is compromised.”’ 
 
Sofya heard it too.              
Artyom asked Sofya, “Compromised from what?”               
Sofya wouldn’t reply.              
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“Compromise”. Isn’t that something you do when you can’t agree? How can a skull   
be compromised?
109
 
 
Nevertheless, ‘They walked into the room, and everything was much better than Artyom 
expected it to be. His father was sitting on the bed, playing cards with men they knew: some 
of their neighbours – Yuri Polovinkin, Gennnady Karbalevich, Eduard Demenev’.110 This is 
the only visit to their father that Artyom and Sofya are allowed, since 
 
Artyom didn’t get to see his father when the tumours metastasised, not within his 
body, but instead crawling to its surface, till they clasped his face, trailing his features 
like poison ivy. He didn’t get to see him when he was producing a stool thirty times a 
day, comprised mainly of blood and mucus. When his skin started cracking on his 
arms and legs. When every evening his sheet would be covered in blood and 
Artyom’s mother would give the soldiers’ directions as to how to move him, and 
make sure her husband had fresh bedding for the night.
111
 
 
For Artyom and Sofya, their father’s radioactive decay is a “phantom” scene, ‘Reconstituted 
from the memories of words, scenes, and affects’.112 The word “compromised” is a broken 
symbol for Artyom in that its meaning is impenetrable to him, unable as it is to describe the 
event. It entombs his father in a mnemic crypt, an imaginative incorporation of the similarly 
impenetrable sealed walls of the room. The unwitnessed event within these walls is thereby 
encrypted, phantomised. Ultimately ‘The idea of the phantom’, Nicolas Abraham and Maria 
Torok theorise in The Shell and the Kernel ‘concerns itself with the unwitting reception of 
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someone else’s secret’.113 The siblings receive their father’s secret dying, an event hidden by 
both the hospital and their mother, who: 
 
couldn’t lie and couldn’t face her children, so she stayed there beside him, unable to 
touch him because it would bring too much pain. Her children brought the soup to the 
attendant at the reception desk, who would deliver it to a table at the entrance to the 
ward. They never asked to see their father. He belonged to their mother now.
114
 
 
When witnessing the junkyard before journeying to the hospital to see his father, the novel 
reveals:  
 
Artyom would return frequently to this moment, in the following weeks, when he 
watched sickness engulf his father, when blood seeped out through the pores of his 
father’s skin, when he began to realise that he could never understand or predict the 
pathways that someone’s life could take.115 
 
The imperative of trash, a displacement of history into memory, of Arytom’s father’s 
radioactive disintegration into Artyom’s recollection of decaying domestic waste, is an effect 
of the phantom in which the past, via Nachträglichkeit, constitutes imagined meaning in the 
absence of empirical evidence in the present. Deprived of its reality, his father’s radioactive 
disintegration, displaced into phantomhood, haunts Artyom’s experience and imagination of 
the (un)natural world. On the one hand it returns in the junkyard, a literal yet excessive scene, 
and on the other, fantastical stories about mythical worlds told to him by his father. ‘In one 
that they returned to often, the living and the dead were connected by bridges made from 
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Kalyna wood. They crossed easily from one side to the other, doing this so readily that after 
some time they could no longer distinguish between the two realms’.116 After his father’s 
death, Artyom returns to this story himself, alone: 
 
Particles skimming through the air. Underneath what he sees and smells and hears. 
Snowflakes concealing their star-tipped patterns. Animals curled up under the ground 
seeing out the winter, their hearts beating with only the faintest of rhythms. His father 
is here: a shadow dancing, merged into the life around him. Inhabiting the cells of 
these things, just as radiation, displaced atoms, inhabited his own living cells, 
changing him.
117
 
 
In this mythical realm of the dead, it is the fantasy and not the reality of nature that exists. 
Artyom’s father appears as a phantom of nature, displaced from perceivable reality into an 
alternate, imagined dimension: the world of the story. The story imaginarily restructuring his 
being is a haunted return of his unwitnessed atomic restructuring. ‘It is a fact that the 
“phantom,” whatever its form, is nothing but the invention of the living’, Abraham and Torok 
write. It is merely ‘the gap produced in us by the concealment of some part of the love 
object’s life’.118 The phantom, then, is not that of the father or his traumatic past. Rather, the 
phantom is Artyom’s – someone who did not witness Chernobyl or its effects firsthand. It is 
his experience of his dying father’s concealment, of its subjective non-existence – ‘a 
formation of the unconscious that has never been conscious – for good reason. It passes – in a 
way yet to be determined – from the parent’s unconscious into the child’s’.119 I claim that in 
All That is Solid Melts Into Air and the other novel to be analysed in this section, Hamid 
Ismailov’s The Dead Lake, this transformation of the parent’s repression into their child’s 
crypt and phantom occurs by way of physical tremors. Artyom’s memory of his father’s tale 
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is induced as he ‘waits for the air to return to stillness, leaves vibrating from the thudding 
hooves’120 of the herded cattle of his native village.       
 In The Dead Lake, the atomic weapons tests at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site 
(SNTS) in Kazakhstan are carried out not far from Kara-Shagan, the way station of the East 
Kazakhstan Railway on the Great Steppe. For Yerzhan, the novel’s young protagonist who, 
like Artyom, does not understand either nuclear reactions or their effects, ‘the joy of the 
steppe, the joy of music and the joy of childhood always coexisted [...] with the anticipation 
of that inescapable, terrible, abominable thing that came as a rumbling and a trembling, and 
then a swirling, sweeping tornado from the Zone’,121 the mountainous region surrounding the 
test site. Here, the unwitnessed event of a nuclear explosion is implicated by the physical 
tremors it carries across the landscape. Ismailov’s novel charts Yerzhan’s development from 
childhood to adolescence against the history of two man-made traumas: the continuing test 
nuclear explosions and a past, repressed domestic trauma of sexual abuse that occurred in the 
preceding generation, of his mother by his father. These traumas replay or haunt Yerzhan as 
physical, bodily tremors, and effect within him their psychological symptoms, which this 
section will now explore using Abraham and Torok’s theory of the phantom.  
 For Žižek, nature is non-existent. In a footnote in his book Living in the End Times, he 
writes:  
 
With the recent devastating earthquakes in the interior of China, the notion of the 
Anthropocene [today’s industrial period in which humans have acquired the status of 
a geological force] has acquired a new actuality: there are good reasons to suppose 
that the main cause of the earthquakes, or at least of their unexpected strength, was 
the construction of the gigantic Three Gorges dams nearby, which resulted in the 
creation of artificial lakes; the additional pressure on the surface seems to influence 
the balance of the underground cracks and thus contribute to the earthquake. 
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Something as elementary as an earthquake should thus also be included in the scope 
of phenomena influenced by human activity.
122
  
 
In The Dead Lake, Yerzhan’s uncle, aptly named Uncle Shaken, works as a watchman in the 
Zone. One day, he takes the children of the nearby school, including Yerzhan, on a trip to the 
test site: 
 
Towards evening Uncle Shaken took the children to the Dead Lake. ‘Don’t drink the 
water and do not touch it,’ he told them. It was a beautiful lake that had formed after 
the explosion of an atomic bomb. A fairy-tale lake, right there in the middle of the 
flat, level steppe, a stretch of emerald-green water, reflecting the rare stray cloud. No 
movement, no waves, no ripples, no trembling – a bottle-green, glassy surface with 
only cautious reflections of the boys’ and girls’ faces as they peeped at its bottom by 
the shore.
123
 
 
Following Žižek, the novel’s quasi-mythical lake, with its unnatural stillness and colour, is 
man-made. It is a remainder, a crater resulting from the impact of one of the nuclear 
detonations. The quakes caused by this Anthropocene of test explosions haunt Yerzhan in the 
form of neuroses: internalised, intergenerational echoes of the event of his mother’s unspoken 
sexual trauma. During the school trip, he experiences a quake upon confronting a phantom of 
the preceding generation: 
 
In the playground they were handed gas masks and chased after each other like aliens. 
But sadly the fun didn’t last long. Because suddenly a real alien in a big rubber suit 
broke into their group. And everyone froze. He made a beeline for [Yerzhan’s 
sweetheart cousin] Aisulu. He grabbed her with his claw gloves. She screamed. And 
she screamed so loud that even through her gas mask and his gas mask Yerzhan could 
hear her cry for help. He ran towards her. But before he had reached them, the alien 
let go of Aisulu and lifted his helmet. It was Uncle Shaken, laughing out loud. Aisulu 
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immediately joined in with her father’s laughter. Only Yerzhan looked at him 
horrified. A strange tremble seized him from inside.
124
 
 
This internal tremor, triggered by the disguised figure of Uncle Shaken in hazmat gear, is a 
displaced, Nachträglichkeit experience of his mother’s sexual trauma, which also took place 
in the Zone: ‘no one, except perhaps God, knew how Yerzhan’s mother, Kanyshat, became 
pregnant with him and by whom’.125 The novel elaborates on this secret event, made secret, 
secreted in a crypt: 
 
All that Yerzhan knew – from what Granny Ulbarsyn told him – was that at the age of 
sixteen Kanyshat had run off into the steppe after her silk scarf, which had blown off. 
The steppe wind lured her on, further and deeper, as if teasing her, on and on towards 
the sunset. And what happened after that was so fantastic that Yerzhan couldn’t make 
any sense of it. The sun was already sinking when suddenly it soared back up into the 
sky, glowing brightly. A tremor ran through the earth from the horizon. A whistling 
wind sprang up out of nowhere, then faded away for an instant, only to reverse its 
direction with a mighty rush so sudden that the dust of the steppe swirled up to the 
heavens in a black, hurtling tornado. And when Kanyshat, more dead than alive, 
discovered that she was at the bottom of a gully, there standing over her scratched and 
bloody body was a creature who looked like an alien from another planet, wearing a 
space suit.
126
 
 
Kanyshat’s rape possesses all the features of her son’s neurosis: the tremor, the hurtling 
tornado and the extraterrestrial-like phantom figure in the hazmat suit, all wrapped in silence; 
‘Since that day Kanyshat hadn’t spoken a word’.127 For Yerzhan, the man-made quakes and 
the encounter with Shaken – a father disguised first as an alien and then as an uncle – return 
the traumatic, unconscious intergenerational secret of his conception, an originating man-
made trauma of repressed sexual violence. As Nicholas Rand writes: 
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Abraham and Torok’s work enables us to understand how the falsification, ignorance, 
or disregard for the past – whether institutionalised by a totalitarian state (as in former 
East Germany) or practised by parents and grandparents – is the breeding ground of 
the phantomatic return of shameful secrets on the level of individuals, families, the 
community, and possibly even entire nations.
128
 
 
Kanyshat’s silence inaugurates the phantom which besets the entire community of Kara-
Shagan, handing it down from one generation to the next. Maria Yassa writes in ‘Nicolas 
Abraham and Maria Torok – The Inner Crypt’ that:  
 
The existence of the phantom in a parent creates a psychically mute zone, 
unexpectedly inaccessible and incomprehensible to the small child, who, failing to 
understand the sudden psychic absence of the parent, attempts to metabolise and is 
therefore compelled to incorporate this mute aspect of the parent, at the price of 
creating a mute psychic zone in the child.
129
 
 
Incorporation, as Abraham and Torok theorise it, ‘results from those losses that for some 
reason cannot be acknowledged as such’.130 Kanyshat’s loss of virginity and consequent 
psychic mute zone, detectable by her mutism, haunts the following generation via another 
zone: the topographical Zone surrounding the test site where the traumatic, repressed origin 
was conceived. Yerzhan incorporates the parental silence in the form of this topographical 
Zone, which consequently becomes a psychic mute zone of his own: ‘Not much troubled 
Yerzhan in those days. There were of course the explosions in the Zone, which the boy never 
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called by their proper name out of visceral fear’.131 Kanyshat’s repressed loss is inaccessible 
to Yerzhan. He cannot acknowledge this incorporated traumatic loss, which is displaced from 
consciousness by the unnameable tremors that nevertheless, as traumatic sensations rather 
than words, hint at its – and his – origin. Thus, ‘the truth can be rediscovered’, to paraphrase 
Lacan in ‘The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis’, ‘in the traces 
that are inevitably preserved by the distortions necessitated by the linking of the adulterated 
chapter to the chapters surrounding it’.132 Yerzhan and Aisulu are half-brother and sister – 
Aisulu’s mother is Baichichek, Shaken’s wife. The young siblings are ignorant of their true, 
familial relationship, which, in its state as unknown knowledge, preserves the adulterous, 
silenced episode of the previous generation in secret. This unconscious knowledge is 
dangerous. If Yerzhan and Aisulu’s relationship as sweethearts were to develop into 
marriage, it could spell incestuous doom for the community of Kara-Shagan. While their 
relationship unwittingly receives their parents’ secret in the form of a phantom, it already 
exists in Yerzhan’s very conception, as mentioned earlier. To return to Lacan, the secret ‘has 
already been written down elsewhere. Namely [...] in monuments: this is my body’.133 On his 
way, perhaps, towards incest, the phantom haunts Yerzhan at a visible level, at the level of 
his body. At the end of the school trip to the test site, ‘the bus driver called Uncle Shaken to 
help him with a punctured tire. Yerzhan was left in charge of the class’.134 Next, 
 
He briefly took Aisulu’s hand. Then he let go of it and pulled off his T-shirt and 
trousers and walked calmly into the forbidden water. For a moment he splashed about 
in it and then, to the admiring and terrified twittering of Aisulu and the others, he 
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walked out of the water, shook himself off as if nothing had happened and dressed 
again in his canvas trousers and Chinese T-shirt.
135
 
 
 Yerzhan’s daring dip in the forbidden lake impresses Aisulu, strengthening their growing 
relationship. For Yerzhan and Aisulu, Shaken’s forbidding of the lake (‘don’t drink the water 
and do not touch it’)136 at once prohibits and preserves the unspoken, unconscious threat of 
incest. Yerzhan’s transgression of his father’s law unleashes a supernatural effect of the 
phantom: the water prevents his physical growth. This prevention, an effect that is 
phantomatic because it is inexplicable and unnameable, creates a difference in physical 
height between the couple over the following year: 
 
And it happened when Yerzhan was twelve years old and Aisulu was eleven. It was in 
the fifth class at school, after the long winter holidays. First the girls and then the boys 
in their class started to outgrow Yerzhan. But, after all, he was a year older than them, 
and he had always been taller and stronger. At first the difference wasn’t very 
noticeable: so what if Serik or Berik had stretched out a bit, that didn’t make them any 
brighter! But when Aisulu, his little mite Sulu, his slim-winged swallow Sulu, started 
overtaking Yerzhan, he sensed that something was wrong. The same fear that had 
always begun with a trembling in his knees and frozen as a heavy ache in his stomach 
seemed to have risen higher now, right up to his throat – and got stuck there, 
preventing his body from growing.
137
 
 
Yerzhan’s stunted growth becomes a crypt that ‘hides as it holds’138 the phantom, to 
paraphrase Derrida in Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, his 
foreword to The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy (1986). The condition is a 
supernaturally induced psychosomatic affliction, whereby a mental trauma or melancholic 
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loss manifests itself within or upon the body. For Abraham and Torok, not only can parents’ 
secrets be entombed within their child’s crypt as a phantom, but a phantom can also haunt a 
subject when their love object’s loss is refused or goes unmourned. This latter possibility is 
demonstrated by one of Torok’s clinical examples: ‘The person suffering from an ulcer 
(necrosis) is bearing a love-object who, unable to digest the loss of his beloved subject, must 
die. The person bearing the necrosis has had to swallow both the loss and the unspeakable 
circumstances that led to it’.139 Here, the phantom is not the lost object but the object’s loss of 
the subject, which is incorporated and translated into the subject’s physical ailments or 
deficiencies. Yerzhan’s psychosomatic affliction, a swallowing both of his lost Aisulu and the 
historical circumstances of this loss (the cryptic inheritance of his parents’ repressed past in 
the form of internalised tremors, test nuclear explosions and the dead lake associated as 
symptoms of this phantom origin), is unspeakable. One day, when Yerzhan and Aisulu are 
teenagers,  
 
after school boys and girls set off back home in pairs. Yerzhan walked in front of the 
donkey, not glancing round at sad, silent Aisulu. He so badly wanted her assurances 
that no matter what was wrong and no matter what happened to him, she would still 
love no one but him and marry no one but him, as she had promised in their 
childhood. On the other hand, he realised that she was almost half a head taller than 
him, and if it carried on…He couldn’t think beyond that.140  
 
While it is not possible for Yerzhan to think of losing Aisulu, it is possible, through his 
incorporation of her, for her to think of losing him. In this inexpressibility of possible future 
loss, much like Abraham and Torok’s theory of melancholic, actual loss, Yerzhan’s ‘illnesses 
(of mourning and psychosomatic growth stunt) are to be translated: [...] “The Lover will 
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recover the Beloved”’,141 his wishful fantasy might read. It is not a literally dead Aisulu, via 
the psychosomatic illness, who is in mourning here. Rather, as an emotionally dead love 
object, sad and silent, she is incorporated from the memories of her childhood promise, the 
lover who will recover the beloved. Yerzhan employs a ‘fantasy of empathy with “the lost 
object who is bereft of me”’,142 in which Aisulu suffers the loss of him. In longing for him in 
this fantasy, she attempts to break the phantom’s curse upon his body: ‘How could Yerzhan 
know that she cried at night [...] tucked up in bed with her head under the sheets, that she was 
dreaming of qualifying as a doctor and finding a cure that would stretch out her Yerzhan’.143 
Medical intervention is not the focus of Yerzhan’s concerns here, since the attempts of 
healers to cure him of his affliction have all failed. He denounces these individuals as ‘Fools, 
fools, fools: one took him to a quack medicine woman, another quartered him alive with 
horses, and as for the one who was educated – he couldn’t do anything either, even with an 
X-ray and a reactor!’144 What is of importance is not Aisulu’s fantasy of healing Yerzhan, but 
Yerzhan’s fantasy of Aisulu’s dreaming of this goal. This fantasy, unlike those incorporations 
of Abraham and Torok’s endocryptic patients, is not taboo, since Aisulu, Yerzhan’s love 
object, is not dead, but can be returned to him: in opposition to Abraham and Torok’s theory 
of endocryptic patients in the eighth chapter of The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of 
Psychoanalysis, ‘Self-to-Self Affliction: Notes of a Conversion on “Pyschosomatics” (, 
Yerzhan can ‘fantasise (indirect though this activity may be) about the object’s tears, 
laments, self reproach, etc.’.145 How could Yerzhan know of his lost love object’s 
lamentations, tucked out of sight in a different hut to his at Kara-Shagan, if not by imagining 
it? The novel does not clarify if Aisulu’s grief is an actual event or, as one might otherwise 
read it, a fantasy incorporated by Yerzhan, who is unable to face his romantic loss of Aisulu 
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directly. He confronts and attempts to close the gap in height and emotional distance between 
them in other traces, which we can gleam from Lacan, however: ‘in the legends which, in a 
historicised form, bear my history’.146       
 The tale that Granny Ulbarsyn tells Yerzhan about the mythical hero, Gesar, sticks in 
his mind: 
 
The bold Gesar did not enjoy his happiness and peace for long. A terrible demon, the 
cannibal Lubsan, attacked his country from the north. But Lubsan’s wife, Tumen 
Djergalan, fell in love with Gesar and revealed her husband’s secret to him. Gesar 
used the secret and killed Lubsan. Tumen Djergalan didn’t waste any time and gave 
Gesar a draught of forgetfulness to drink in order to bind him to her forever. Gesar 
drank the draught, forgot about his beloved Urmai-sulu and stayed with Tumen 
Djeralan.        
 Meanwhile, in the steppe kingdom, a rebellion arose and Kara-Choton forced 
Urmai-Sulu to marry him. But Tengri did not desert Gesar and freed him of the 
enchantment on the very shore of the Dead Lake, where Gesar saw the reflection of 
his own magical steed. He returned on this steed home to the steppe kingdom and 
killed Kara-Choton, freeing his Urmai-Sulu.
147
 
 
This legend bears Yerzhan’s history insofar as it enables him to identify the usurper who has 
taken his Aisulu: Yerzhan’s other uncle, Kepek. Yerzhan no longer goes to school with 
Aisulu on the donkey because he is ashamed of his affliction; Kepek accompanies her in his 
stead, which Yerzhan reads jealously. When Kepek returns Aisulu from school one day, 
Yerzhan notices that ‘she sat in front of him instead of behind, so that his arms were around 
her youthful body as he was holding the reins’.148 ‘Yerzhan didn’t greet them. And at night he 
burnt, not in an imaginary blaze but in the genuine infernal fever of his own boyish hell’.149 
Thus, ‘he of course knew who the Kara-Choton in his life was – Kepek’.150 Reading Granny 
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Ulbarsyn’s tale enables him to speculate on possible real events and bodily sensations which 
have until this point remained unspoken; he ‘was convinced that this story [...] was about 
him. He had to solve the mystery that had sunk its claws into his body and soul’.151 The tale 
refers not only to the liquid “draught” of the Dead Lake which Yerzhan has absorbed and 
made him lose or “forget” Aisulu and the subsequent “rebellion” against him by Kepek, but 
also ‘the terrible demon Lubsan’ which attacked the steppe kingdom from the north, which 
happens to be the direction of the test site from Kara-Shagan. Obsessing over the tale, 
‘Yerzhan rarely slept at night now, and it wasn’t as if he caught up during the day – no, sleep 
simply wouldn’t come to his eyes. He tossed and turned from one side to the other, caught in 
the same circle of burdensome thoughts that were impossible either to control or to accept’.152 
Tossing and turning in the liminal space between sleep and wakefulness, Yerzhan’s psychic 
mute Zone, with the interpretative aid of the tale, crosses sides, from unconsciousness to 
consciousness, identifying itself at once as the origin of his trauma and the trauma of his 
origin. It appears to him of its own volition in the following outburst: 
 
“The Zone! The Zone! That’s the terrible demon Lubsan.” He suddenly sat up straight 
in bed. The Zone had taken him captive, the Zone had given him the draught of 
forgetfulness to drink, and until he reached the Dead Lake – the same Dead Lake in 
which he had once bathed – he would never be freed from this enchantment. Didn’t 
the story say that there, by the Dead Lake, Tengri would free him of the enchantment 
and show him his own reflection and the reflection of the magical steed on which he 
had galloped throughout his childhood?
153
 
 
Granny Ulbarsyn’s tale symbolises at once a topographical space (the Zone! the site of the 
originating trauma’s occurrence!) and draws up a suspect list of the trauma’s possible 
perpetrators or co-symbols: Grandad Daulet? But his wife was Granny Ulbarsyn. She 
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couldn’t possibly be in love with Yerzhan. And Petko didn’t fit either, because he didn’t have 
any wife at all. Uncle Shaken? Could Baichichek be Tumen Djergalan?’154   
 For Derrida, the phantom – portrayed in The Dead Lake by the terrible demon Lubsan 
– is identified as such by the word “Fors”, the title of his foreword to Abraham and Torok’s 
Cryptonomy. Fors (derivative of the Latin Foris, meaning “outside, outdoors”155 and, as a 
plural of “for”, ‘designates the inner heart, “the tribunal of conscience”, subjective 
interiority’156; Fors ‘thus may mean both exteriority and interiority at the very same time’,157 
Zoltán Dragon suggests, ‘an impossible place in the possible space, invisible in the 
visible’.158 Fors for Yerzhan means the Zone, the outdoor space that is at the same time 
inside him, incorporated as an impossible, invisible event with no conscious referent – his 
mother’s rape, his traumatic conception; the Zone, as a crypt, marks ‘a definite place in the 
topography. [But] it is neither the dynamic unconscious nor the ego of introjections. Rather, it 
is an enclave between the two, a kind of artificial unconscious, lodged in the very midst of 
the ego’.159 Here we must not only embrace Derrida’s theory of the phantom encrypted in 
physical place, but also in psychic space, as in Abraham’s theory outlined in his ‘Notes on the 
Phantom’. The phantom also has a “linguistic turn”, obscuring itself within co-symbols, one 
of which must be selected and spoken. ‘For Abraham, an analyst is given only symbols, not 
meanings: data that lack a missing part that “can be determined” [...] The aim of analysis is to 
restore the symbol’s unity [between psychic space and physical place, between trauma and its 
site of occurrence, between victim and perpetrator], thus overcoming the separation, and 
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making it possible for the patient to heal through speaking.’160 Yerzhan’s aim, simultaneously 
as analyst and as analysand, is to venture into the Zone, a silent space that reflects the silence 
of the phantom, in order to name the symbol’s missing part: the co-symbol that is the 
perpetrator of the intergenerational trauma. In doing so, he will exorcise this phantom from 
his body, heal his body from its growth affliction, and reverse the separation with his Aisulu 
it caused:  
 
Perhaps his unspeaking mother, Kanyshat, held the key to the mystery that controlled 
his life and body. Perhaps he shouldn’t search for any Dead Lake. Perhaps he should 
free his mother from her enchantment? Perhaps if words could leave her mouth, then 
the spell would fall away from his puny body? And the steed of his childhood would 
gallop once again to rescue his Aisulu.
161
  
 
Questioning whether he should search for a dead lake in the landscape or break his mother’s 
silence, Yerzhan reveals how the phantom hides in both topographical and linguistic 
uncertainty. In which geographical and verbal formation does it hide? The phantom’s crypt 
‘must be guarded in order to go unnoticed and thus undisturbed’.162 The phantom ‘produces 
false traces in order to ward off any attempt at the disclosure of the crypt’. Granny Ulbarsyn’s 
tale produces these false traces; it can be read as a ‘faulty map’ of the crypt filled with 
fictional names leading to the false incrimination of family members. The Zone also leads 
Yerzhan by diversion and misdirection. One day, Yerzhan enters the Zone on horseback; it 
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was ‘so quiet it set his ears ringing [...] like his mother’s eternal silence’.163 On his way to the 
Dead Lake, he sees  
 
a solitary dog or fox or wolf. The galloping horse drew closer. A wolf. Yerzhan didn’t 
slow Aigyr [his horse]. He pulled out Grandad’s shotgun from under the saddle girth 
at full speed and, without bothering to aim, just to frighten the creature, fired into the 
air with one barrel. The wolf flew off in the same direction as Aigyr and Yerzhan. 
And once again Yerzhan found himself in pursuit of a wolf, like so many years ago 
with Aisulu on the donkey.
164
 
 
The previous event this scene recalls is one in which Yerzhan and Aisulu encounter a wolf 
while riding the donkey on their way to music lessons at Petko’s trailer. These two 
encounters reflect an even earlier memory of Yerzhan’s: hunting a fox on the steppe when he 
was a young boy, accompanied by Petko, Uncle Shaken and their dog, Kapty. The movement 
of the three pursued creatures preserves the scenes’ resemblance to each other: in each case 
the pursued turns and runs off in the same direction as the pursuer as if to (mis)lead them, and 
in each the beast vanishes as if it were an illusion. In the latest encounter,  
 
Fervent Aigyr strove even harder, forcing on the incessant movement of his hooves. 
Then all of a sudden the wolf disappeared into the ground.    
 What was it? A mirage that had sprung from the boy’s overheated and 
inflamed imagination? Salt, glittering in the bright Autumn sun? A stretch of stagnant 
water, lying here since the summer? The shore of the Dead Lake?
165
 
 
Here, the phantom haunting Yerzhan manifests itself at once as a false symbol and co-symbol 
in the forms of a fake topographical feature (a lake that is either a mirage or man-made) and a 
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misidentified or fictional “character” respectively. For Yerzhan, as for Freud during his study 
of the Wolf Man, the wolf acts as a phantasmic incrimination of the wrong perpetrator: the 
wolf image initially frames the Wolf Man’s sister and then his parents’ maid Grusha, 
obscuring his father’s coitus a tergo with his mother as the supposedly real cause of his 
trauma; in The Dead Lake the wolf spectre deceptively casts Uncle Kepek as Yerzhan’s 
originator in a fake repetition of the primal scene, protecting the true father, Shaken, from 
accusation, just as a phantom ought to: 
 
Suddenly he [Yerzhan] saw what he had been afraid of seeing all his life. Down 
below among the sand and stones of the dried-up riverbed Aisulu lay stretched out, 
with Kara-Choton – the loathsome Kepek – leaning down towards her over and over 
again. Yerzhan reined in the horse and dismounted and grabbed Grandad’s shotgun 
with both hands [...]         
 He took aim and fired the remaining cartridge.    
 The fear that had lurked within him all his life suddenly stirred, brushing past 
his stomach, flying up to his throat and bursting out in a frenetic, childish scream. 
Kepek collapsed onto Aisulu like a limp sack. Yerzhan dashed forward, watching 
with utter horror as a strip of gauze, as bright red with his uncle’s blood as a streak of 
sunset, fell out of Kepek’s hands on to Aisulu’s white leg, which was left only half-
bandaged.          
 Aisulu had broken her leg looking for Yerzhan.
166
  
 
The silence of this scene is literally deathly, as Yerzhan, neither speaking to the phantom nor 
spoken to by it – both the Zone symbol and its co-symbol, Kepek, are silent – identifies the 
wrong man in a misread harmless scene. ‘What appears, thus, is a mere display created in 
order to hide something more effectively. In other words, the phantom does not return to the 
form of uncanny apparitions, but returns to form uncanny apparitions’.167 The scene before 
Yerzhan is not a return of the phantom’s traumatic inauguration – a repetition of the mother’s 
rape by the father using the half-sister – but its return as a fake trace that obscures the 
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knowledge of its true origin, ‘i.e. one comes to know of the presence of an unknown 
knowledge but not the knowledge itself’.168        
 In the theory of the phantom, there seems to be a shift from the phantom speaking to 
its being spoken to. For Derrida in Specters of Marx, the ghost should be asked to speak. In 
his analysis of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, he quotes Horatio’s command to Old Hamlet’s ghost in 
Act I Scene I: ‘What art thou, that usurp’st this time of night,/ Together with that fair and 
warlike form/ In which the majesty of buried Denmark/ Did sometimes march? By heaven I 
charge thee, speak!’169 When our command for the ghost’s speech produces the ghost’s non-
response and disappearance (‘See, it stalks away!’),170 Derrida suggests that we ‘should learn 
not how to make conversation with the ghost but how to talk with him, with her, how to let 
them speak or how to give them back speech, even if it is in oneself, in the other, in the other 
in oneself’.171 Since Yerzhan does not or cannot speak to the phantom at its fake scene in the 
Zone, he gives up searching for the Dead Lake and returns to his silent mother to talk to her, 
to attempt to give her back speech: 
 
Immediately the fear lurking in Yerzhan’s ankles moved upwards along its usual path 
to his stomach, paused there as a cold, heavy weight and then slowly crept on up to 
his throat, and, after choking him for a moment, reached his lips, emerging as 
something that was neither a whisper, nor a wheeze, nor a convulsion: Is he [Shaken] 
my father?’ A faint rumbling ran across the floor, the room started trembling and his 
mother carried on sitting on the windowsill in the way that she had been sitting, doing 
nothing for the first time in her life, merely gazing out of the window towards yet 
another train or yet another explosion.
172
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In his mother’s unlifted silence, Yerzhan speaks only to himself, to his phantom, other 
identity: the other in himself. The name of his true father, Shaken – the true co-symbol of his 
trauma – is announced, as if by the phantom on his behalf, alongside the usual phantom pain 
associated with the haunting. The pain travels through him, through his ankles, stomach, 
throat and lips, emerging as if in alien enunciation, in a nameless, unidentifiable other voice 
(not a whisper, wheeze or convulsion). This voice is the phantom, the announcement of its 
own exorcism, which ‘works like a ventriloquist, like a stranger within the subject’s own 
mental topography’,173 by Abraham and Torok’s definition. This exorcism as emergence 
occurs precisely because ‘to exorcise it one must express it in words’;174 following Derrida, 
the specter only speaks or passes through the spectator, the one who carries the painful secret.
 Yerzhan is able to release himself from the phantom (if only after a tragic murderous 
detour and other unfortunate events: Aisulu passes away from the Zone’s radioactivity and 
Yerzhan never resumes physical growth). Freud’s Wolf Man, however, is not so lucky. The 
analyst in this case is unable to determine the culpability of the father as originator of the 
traumatic sexual “crime” – or even if it took place at all. Other survivors of a phantomised 
intergenerational trauma – second generation survivors of the Chernobyl disaster – are 
doomed to a similar fate like first generation survivors, as All That is Solid Melts Into Air 
demonstrates; while the explosion definitely occurred in their history or pre-history, the 
specific location and symptoms of its traumatic origin remains inaccessible to analytic 
disclosure. Artyom’s father, in contrast to Yerzhan’s, remains a hidden source of trauma; 
although he was always identified as Arytom’s father, his past deed and its consequence – 
putting out the blaze at Reactor Four and receiving an eventually fatal dose of radiation 
therein – remains unknown to and thus incorporated by Artyom, encrypted as it is by the 
inaccessible hospital ward. In short, the phantom remains within the subject, so long as it 
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remains unknown to the subject. The final section of this chapter will analyse the videogame 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R: Shadow of Chernobyl, offering a concluding summary of all the theory 
explored in the thesis: the inaccessibility of the Chernobyl primal scene, its misremembering, 
which produces other, invented scenes, the impossibility of mourning the nuclear disaster, 
and how ethical reading should respond to this inconsolable loss. 
 
Calls of Chernobyl, Duties of Play: Cryptic Code and the Language of Trauma in 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R: Shadow of Chernobyl  
 
 
Earthbound, 1995 
At the end of Earthbound, the 1995 videogame for the Super Nintendo Entertainment 
System, the player fights Giygas, an enemy that takes the form of twisting colours and noises 
and cannot be made sense of. The game’s developer, Shigesato Itoi, revealed in an interview 
219 
 
that Giygas was inspired by a childhood trauma: at a cinema, an eight-year-old Itoi 
accidentally walked into the wrong screen, briefly seeing part of what he thought was a rape 
scene from the 1957 adult film, The Military Policeman and the Dismembered Beauty. 
Recollecting this event in the interview, Itoi said that ‘when the guy grabbed her breast really 
hard, it got distorted into this ball shape. It all hit me really hard. It was a direct attack to my 
brain’.175 The traumatising scene Itoi describes, however, does not actually take place in the 
film; what he witnessed is in fact a scene of consensual sex. He admitted his memory of it ‘is 
fuzzy at best’.176 The Freudian primal scene, where an individual suffers neuroses as a result 
of misinterpreting a witnessed sex act due to not yet having gained a knowledge of sexual 
life, is restaged in the videogame medium by Itoi’s Giygas. Re-reading his famous Wolf Man 
case study, Sigmund Freud questions whether his patient’s primal scene, the observation of 
parental coitus, ever had any reality as an event; it might rather be a phantasy concocted from 
the observation of animals copulating, misremembered in Nachträglichkeit as his parents. 
The similarly violent impact of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, for some of its traumatised 
eyewitnesses, lacks a true, disclosable origin. Here, it is radioactive contamination following 
the explosion rather than a sexual act that provides the experience prior to an understanding 
of it. Igor Kostin, the first photographer to capture Chernobyl on film, writes: ‘We were at 
war against the radiation. [...] The enemy was everywhere, nothing stopped it. You were hit 
by thousands of bullets and you did not know who was firing on you. You did not know if 
you were injured, or where you had been hit, or at which point’.177 Sergei Sobolev, deputy 
head of the Executive Committee of the Shield of Chernobyl Association, thinks of his dead 
comrades as ‘heroes, not victims, of a war that supposedly never happened. They call it an 
accident, a catastrophe. But it was a war. The Chernobyl monuments look like war 
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monuments’.178 Where no understanding of nuclear catastrophe is available, then, war against 
radiation, an inauthentic event, is not a fictional supplement to the absence of true memory 
but the absence of true memory itself; the memorial, symbolic reproductions reflect a 
misremembered primal scene. As Jacques Derrida says, writing actually founds memory. It is 
not, as it deceptively appears, simply a supplement to it. Freudian psychology, in prescribing 
its patients the completable mourning of a fundamentally incomplete or unverified mnemic 
scene, enacts a supreme violence upon both the living and the dead. The living’s therapy is 
impossible because their failed memory is ignored, and the dead are abandoned because the 
mourning of their misunderstood deaths is cut short. In light of this psychology’s failure, 
Derrida, in The Work of Mourning, proposes that the law of mourning ‘would have to fail in 
order to succeed. In order to succeed, it would have to fail, to fail well’.179 To fail well is to 
enact impossible mourning. In the practice of impossible mourning some secret that would 
restore the loss to the traumatic memory and furnish its truthful finality is allowed to escape. 
For Itoi, Gigyas is a videogame acknowledgement of an already inauthentic primal scene. 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R: Shadow of Chernobyl, a videogame set within Chernobyl’s post-disaster 
Exclusion Zone, reconstructs the failure of memory, meaning and conclusion engendered by 
trauma; this gesture is an abstraction of absence, of impossible mourning. The game casts the 
player in the role of a nameless protagonist, known only as ‘The Marked One’, whose task, 
among others, is to venture into the heart of post-disaster Chernobyl and discover the source 
of a mysterious signal that has been detected there.  
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S.T.A.L.K.E.R: Shadow of Chernobyl, (producer: Sergiy Grygorovych, GSC Gameworld, 2007)  
 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R: Shadow of Chernobyl, 2007  
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 The game begins this gesture of impossible mourning by presenting two cryptic 
secrets: ‘Kill the Strelok’, and ‘S.T.A.L.K.E.R’. As signifiers that have no restorable 
signifieds, these messages intentionally resist interpretation to obscure a meaning that never 
was, restaging the way in which an absence of understanding at Chernobyl engenders a 
misremembered trauma in later recollection. The reference to an inaccessible, impossible 
totality that ‘Kill the Strelok’ and ‘S.T.A.L.K.E.R’ make occurs within, or more accurately, 
upon a crypt. Crypts, to use Maurice Blanchot’s definition, are empty ‘pockets, cavernous 
spaces where words become things, where the inside is out and thus inaccessible to any 
cryptoanalysis’.180 Lacking an inside, the buried meaning of true origins, the words the game 
introduces become things, indecipherable marks of the outside displayed on the protagonist’s 
PDA or forearm. The only staged secret here is the secret that there is no secret. As Blanchot 
suggests in The Writing of the Disaster, the cryptic word is ‘the key word that opens and does 
not open. At that juncture something gets away safely, something which frees loss and refutes 
the gift of it. “I can only save an inner self by placing it on me, separate from myself, 
outside”’.181 This refuted gift of loss is freed from the finality of mourning demanded by 
analysis; in placing words upon the outside, rendering them as things or cryptic surfaces, the 
game imposes no limit on the possible meanings of ‘Kill the Strelok’ or ‘S.T.A.L.K.E.R’. 
Also, the question as to who these two titles refer to remains unanswered. Commemorating 
the death of Sarah Kofman in his essay ‘. . . . . . . .’, Jacques Derrida asks ‘What is the gift of 
a title? [...] such a gift would be somewhat indecent: it would imply the violent selection of a 
perspective, and abusive interpretive framing or narcissistic reappropriation, a conspicuous 
signature’.182 It is arguable that the open question of S.T.A.L.K.E.R, a title rendered similarly 
unspeakable or uninterpretable through punctuation, is countered by the subtitle attached to 
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it: Shadow of Chernobyl. Indeed, critics of the videogame have condemned its historical 
revisionism, claiming that it transforms the nuclear disaster into virtual entertainment through 
the generic conventions of Gothic and post-apocalyptic Sci-fi, and frames this action in the 
first-person perspective popularised by earlier videogames such as Doom. For one critic of 
videogaming, as Fred Botting reminds us in ‘Aftergothic: Consumption, Machines and Black 
Holes’, games are ‘a degenerate spectacle awash in the flood of information images, 
internalising current and archaic phantasms of pleasure, violence and control through simple 
narratives, crude moralizing filters and forms of self-identification’.183 However, 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R: Shadow of Chernobyl, programmed by second-generation Chernobyl 
survivors and mapped through photography and satellite telemetry of the actual Exclusion 
Zone, abandons in its pursuit of impossible mourning the gaming master narrative of direct 
control, violence, and the production of narcissistic identificatory messages, meanings, 
characters and pleasure. The game’s digital technology, like the archives of other games and 
eighteenth-century Gothic romances before them, creates fictional landscapes through 
graphic reproductions of ruinous art and architecture: counterfeit scenes in which exploration 
is enacted. However, where the videogame Doom elicits pleasure from the linear exploration 
of threatening rooms sequenced by levels – like chapters in a Gothic romance – 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R’s open world map pertains to a rhizome with little discernible structure, mostly 
detached from the authority of the Gothic landscape’s pleasure-yielding archival organisation 
and straightforward interaction; in S.T.A.L.K.E.R, there is no red key that opens a red door, 
and no keyword can unlock ultimate meaning. Rather, pleasure is purposefully and eternally 
delayed. Frustration is the game’s simulation of absent progress, a gesture of impossible 
mourning in which satisfactory accomplishment, like completable mourning, is an illusion. In 
Doom, catharsis is yielded through the explosive violence of hi-tech Sci-fi weaponry, ‘linking 
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instinctual energies with powerful machines’,184 as Botting writes. Doom, he reminds us, 
‘was redesigned to train U.S Marines in the art of “one-shot kills” and described by a military 
expert as a “how-to manual for killing without conscience”. Morality is replaced by 
murderous efficiency, reason by reaction time, knowledge by technique’. 185 In S.T.A.L.K.E.R, 
however, the quality of the player’s weapons, exposed to the polluted environmental 
elements, degrade over time, reducing accuracy, range, and reload times, while the 
radioactivity of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone is restaged as a series of perspective-shattering 
traumatic effects which impede the player’s virtual view: blackouts, hallucinations and other 
psychological disturbances. 
 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R: Shadow of Chernobyl, 2007 
Where Doom’s first-person perspective grants the player transparent access to a virtual world 
of immediately gratifying violence and power, S.T.A.L.K.E.R’s virtual restaging of a war 
against radiation purposefully fails to satisfy the player; recalling Derrida’s imperative in his 
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‘Mnemosyne’ lecture, it fails well. The game, tasking its player to survive an unwinnable war 
against an invisible and omnipresent force, bears witness to survivor testimony of the futile 
war against radiation, a misremembered Chernobyl trauma. Here, the survivor’s 
misremembering of trauma becomes the game’s trauma of misremembering, where the 
incomprehensibility of the nuclear disaster is virtually restaged within a simulation of the war 
fiction that encrypts it; the non-understandable event of radioactivity, excluded from 
conscious memory or understanding, appears in the game as effects outside interiority, in the 
outside itself: player control over combat is impeded by momentary absences of 
environmental light or sound, and orientation is dislocated by anomalous teleportations and 
vortexes of wind. The Chernobyl disaster is, to use Blanchot’s definition of the word disaster, 
‘unknown; it is the unknown name for that in thought itself which dissuades us from thinking 
it’.186 In exploring the simulated environment of the exclusion zone, the player is ‘Alone and 
thus exposed to the thought of the disaster which disrupts solitude and overflows every 
variety of thought, as the intense, silent and disastrous affirmation of the outside’.187  
 This deflection of the inside onto the outside is at work in not just the game’s 
represented effects, but also its representational medium: programming code. One reviewer, 
playing through the game a second time, noticed a glitch, where friendly, computer-
controlled allies started shooting at his character for no apparent reason. ‘I wasn’t sure if it 
was a bug or if I’d unwittingly done something in the game to make them turn against me,’ 
he writes, ‘but the overall effect of making me paranoid, even in the safest of areas, somehow 
seemed to suit the tone’.188 This is the result of a well-known glitch in the game, caused by an 
improperly written piece of code activated when the player makes gameplay choices in a 
certain order. Here, the broken code is the disaster of representing the disaster, where the 
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game’s inaccessible, inexplicable and corrupted inside is deflected onto the outside, where 
indecipherable words become things when code loses its functionality. Like a mental trauma 
that has no language to describe it or memory to store it, the corruption in S.T.A.L.K.E.R’s 
digital fabric creates unintentional effects at the level of gameplay experience in the manner 
of a misremembered primal scene. This sequence of unintentional effects mimics the way in 
which a primal scene arises out of the very failure of language and memory as opposed to 
merely supplementing such an absence. In the writing of the disaster, something always goes 
askew, intentionally or otherwise, and often in the moments where meaning seems most 
assured, where it appears the writer, reader or gamer is in a haven of predictability. Blanchot 
suggests that the writing of the disaster is writing ‘in the thrall of the impossible real, that 
share of the disaster wherein every reality, safe and sound, sinks’.189   
 The game’s multiple endings undermine any definitive explanation of the events that 
have taken place over the course of gameplay; the player’s in-game choices reflected in the 
outcome they determine suggest only their absent alternatives.  
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“I don’t know if I was right or wrong – I guess I’ll never know. But I made it. And I guess I should be thankful for that” - 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R: Shadow of Chernobyl, 2007 
 
Like a Prince Hamlet thankful to have survived his tragedy, his futile ‘words, words, words’ 
reproduced in the above caption question which out of the two decisions was morally right: to 
fulfil or abandon his murderous task to kill the Strelok. These concluding words speak to an 
Absolute Other: the collective, anonymous Chernobyl dead that includes both fictional in-
game and actual losses. ‘This expression evokes Emmanuel Levinas and his conviction that 
speech alone sustains the relation of a subject to the Other’.190 Blanchot attributes speech to 
the Absolute Other as ‘not any particular communication, but speech itself as an offering, the 
offering of language in response to the infinite obligation which the presence of another 
person is’.191 The question of what is moral, then, is answered not by what one says, but by 
the act of speech itself. S.T.A.L.K.E.R’s speech without discourse, written words without 
meaning, maps without directions and gameplay without transparent perspective or 
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interaction mark a shift in videogaming from the sidestepping of trauma caused by conflict 
and survival toward its simulation and impossible mourning. If in Doom there is purposefully 
too little morality, in S.T.A.L.K.E.R, there is purposefully too much; where the former short-
circuits the theme of trauma to train soldiers in killing without conscience, the latter 
overloads it to suggest that traumatised subjects can never fully recover.    
 The following conclusion to this thesis will argue that the trauma of the Chernobyl 
eyewitness is actively conceived of as irrecoverable rather than naturally manifesting as such, 
partly due to certain overused methods of reading. A global, namely Eurocentric or 
American-centric theory that favours the emergence of trauma in the life of the sufferer as 
inaccessible, in which the sufferer is necessarily displaced and alienated from any 
understanding of its origin, however provisional, will now be countered. While failing at 
meaning-making might seem the best method for readers of facing and respecting the 
Absolute Other, the flip-side or underbelly of this proposal perhaps unintentionally drowns 
out the latter’s own acts in the surrounding global condemnation of their trauma to 
inaccessibility. Thus, traumatised subjects, likewise immersed in this theory, can feel 
alienated not just from us but also from themselves: from the experience and memory of 
trauma that links them to the world. In opposition to this, the following conclusion proposes 
an alternative reading of Chernobyl trauma, one which renders it interpretable in the form of 
fictional, mythic narratives articulated in a festive tradition common to the Slav peasant 
cultures of Russia and Ukraine: carnival. 
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Conclusion: Pushed Out By Laughter: Alternative Abreactions of Chernobyl Trauma 
 
Robert van Voren recalls a humorous anecdote in On Dissidents and Madness (2009), his 
book about his role in overturning the political abuse of psychiatry in the former Soviet 
Union. The story concerns Western psychiatrists’ attempted education in Western psychiatric 
practice of Russian and Ukrainian nurses used to the old ways in which psychiatry was 
carried out under Soviet communism. Van Voren writes: 
 
we organised a special network meeting on psychiatric nursing. About forty nurses 
from more than ten countries met at a conference centre in the forest somewhere in 
the Netherlands, where in addition to lectures, role-plays were used as an educational 
tool. A group of British participants had worked out the role-plays and with the help 
of simultaneous translation English-Russian, they tried to copy reality as much as 
possible. They had prepared several versions: how it should not be done, with a 
dominant psychiatrist who immediately took the lead and decided everything by 
himself; how it usually went, by contributions by all but with a psychiatrist who still 
dominated the meeting; and last, but not least, what should be the optimal situation. 
The first-role play was enacted and ended in enthusiastic applause by the audience. A 
chief nurse from a provincial psychiatric hospital got up and full of passion, she 
grabbed the microphone and started speaking. Fantastic! She had never seen 
something so powerful, so good. If she could ever convince her director to put this to 
practice in his hospital, she would be delighted. It was almost too painful to tell her 
the truth that this was exactly how it should not be done! For her this was already 
almost a fata morgana, an unreachable goal.
1
 
 
How psychiatry should and should not be done continues to be a hotly debated issue in 
trauma studies. In van Voren’s account, the transition from the communist practice of a 
domineering psychiatrist unquestioningly obeyed by nurses to a Western, more democratic 
configuration of active participation in the procedure by all involved is impossible. This 
impasse regarding the input ratio between instructor and student or psychiatrist and trauma 
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victim perpetually crops up in trauma theory and therapy practice. On the one hand, Mikkel 
Borch-Jacobson writes in his article ‘Neurotica: Freud and the Seduction Theory’ (1996): 
‘Good hypnotists have always known that initially suggestibility is nothing but the sheer 
acceptance of the hypnotic contract: the subject must accept the hypnotic game, failing which 
the game cannot begin’.2 In opposition to this submission in which the hypnotee becomes a 
willingly instructed actor of the hypnotist’s suggestions in the abreaction of the former’s 
traumatic memories, the American psychiatrist Judith Herman theorised that ‘the victim must 
be helped to speak the horrifying truth of her past’.3 Also, in the literary study of trauma, a 
schism persists between the Western interpreter’s representation of a non-Western subject’s 
trauma and the alternative, native conceptions of this trauma’s original emergence in lived 
experience by the subject herself. Regarding the reading and representation of non-Western 
trauma by Western literary trauma scholars, Stef Craps writes in his essay ‘Beyond 
Eurocentrism: Trauma Theory in the Global Age’ (2014): 
 
the founding texts of the field (Including [Cathy] Caruth’s own work4) largely fail to 
live up to this cross-cultural ethical engagement. They fail on at least three counts: 
they marginalise or ignore traumatic experiences of non-Western or minority cultures; 
they tend to take for granted the universal validity of definitions of trauma and 
recovery that have developed out of the history of Western modernity; and they often 
favour or even prescribe a modernist aesthetic of fragmentation and aporia as 
uniquely suited to the task of bearing witness to trauma.
5
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The Western theorisation of trauma, still often seen as the foundational, empirically proven 
master to the non-Western, wayward apprentice, persists in trauma studies in the form of a 
template that constructively lays down a few universal, unshakeable, theoretical guidelines. 
This schema echoes van Voren’s account of the British psychiatrists’ prevention of the 
former-Soviets’ deviation from the Western model beyond certain defined limits. Let us 
expand upon this parallel and ask: how did van Voren, a Dutch human rights campaigner 
working in the Former Soviet Union, balance the sometimes antagonistic opposition between 
Western expertise and success in treating cases of trauma and local, sometimes recidivist 
methods practiced by the former-Soviets? How did he and his team of Western psychiatrists 
manage their own input ratio with that of the Russian and Ukrainian nurses who, without 
effective guidance, would relapse into their old abusive ways, without silencing them 
entirely? In his book, he recalls that: 
 
Stimulating one’s own initiative, developing a plan or a model, also meant that you 
radically risked reinventing the wheel all over again. In fact, it was the other way 
around: it was important that people [in the Former Soviet Union] themselves 
invented the wheel, that they themselves discovered the best approach. We provided 
the information, contacts, and showed how it worked in other countries; but for the 
rest, we were supposed to stay in the background. This also meant that mistakes were 
made, but however unpleasant that might be, these mistakes were an important part of 
the learning process. A mistake is only a mistake when you don’t learn from it.6 
 
 The ideal method, van Voren found, was not to reinvent the wheel or jettison the founding 
work of trauma theory and practice when helping the Russians and Ukrainians revise the 
psychiatry in their countries, but to let them work out (or, perhaps, more cynically, find out) 
what methods work best. In van Voren’s account Western practice remains exemplary, and a 
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framework of this practice is created through the provision of Western information and 
contacts via the Dutch special network meeting, which the former-Soviets can then build 
within through their own volition. As I have already just suggested, this history reflects the 
current drive in trauma studies to bridge the gap between Western and non-Western 
interpretations of trauma, which my conclusion will use as a basis to propose a constructive 
compromise between scholars’ theorisation of Chernobyl trauma and its representation by the 
Chernobylites themselves. I claim, as other trauma theorists do, that some of the subject’s 
inalienable psychic mechanisms discovered by Freud and corroborated by his subsequent 
practitioners are, as this suggests, always active and universal in the experience of trauma. 
Ananya Jahanara Kabir, in her article ‘Affect, Body, Place: Trauma Theory in the World’ 
(2014), argues for this case on a fundamental level, claiming that 
 
the unconscious can hardly be done away with within attempted nativist re-
appropriations of trauma theory. This continued dependence on Freudian vocabulary 
is evident in an inability to move away from that vocabulary even when attempting a 
severance: the most radical we can get is to call for recognition of ‘critical 
melancholia’, or melancholia as a positive force – rather than abandon the word 
altogether. Far more productive, then, is to develop a non-Eurocentric trauma theory 
that can revivify existing paradigms for explicating the work of trauma, by returning 
to consideration an interconnected emphasis on body, affect and place.
7
 
 
The ego’s protection against or adaptation into socially acceptable forms of destructive 
unconscious drives or repressed trauma, as Anna Freud theorised in her book The Ego and 
the Mechanisms of Defence (1936), remain in play for both Kabir and van Voren.
8
 The same 
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goes for the theory of melancholia – the disruption of mourning loss by persisting libidinal 
desire and secondary narcissism: the ego’s withdrawal from the external world and exclusive 
focus on the lost, introjected love object. As the conclusion to this thesis will argue, the 
Chernobyl disaster survivors’ repressed trauma and melancholia are frequently reworked 
through Svetlana Alexievich’s interviews compiled in Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral 
History of a Nuclear Disaster (2006) as positive forces articulated by the survivors 
themselves, echoing Herman’s theory that the analyst merely lays the groundwork for the 
subject to speak the horrifying truth of their traumatic experiences in their own words. For 
this conclusion, then, we may need to leave to one side the overexposed, Western conception 
of trauma as an aporistic, inaccessible psychic force that belatedly marks the victim only in 
the forms of its abstraction and uninterpretability, as theorised earlier in the analysis of 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R in chapter three. In a return to the model of the rhizome developed in chapters 
two and three of this thesis, the resurgence of Chernobyl disaster eyewitnesses’ culturally 
subterranean, hitherto repressed formulations of their own traumatic experiences will now be 
analysed. Zinaida Kovalenko, an elderly re-settler to the Exclusion Zone, testifies to her 
traumatic experience of the Chernobyl disaster in an interview for Voices from Chernobyl. 
She then says to Alexievich: ‘Oh Lyubochka, do you understand what I’m telling you, my 
sorrow? You’ll carry it to people, maybe I won’t be here anymore. I’ll be in the ground, 
under the roots...’9 Memories of the eyewitness’s traumatic experiences sink along with their 
body, dissociated by Soviet or Western psychiatric models from the so-called roots or source 
of their trauma, which supposedly surfaces to “official”, empirical analysis. Absent or denied 
as trauma’s official origination in favour of authoritative explanations, these memories are 
carried off, propagated like Deleuzian rhizomes by the analyst, at the eyewitness’s request. 
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Like botanical rhizomes, each of which can be cut off from the underground stem and 
propagated to grow a new plant, each testimonial strand that is separated from the authorised 
origin may give rise to a variant or double of this origin’s results. What we will then have is 
an alternative take on the history of trauma and the disaster. In what form does this isolated, 
rhizomatic testimony to trauma or sorrow that has not yet arisen and hence reached 
understanding take? The social world of Chernobyl, with its testimonial, linguistic 
polyphony
10
 of scientists, former Party bureaucrats, doctors, soldiers, helicopter pilots, 
refugees and re-settlers from all over the Soviet Union, ‘is bisected into a novelistic side and 
a poetic side, into a culture of laughter and a culture of seriousness, a dialogical culture of the 
people and a monological ‘official’ culture’.11 In her interviews, Alexievich unearths the split 
between the official, serious culture of the Soviet authorities who attempt to produce a 
comprehensive history or grand narrative of the nuclear disaster to assert the peoples’ 
recovery and the unofficial, spontaneous, timeless laughter frequently conveyed by bawdy 
chastushka.
12
 The latter, these sudden outbursts of humour in the form of ribald speech acts 
akin to the Rabelaisian ploshchadnoe slovo or Medieval carnival “public-square word”, are 
‘always in the background, ready to break out, yet always [...] driven back or suppressed’.13 
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Soldiers sing their chastushki for Alexievich’s interviews:  ‘Even one thousand gamma rays/ 
Can’t keep the Russian cock from having its days’.14 What has been culturally repressed by 
the Soviet authorities is not only the dangerous radiation levels but also the disorderly poetics 
of soldiers-turned liquidators, ‘the language of the barracks room’ as Georg Lukács might 
call it. Due to the intense scrutiny the Zone received by the global press in the Chernobyl 
disaster’s aftermath, the authorities, wanting to maintain their illusion of calm control over 
the situation within their entire ranks to the outside world, attempted to hold the liquidators 
accountable to a level of respectable conduct representative of Soviet heroism. The outbursts 
into ribald chastushka, in a Bakhtinian sense, constitute an anarchic carnival of sorts – a 
cathartic, alternative articulation of Chernobyl trauma in opposition to official, polite culture. 
Chastushki, ‘instead of “gravitating” to a “system,” [...] exist as “live” events’.15 The 
soldiers’ laughter, though recorded as a “live” event occurring in interview, is not 
universalised, as we will see. One says to her: ‘I have my own memories. My official post 
there was commander of the guard units. Something like the director of the apocalypse. 
[Laughs.] Yes. Write it down just like that’.16 The soldier’s request to write his testimony 
down exactly as it arose, not just as autobiographical fact but also as fantastic, laughter-
inducing fiction, demonstrates a desire to record carnival. This very notion constitutes a 
problematic acquiescence of local expression to modern Western therapeutic methods, of folk 
culture
17
 to the interview as talking cure, with its strict hierarchical roles of analyst and 
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analysand. Why does the reception of the soldiers’ humorous testimony undermine its 
designation as carnival? Mikhail Bakhtin writes in his book Rabelais and his World (1941, 
1965)
18: ‘Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it [...] While carnival 
lasts, there is no other life outside it’.19 However, Alexievich does not participate in the 
liquidators’ disruptive laughter, and thus is instead an audience to it. One of the liquidators, 
Arkady Filin, asks her: 
 
Want to hear a joke? This prisoner escapes from jail, and runs to the thirty-kilometre 
Zone at Chernobyl. They catch him, bring him to the dosimeters. He’s “glowing” so 
much, they can’t possibly put him back in prison, can’t take him to hospital, can’t put 
him around people. Why aren’t you laughing? [Laughs.]20 
 
Both Alexievich’s recording and not laughing at Filin’s joke undermines carnival’s universal 
inclusivity, respectively transforming the carnival moment of testifying into literary 
carnivalesque and what Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson term in Mikhail Bakhtin: 
Creation of a Prosaics (1990) reduced laughter. ‘What distinguishes carnival from literary 
genres per se’, they write, ‘is its lack of a readership or audience; everyone participates in it. 
If there are viewers who do not participate, there can be no true carnival; instead, we have 
performance’.21 Nevertheless, this reduced, recorded laughter, which is bawdy, satirical and 
flies against authority and adversity, still possesses therapeutic power for Chernobyl 
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survivors, helping the liquidators deal with the inevitable odds presented by their radioactive 
contamination. Aleksandr Kudryagin, one of the liquidators sent to the roof of Reactor Four, 
recalls: 
 
We had lead underwear, we wore it over our pants. Write that. We had good jokes 
too. Here’s one: An American robot is on the roof for five minutes, then it breaks 
down. The Japanese robot is on the roof for five minutes, and then – it breaks down.22 
The Russian robot is up there for two hours! Then a command comes in over the 
loudspeaker: “Private Ivanov! In two hours you’re welcome to come down and have a 
cigarette break.” Ha-ha! [Laughs.]23   
 
How might this humour constitute therapy? In it, and also ‘In Rabelais and the folklore he 
imbibed, value is diverted from any specific time frame, real history is not registered, and 
space becomes thoroughly fantastic. [...] Language is limited to cheerful obscenity and 
epithets’.24 In Kudryagin’s joke, authentic, historical time is momentarily suspended in 
fantasy time (it is not true that liquidators were forced to work on the reactor roof for four 
hours; the time was closer to forty seconds – still enough for a lethal dose, however). 
Carnival, many theorists argue, is not a permanent inversion or overthrow of official power. 
While this carnival lasts, it shrinks testimony to encompass only fiction and laughter. Any 
criticism of the authorities and their orders for liquidators is absent from memory, since 
references to the actual, memorised past, of colleagues purposely misled by these orders into 
mortally dangerous conditions, are pushed out by the joke loudspeaker command and figure 
of Private Ivanov, the epithetic Russian robot. Following Morson and Emerson’s argument, 
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the comic world of this joke, which ridicules a fictionalised liquidator and task, is, in 
opposition to historicisation, ‘without memory. In the comic world, there is “nothing for 
memory and tradition to do. One ridicules in order to forget.”’25 Although traumatic 
experience of the disaster may return to memory, humour temporarily clears a space in 
memory to enable this therapeutic, interim forgetting of Chernobyl trauma to occur. 
 As we have already seen, there is a dissonance between this local engagement in 
therapy and Western or simply outsider perspectives of it. But is it really essential for the 
analyst to join in with the Chernobyl survivor’s laughter for the sake of making it carnival? Is 
it only this involvement, arguably still an approval or authorisation that confers upon the 
analyst the role of authority, which grants the practice authenticity? It seems not necessarily, 
just as it is not essential to discard the pre-existing methods of Western psychoanalytic 
practice in analysis. In her ‘In Place of an Epilogue’, which concludes Voices from 
Chernobyl, Alexievich writes: ‘the Zone – it’s a separate world, a world within the rest of the 
world – and it’s more powerful than anything literature has to say’.26 She continues, 
reflecting: 
 
I often thought that the simple fact, the mechanical fact, is no closer to the truth than a 
vague feeling, rumour, vision. Why repeat the facts – they cover up our feelings. The 
development of these feelings, the spilling of these feelings past the facts, is what 
fascinates me. I try to find them, collect them, protect them.
27
 
  
The power of reduced laughter spills or rhizomatically shoots off from audience participation 
in the act or literary repetition. Alexievich’s analytical forms of location, collection and 
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protection vaguely trace the development of analysands’ rhizomatic, therapeutic feelings. 
‘Reduced laughter’, Morson and Emerson write, is denied any direct expression, which is to 
say ‘it does not ring out’, but traces of it remain in the structure of an image or a discourse 
and can be detected in it’.28 The Western detection of Chernobyl trauma and therapy through 
interview, functioning as a talking cure in which the survivor is asked and thereby helped to 
abreact their traumatic experiences and memories, takes precedence over immediate 
individualisation and medicalisation of trauma. Here, Western analysis acts as theoretical 
framework for the Russian and Ukrainian linguistic tradition of the laughter coping strategy. 
 The linguistic tradition of carnival, which does not automatically mean cultural or 
calendar carnival, was practiced long before the event of Chernobyl eyewitness testimony, 
the nuclear catastrophe itself, or even the power plant’s construction. The catharsis of 
carnival arose in Russian and Ukrainian culture in response to and alongside the previous, 
long-term traumas of the history of communism. ‘What seems to be valuable about carnival’, 
Clair Wills writes in her essay ‘Upsetting the Public: Carnival, Hysteria and Women’s Texts’ 
(1990), ‘is its awareness of the discontinuity of history, or history as crisis’.29 Not rooted in 
one period, expressions of carnival grow beneath history, continually surfacing at moments of 
historical disruption or trauma, such as the social upheavals caused by the development of 
Soviet communism.
30
 Carnival, Bakhtin writes in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1973), 
‘knows no period, and is, in fact, hostile to any sort of conclusive conclusion’. Rather, it 
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determines: ‘all endings are merely new beginnings; carnival images are reborn again and 
again’.31 Indeed, Alexandr Revalskiy, a historian of Chernobyl, recalls that the 
materialisation of laughter in the nuclear disaster’s aftermath echoes its emergence in an 
earlier period of communist history. He says: ‘When I was eighteen, or maybe a little earlier’,  
 
when I began to read samizdat and discovered Shalamov, Solzhenitsyn, I suddenly 
understood that my entire childhood, the childhood of my street, even though I grew 
up in a family that was part of the intelligentsia (my grandfather was a minister, my 
father a professor at the university at St. Petersburg), all of it was shot through with 
the language of the camps. For us teenagers it was perfectly natural to call our fathers 
pakhan, our mothers makhan. “For every uptight asshole there’s a dick with a 
screwdriver” – I learned that saying when I was nine years old. I didn’t know a single 
civilised word. Even our games, our sayings, our riddles were from the camps. [...] I 
think that this prison consciousness was inevitably going to collide with the larger 
culture – with civilisation, with the particle accelerator. [...] The Russian always needs 
to believe in something: in the railroad, in the frog [as does Bazarov in Turganev’s 
Fathers and Sons], in Byzantium, in the atom. And now, in the market.
32
 
 
The carnival mindset of assigning epithets to fictionalise ordinary people
33
 and referring 
lewd, timeless platitudes to history’s inevitable authority figures reaches not only the past, 
but also the future; a playful, childlike language of the camps extends at once backwards into 
the world of ancient cities and other, later, Soviet constructions, and forwards into scientific 
and economic progress. ‘Chernobyl is a portal to infinity’, says Victor Latun, a photographer 
of the Exclusion Zone: 
 
I remember discussions about the fate of Russian culture, its pull towards the tragic. 
You can’t understand anything without the shadow of death. And only on the basis of 
                                                          
31
 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, edited and translated by Caryl Emerson, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p.165 
32
 Aleksandr Revalskiy, ‘Monologue about Answers’, pp. 171-172 (Alexievich’s parentheses) 
33
 Pakhan is a title in the Russian mafia equivalent to godfather. 
241 
 
Russian culture could you begin to make sense of the catastrophe. Only Russian 
culture was prepared for it.
34
 
 
The pull of Russian and Ukrainian culture towards death, either as tragedy or, as this 
conclusion has argued, as comedy, acts as a sense-making processing of collective traumatic 
experience throughout the lifespan of communism: the Gulags, the prisoners’ construction of 
the railways across Siberia, the catastrophe of the atom at Chernobyl, and the economic 
difficulties consequent to joining global capitalism. Testimony, as a fictionalising, 
carnivalising, cathartic transformation of the repressed event of trauma, ‘is no less “real” on 
that account’, according to Ruth Leys in her book Trauma: A Genealogy (2001). Carnival, 
like ‘PTSD is a way of “making up” a certain type of person that individuals can conceive 
themselves as being’,35 not, as Ian Hacking observes, to ‘become eligible for insurance-
reimbursed therapy, or compensation, or [...] plead diminished responsibility in courts of 
law’,36 but to create fictional ‘“narrative memory,” involving the ability to be consciously 
aware of and verbally narrate events that have happened to the individual via ‘verbal-
semantic-linguistic representation’.37 Testimony or biography is fiction, as Jacques Derrida 
writes in Demeure: Fiction and Testimony (2000), at the limits of literature, beyond restraint 
and death; in Filin’s joke of the prisoner irradiated and thereby freed at Chernobyl or Latun’s 
of Ivan the liquidator up on the exploded reactor roof for what in reality is an unsurvivable 
amount of time, ‘biographical or autobiographical truthfulness of a witness [...] speaks of 
himself and claims to be recounting not only his life but his death, his quasi-resurrection, a 
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sort of Passion’.38 The renewal of the human spirit after traumatic disaster offered by 
testimonial, biographical survival, in which one recalls and laughs at the expense of a 
fictional other, are catalysed by Alexievich’s interviews. Leaving aside the possible veracity 
of the Chernobyl disaster survivor’s testimony and certainly the possibility of their permanent 
recovery, their will to speak, laugh and spiritually or psychically resurrect, is opened by 
Western invitation. Carnival or reduced laughter, the testimonial response to this invitation, 
‘can now be heard as a minor and displaced echo, indeed, a modest translation’.39 The local 
restaging of traumatic experiences as jokes is transcribed into literature, into Voices from 
Chernobyl: Carnival is translated into carnivalesque, the eyewitness’s fictionalised 
recollection into testimony. ‘What post-structuralist discourses speak of as a “play of 
signifiers”’, Graham Pechey writes in his essay ‘Not the Novel: Bakhtin, Poetry, Truth, God’ 
(1990), ‘is just that: a play, a drama of signification at the heart of all meaning. This metaphor 
of “play,” of a “playing out” or staging, is never far off in Bakhtin’s account of the varieties 
of meaning-making’.40 Chernobyl too is never far off, a testimonial playing out or staging of 
meaning-making and a renewal in the face of decay. The continual return to Chernobyl 
occurs in the form of eternal, renewing ritual. Next year, in 2015, a New Safe Confinement 
(N.S.C) is due to be placed over the current Chernobyl sarcophagus, which was hastily built 
in 1986 under the immediate pressures of the sudden nuclear crisis to cover the destroyed 
reactor and, since then, has been corroded by the radioactivity of this ruined structure it still 
entombs. The more carefully planned and constructed N.S.C, its architects predict, will last 
for one hundred years before it befalls a similar fate. Since the radiation at Chernobyl will 
take millions of years to dissipate, the eternal renewal against decay and nuclear disaster may 
benefit from the coping mechanism of ironic laughter. Global nuclear apocalypse has not yet 
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occurred, yet everything hangs in the balance; the consequences of a future explosion at 
Chernobyl would be a lot direr than the disaster of 1986. Perhaps this threat will keep us 
going, and ironic laughter and its literary forms will steady our cause. ‘Chernobyl is a theme 
worthy of Dostoevsky, an attempt to justify mankind’,41 Revalskiy comments. And as 
Bakhtin writes in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics,  
 
nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world...the world is open and free, 
everything is still in the future and will always be in the future [...] But this is, after 
all, also the purifying sense of ambivalent laughter.
42
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